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This Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) addresses the
environmental impacts which may be caused by the implementation of the Ulysses
mission, a space flight mission to observe the polar regions of the Sun. The
proposed action is completion of preparation and operation of the Ulysses
spacecraft, including its planned launch at the earliest available launch
opportunity on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle in October 1990
or in the backup opportunity in November 1991. The alternative is canceling
further work on the mission.
The Tier I EIS (NASA 1988a) included a delay alternative which considered
the Titan IV launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991
or later. This alternative was further evaluated and eliminated from
consideration when, in November 1988, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the
Titan IV, notified the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
that it could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity
because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. Subsequently,
NASA was notified that a Titan IV could not be available until 1995.
Consequently, NASA terminated all mission planning for the Titan IV as a
backup launch vehicle for the Ulysses mission. Even if a Titan IV were
available, a minimum of 3 years is required to implement mission-specific
modifications to the basic Titan IV launch configuration after a decision is
made to use the Titan IV. Therefore, insufficient time would be available to
use a Titan IV vehicle in November 1991. Thus, the Titan IV launch vehicle is
no longer a feasible alternative to the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload
Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) for the November 1991 launch opportunity.
Because the only launch configuration available for a launch in 1990 or
1991 is the STS/IUS/PAM-S and the environmental impacts of an STS/IUS/PAM-S
launch are the same whenever the launch occurs, a delay alternative would have
the same environmental impacts as the planned launch in 1990. Hence, the
delay alternative would provide no new environmental information and is
eliminated from further consideration. The Iggl backup launch date is a
contingency opportunity due to the short launch period available in IggO.
The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are
associated with normal launch vehicle operation and are treated in published
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents on the Shuttle (NASA 1978)
and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979), and in the KSC Environmental
Resources Document (NASA 1986), the Galtleo and Ulysses Mission Tier 1EIS
(NASA 1988a), and the Galileo Tier 2 EIS (NASA 1989a).
The environmental impacts of normal Shuttle launches have been addressed
in existing NEPA documentation and are briefly summarized in Chapter 4. These
impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch pad, except for
temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and occasional sonic boom
effects near the landing site. These effects have been judged insufficient to
preclude Shuttle launches.
There could also be environmental impacts associated with the accidental
release of radiological material during launch, deployment, or interplanetary
trajectory injection of the Ulysses spacecraft. Intensive analysis indicates
that the probability of release is small. The most probable release occurs
during Mission Phase 4, interplanetary trajectory injection, with a total
probability of release of 1 in 4,670 (2.14 x 10"4). Even in the rare event of
a release, comprehensive analysis indicates that the chances of adverse health
or environmental consequences are remote No accident scenario in a_y phase
of this mission, to a probability level of 1 in one million (] x IO" ), would
lead to a fatality.
There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative; however,
the U.S. Government and the European Space Agency would suffer adverse fiscal
and programmatic impacts if this alternative were adopted. The scientific
benefits of the mission would be delayed and possibly lost. There could be
significant impacts on the ability of the U.S. to negotiate international
agreements for cooperative space activities.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PURPOSE AND NEED FOR THE ACTION
The Ulysses mission is a joint effort conducted by the European Space
Agency (ESA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
ESA is responsible for developing and operating the spacecraft and for about
half of the experiments installed on the spacecraft. NASA is responsible for
providing the launch on the Space Transportation System (STS)/Inertial Upper
Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) vehicles, the remaining
experiments, and the mission support using the communications and spacecraft
tracking facilities of NASA's Deep Space Network.
The Ulysses mission supports NASA's Solar System Exploration and Space
Physics Programs. The scientific objectives for the Ulysses mission are to
conduct studies of the Sun and the heliosphere (i.e., the regions of space for
which the Sun provides the primary influence) over a wide and unexplored range
of heliographic latitudes.
ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
The proposed action addressed by this (Tier 2) Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) is the completion of preparation and operation of the Ulysses
mission, including its launch at the earliest available launch opportunity on
the Space Shuttle in October 19g0 or in the backup opportunity in November
1991. The launch configuration will use the STS/IUS/PAM-S combination. To
achieve an orbit over the poles of the Sun, the spacecraft must travel to
Jupiter and use that planet's huge gravitational pull to propel the spacecraft
out of the Earth's orbital plane and into a polar orbit about the Sun.
The alternative to the proposed action is no-action; that is, canceling
further work on the mission.
The Tier 1EIS (NASA 1988a) included a delay alternative which considered
the Titan IV launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in
November 1991 or later. The Titan IV is not a commercially available launch
vehicle; the U.S. Air Force procures that vehicle for NASA. The Titan IV
alternative was further evaluated and eliminated from consideration when, in
November 1988, the U.S. Air Force notified NASA that it could not provide a
Titan IV vehicle for the 1991 backup launch opportunity because of high
priority Department of Defense requirements. Subsequently, NASA was notified
that a Titan IV could not be available until 1995. Consequently, NASA
terminated all mission planning for the Titan IV as a backup launch vehicle.
Even if the Titan IV were available, a minimum of 3 years is required from the
decision to launch on a Titan IV in order to implement mission-specific
modifications to the basic Titan IV launch configuration; therefore,
insufficient time is available to use a Titan IV vehicle in November 1991,
even if it were available. Thus, the Titan IV launch vehicle is no longer a
feasible alternative to the STS/IUS for the November 1991 backup launch
opportunity.
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Because the only launch configuration available is the STS/IUS/PAM-S and
the environmental impacts of an STS/IUS/PAM-S launch are the same whenever the
launch occurs, a delay alternative involving the STS/IUS/PAH-S would have the
same environmental impacts as the planned launch in 1990. The 1991 backup
launch date is a contingency opportunity due to the short launch period
available in 1990.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are
associated with normal launch vehicle operation. These effects have been
considered in the previously published EISs on the Space Shuttle Program (NASA
1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA Iglg) and in the Final (Tier I) EIS
for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions (NASA Ig88a), the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) Environmental Resource Document (NASA 1986), and the Final (Tier 2) EIS
for the Galileo Mission (NASA IgBga). The environmental consequences of
normal Shuttle launches are small and temporary, and have been judged
insufficient to preclude Shuttle operations.
In the event of (I) an accident during launch, or (2) reentry of the
spacecraft from Earth orbit, there are possible adverse health and
environmental effects associated with the possible release of plutonium
dioxide from the spacecraft's Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG).
The potential effects considered in preparing this EIS include risks of air
and water quality impacts, local land area contamination by plutonium dioxide,
adverse health and safety impacts, the disturbance of biotic resources, the
occurrence of adverse impacts on wetland areas or in areas containing
historical sites, and socioeconomic impacts.
An extensive analysis of the safety and environmental consequences of
launch or mission accidents indicates very small risks to human health or the
environment. The results of the detailed analyses are summarized for each
mission phase.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has developed an extensive data base
on the behavior of space nuclear power systems, and their components and
materials, under a wide variety of environmental conditions over some 30 years
of research, development, test, and evaluation. This data base was used to
develop models and simulation techniques to conduct a detailed, in-depth
safety analysis. Monte Carlo simulation was used to combine the range of
release quantities with the range of atmospheric dispersion and deposition
parameters to arrive at a distribution of possible accident consequences along
with their probability of occurrence. This FEIS primarily discusses the mean
consequences as a best estimate of the consequences and the ggth percentile as
representative of the "maximum case."
In view of the detailed analyses of this STS/IUS launch vehicle
configuration (DOE Ig88a, DOE Ig88b, DOE Ig8ga, DOE Ig8gb, DOE IggOa, DOE
Iggob, DOE IggOc, DOE IggOd, DOE ]ggOe, DOE Iggof, DOE 19gOg), enough
information is available to indicate an envelope of the risks in the Ulysses
mission. The most probable release occurs in Phase 4 (at interplanetary
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trajectory injection) 3With a total probability of land impact of about I in
602 (i.e., 1.66 x 10 ) and the conditional probability of one or more modules
hitting rock and one or more clads having a release is 0.129. The total
probability of release is 2.14 x 10.4 (or i in 4,670). There are no health
effects from the release in either the mean value or the ggth percentile
analysis. The mean collective population dose over a 50-year period would be
0.19 person-rem. "Maximum" collective dose is predicted to be 3 person-rem
with a probability of approximately I in 60,000. The ability of the modules
to survive Earth orbital reentry heating without a loss of fuel has been
demonstrated by test and operational experience. The release could occur only
in the event of reentry and impact on rock or a similar unyielding surface.
If the RTG modules reenter and lands in the ocean, statistically the most
likely occurrence, there would be no release.
The maximum consequences accident scenario is a Solid Rocket Booster
(SRB) case rupture near the end of first stage ascent (106-120 seconds). In
the 99th percentile analysis, and without the _e minimis assumption, that
scenario would indicate up to 14.5 health effects worldwide at a probability
level of I in 44,000,000 (2.27 x lOa). This scenario involves high speed SRB
fragment impact on the RTG and release of plutonium dioxide high in the
stratosphere. The respirable size particles of interest have long residence
times in the stratosphere which leads to wide dispersion and therefore low
local dose levels. The maximum individual dose (9gth percentile) is 0.0127
millirems over the fifty year dose commitment. At such a low dose level, zero
health effects is equally as likely as 14.5.
In summary, the average individual risk of cancer fatality was calculated
for this mission and was compared to risks tabulated by the Bureau of the
Census. The risks associated with this mission are four to five orders of
magnitude smaller than any of the risks tabulated as commonly occurring. Thus
the health risks of this mission are very small.
No launch area accident would indicate environmental contamination of any
area of significant size. An early first stage ascent (0-10 seconds) release
in the 99th percentile analysis could lead to deposition above the EPA
screening level of 0.2 pCi/m ( over an area of 111 square kilometers This
would indicate the need for monitoring to assess the need for remedial action.
There are no adverse impacts to the physical environment associated with
the no-action alternative. However, the U.S. Government and the European
Space Agency would suffer significant fiscal, programmatic and geopolitical
impacts were the mission to be canceled.
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I. PURPOSE AND NEED FOR ACTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The Ulysses mission is an international cooperative effort of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space
Agency (ESA). The mission will, for the first time, explore the Sun and its
influence on interplanetary space over the full range of heliographic
latitudes (i.e., over the solar poles). ESA will provide the spacecraft, the
spacecraft operations team and control software, integrate all the science
instruments, and provide a complement of scientific investigations; NASA will
provide launch services, including integration of the ESA-assembled spacecraft
into the launch vehicle, mission control facilities and support, spacecraft
tracking and data recovery, the RTG power system and an additional complement
of scientific investigations.
This Final (TIER Z) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) provides
updated information associated with the launch and operation of the Ulysses
mission. The proposed action is the completion of preparation for launch and
operation of the Ulysses mission, including its planned launch at the earliest
launch opportunity in October 1990 or in the November ]ggI backup opportunity
(i.e., the earliest opportunities), using the Space Transportation System
(STS) Shuttle, the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) and the Payload Assist Module-
Special (PAM-S) launch configuration. Alternative approaches for achieving
the mission are described in Section Z. This document succeeds a Final EIS
(TIER I) for the Galileo and Ulysses missions (NASA Ig88a).
The Ulysses mission supports both NASA's Solar System Exploration Program
(SSEP) and NASA's Space Physics Program (SPP). The Ulysses mission will
contribute to the SSEP goal of characterizing the solar system's
interplanetary medium; the mission will contribute to the SPP goals of
describing the high latitude characteristic of the solar wind and how it helps
control the geospace environment and possible effects of solar processes on
the Earth.
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
The Ulysses mission will be the first solar exploratlon mission to
observe the polar regions of the Sun and explore the heliosphere at high
heliographic latitudes. The mission will provide scientists with a unique
opportunity to broaden human understanding of the Sun. Since the Sun is the
star nearest Earth, knowledge gained from the Ulysses mission will also
enhance the understanding of other stars and the space that separates them.
The major scientific objectives of the Ulysses mission are to:
• Characterize the inner heliosphere as a function of heliographic
latitude
I-!
e Characterize particles and fields from the ecliptic to the Sun's poles
- Particles: solar wind, cosmic rays, solar-heliospheric energetic
particles
- Fields: plasma waves, solar emissions, solar-heliospheric magnetic
particles.
Specifically, Ulysses carries individual instruments to conduct
investigations of the properties of the solar wind (plasma and ion
composition), the Sun/wind interface, the Sun's magnetic field, solar radio
bursts and plasma waves, solar x-rays, solar and galactic cosmic rays, and
interplanetary and interstellar neutral gas and dust.
In pursuing these ends, the Ulysses mission, as a joint endeavor between
NASA and ESA, will serve to strengthen the spirit of international cooperation
in space exploration.
The findings of the Ulysses mission are expected to be very important for
the following reasons. First, because of its proximity, the Sun is the only
star whose internal processes can be studied with high temporal and spatial
resolutions. Since our Sun is of a common stellar size and nature that is
generally found in the universe, our increased understanding of its behavior
will contribute greatly to our knowledge of stellar processes. Second, solar
processes have great influences on Earth. Not only does the Sun heat and
illuminate the Earth, but the Sun also influences terrestrial phenomena in
mere subtle ways. For instance, solar flares and solar magnetic disturbances
can disrupt radio communications on Earth. Solar emissions, both the solar
particle flux and the photon flux, play important roles in the Earth's upper
atmospheric chemistry. Solar variability may also contribute to the
variability in climate on Earth.
1.2.1 Exploration Out of the Ecliptic
The plane in which the Earth orbits our Sun is called the ecliptic.
Because the Sun's spin axis is tilted seven degrees toward this plane, direct
earth-based measurement of the Sun's particle emissions and magnetic field
tend to be limited to within 7 degrees of the equator. Until recently, the
same limitation has plagued direct space-based measurements. In order to
study the complete range of heliographic latitudes (the third dimension), a
spacecraft must leave the ecliptic and traverse the solar poles. No launch
vehicles have been available with sufficient energy to send the spacecraft out
of the ecliptic. However, Ulysses will overcome these limitations by using
Jupiter's immense gravitational field to swing out of the ecliptic and back
toward the Sun and into an orbit that will allow observation from a polar
perspective. To gain sufficient energy to leave the ecliptic, the Ulysses
spacecraft will execute a gravity-asslsted fly-by of Jupiter and head back
toward the Sun. The trajectory will carry the spacecraft first over the Sun's
south pole and then upward over the north pole. In so doing, the spacecraft
will monitor the heliosphere out to S astronomical units (AU) (i.e., Sun-to-
Earth distances), which is Jupiter's orbital distance, and then back to
approximately 1.3 AU at perihelion, its point of closest approach to the Sun.
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The mission is planned to arrive in the Sun's polar regions near the solar
minimum when the Sun's activity is less volatile; this provides an opportunity
to view phenomena such as the solar winds and the Sun's magnetic fields in
their least perturbed state. The nominal end of the mission is September 30,
1995, but the mission could be operated until the spacecraft power level is
reduced to a point where the spacecraft systems and instruments no longer
function properly. The spacecraft will continue to travel around the Sun in a
5 AU to 1.3 AU elliptical orbit.
The heliosphere is the region encompassing the Sun where the solar wind
(a wind of charged particles emitted from the Sun) dominates the interstellar
medium and tends to sweep away much of the interstellar gas. The heliosphere
is thought to exist as far out as 100 AU, well beyond the outermost planet.
While the journey to high solar latitudes by Ulysses is an entirely worthwhile
mission on its own, its value will clearly be enhanced by simultaneous
measurements in the ecliptic near the Earth and by the two Pioneer and two
Voyager spacecraft which are approaching the heliospheric boundary. The
heliosphere extends to the point where the pressure of the solar winds equal
those of the interstellar gas. Ulysses will provide a unique opportunity to
compare heliospheric measurements from high solar latitudes with those
obtained from six other spacecraft at great distances from the Sun. These
spacecraft are located both near the ecliptic (Pioneers 10 and 11), and at
moderate distances from the ecliptic (Voyagers I and 2). The IMP-8 spacecraft
will provide a good comparison with in-ecliptic data obtained near the Sun (I
to 3 AU), Table I-I shows the configuration of the Pioneer and Voyager
spacecraft. As a result of these combined measurements, scientists will be
able to measure the solar winds and magnetic fields from their origins to near
the edge of the heliosphere.
TABLE I-I. RELATIVE RANGES, OVER TIME, OF OTHER SPACECRAFT IMPORTANT
TO THE ULYSSES SCIENCE PROGRAM
Spacecraft Solar Inclination Ranoe in AU
1990 1995" 1998
Voyager 1 35 deg N. 44 60 71
Voyager 2 45 deg S. 30 46 57
Pioneer 10 3 deg N. 48 61 69
Pioneer 11 17 deg N. 30 42 50
" Ulysses in high solar polar region
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To have a comprehensive understanding of the Sun, both of how it behaves
as a star and how it influences Earth, it is important to understand how the
Sun influences the heliosphere in three dimensions. There is good reason to
believe that the solar wind phenomena change as one moves away from the solar
equatorial region (i.e., the region of ecliptic in which the Earth orbits the
Sun). For instance, as the Sun rotates, the solar magnetic field lines, which
are carried outward by the escaping solar wind, spiral outward in the Sun's
equatorial plane, the ecliptic. However, as one moves away from the eclipttc
to high solar latitudes, the influences of the Sun's rotation dramatically
diminish, hence the solar magnetic field lines are expected to be more nearly
radial.
From high solar latitudes, scientists expect to observe solar phenomena
significantly different from that previously observed in the Sun's equatorial
region. In particular, scientists anticipate differences in the behavior of
the solar wind. This "wind" is comprised of charged particles that flow
continuously from the Sun pushing against interstellar gas molecules situated
beyond 50 AU. Because the particles in these flows carry with them the Sun's
magnetic field, any disturbance on the Sun will be reflected both in the wind
and the magnetic field. Ulysses will be investigating regions of the Sun
where such disturbances, known as sunspots, occur. It will also investigate
areas known as coronal holes. Within these regions, the topology of the Sun's
magnetic field differs. Together, these areas are part of the reason why
scientists expect to see solar wind behavior that is different from what has
been previously observed in the Sun's equatorial regions.
The Pioneer spacecraft were launched in 1972 and 1973 and the Voyagers
were launched in 1977. As these spacecraft recede from Earth and their power
systems diminish in strength, it will become increasingly difficult to receive
their data. Tracking and data acquisition experts estimate that data from the
Pioneer spacecraft will no longer be available after 1997 or 1998, while data
from the Voyager spacecraft will be available beyond 2010. With its planned
launch in October 1990, Ulysses will transmit data from its Jupiter flyby to
the first solar polar pass in 1994 as the solar wind becomes less turbulent
following the solar maximum of 1990. The Ulysses pole-to-pole passage in
1994-to-1995 will occur just before solar minimum conditions when the
spacecraft should encounter a relatively well-ordered structure in which
latitude dependencies are most clear.
1.2.2 Better Understandina the Sun to Better Understand the Earth
Conditions on Earth are in many ways linked to conditions on the Sun.
For instance, variations in the Sun's magnetic field and solar wind interfere
with radio communication and electric power distribution on Earth. These
solar variations also cause dramatic changes in the constituents of the
Earth's upper atmosphere, perhaps affecting its climate. The Earth's magnetic
field also varies in accordance with these solar variations, sometimes
allowing energetic charged particles to reach the Earth's surface.
To the extent that such changes on the Sun can have a measurable effect
upon the Earth, a better understanding of the Sun will facilitate
understanding and predicting conditions on Earth. Ulysses will undertake a
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variety of observations designed to improve this understanding. In
particular, Ulysses will observe, from a polar perspective, the solar corona
(the Sun's outer atmosphere), the solar wind, and the Sun's magnetic field.
These observations are expected to yield new insights into the behavior of
sunspots, solar flares, solar x-rays, solar radio noise, and the behavior of
the solar atmosphere across different heliographic latitudes, phenomena which
may have a bearing on what happens on Earth.
1.2.3 Unravelina the Mysteries of the Stars
Since the Sun is our nearest star, better understanding of its nature and
physical behavior may also help us to unravel the mysteries associated with
other stars and the space that separates them. Ulysses will endeavor to
improve this understanding by investigating the role that solar wind and
coronal holes play in dissipation of the solar atmosphere. By carrying
special cosmic ray instrumentation out of the ecliptic to high latitudes where
such rays can more easily penetrate the Sun's magnetic field, scientists hope
to detect virgin, mid-energy, interstellar cosmic rays. This will lead to a
better understanding of the nature and origins of cosmic rays. Scientists
will also directly measure the heliosphere's neutral helium content. These
helium measurements will help provide information on the state of the
interstellar gas in the vicinity of the solar system, and the measurement of
the heliosphere's dust particle content will help scientists to better
understand where this dust comes from and how it evolves.
1.3 NEED FOR THE ACTION
It is vital at this stage of solar system exploration and space physics
to fully characterize the three dimensional structure of the heliosphere. The
Ulysses mission will be the first source of those data that will contribute to
a number of national and international goals. The Ulysses mission is expected
to make major scientific contributions to the International Heliospheric
Study, whose aim is investigation of the structure of the heliosphere. The
measurements to be gained from the Ulysses mission cannot be obtained from
Earth or from Earth orbit. They can only be made in-situ by a spacecraft that
is well out of the ecliptic.
Furthermore, the President of the United States has announced the
intention to establish a permanent human presence on the Moon and to undertake
human exploration of Mars. In a general sense, the more we understand the
physics of the Sun, the better we will understand solar flares and other
energetic solar disturbances that could influence the environment in which
humans may operate in space.
Ulysses will be the first mission to explore interplanetary space above
the Sun's polar regions. As such, it will return new discoveries no matter
when it is executed. However, two compelling reasons suggest that the planned
1990 launch is particularly timely to ensure a maximum scientific return from
this mission.
The first reason has to do with the 11-year cycle of solar activity. A
Iggo launch allows Ulysses to undergo its sequential polar passages in mid-
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1994 and mid-1995 (south and then north poles, respectively). Since the
current solar activity cycle will peak in 1990, Ulysses will therefore
traverse the high solar latitude heliosphere when the Sun is rapidly
approaching its minimum of activity. This means that the interplanetary
medium, which is what Ulysses measures, will be least complicated by sporadic,
energetic solar events, and therefore, easiest to interpret as far as a new
environment is concerned. Conversely, when the last few solar events do occur
during these polar overflights, they will be far more tsolated so that their
effect on the interplanetary medium will be most obvious. The original 1983
launch would have had solar passage near solar minimum.
The second reason is that space science in the early to mid 1990's will
enjoy a particularly rich complement of other solar and interplanetary
missions sponsored by NASA, ESA, Japan, and the USSR (a subset of which is
called the International Solar Terrestrial Program). These 13 to 15 different
missions range from NASA's Pioneers and Voyagers at the outer edge of the
solar system, to missions like Polar in near Earth orbit, each of which
simultaneously samples a different part of the heliosphere or near-Earth space
environment. Taken as an entire mission set, the total scientific return will
be immensely greater than the sum of its parts. Even though fully justified
in its own right, for Ulysses to conduct its primary mission during this same
period, thereby measuring the otherwise unsampled solar polar region, is a
particularly fortuitous circumstance that will not be repeated in even the
most optimistic of mission planning scenarios. This constellation of
simultaneously operating spacecraft is a definitely perishable circumstance.
The life of these spacecraft will deteriorate, and the very distant ones
(e.g., Pioneers) will no longer be within range for receipt of data.
The Ulysses mission can be launched only during specific periods, spaced
about 13 months apart, depending on the position of Jupiter and the capability
of the available launch vehicles. Presently, the earliest available launch
opportunity is in October 1990. The proposed action is needed to implement
the mission at the earliest available launch opportunity.
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2. ALTERNATIVES,INCLUDINGTHEPROPOSEDACTION
2.1 ALTERNATIVESCONSIDERED
This Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Ulysses
mission considers the following alternatives:
Proposed Action: Completion of preparation and operation of the
mission, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation
System/Inertial Upper Stage (STS/IUS) vehicle, supplemented by the
Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) third stage, in October 1990
or in the backup opportunity in November 1991.
• No-Action Alternative: Cancellation of any further commitment of
resources to the mission.
Delay alternatives, to allow access to alternative power sources or
alternative launch systems were further evaluated and eliminated from
consideration for reasons discussed in subsections 2.2.4.2 and 2.3,
respectively.
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION TO PROCEED AS PLANNED WITH COMPLETION
OF PREPARATIONS AND OPERATION OF THE ULYSSES MISSION, INCLUDING ITS
PLANNED LAUNCH ON THE STS IN OCTOBER 1990 OR IN THE BACKUP OPPORTUNITY
IN NOVEMBER 1991
2.2.1 Mission Desian
The launch of the Ulysses spacecraft is planned for October 1990. Its
trajectory, as shown in Figure 2-1, provides for it to travel in the ecliptic
and pass over the north pole of Jupiter in February 1992. The flyby will
thrust it out of the ecliptic and return it toward the Sun. The spacecraft
will reach 70 degrees south polar latitude in June 1994, will reach
maximum latitude in August 1994, and will again cross 70 degrees south
latitude in September 1994. The spacecraft will achieve its closest approach
to the Sun of 1.3 astronomical units (AU) (i.e., Sun-to-Earth-distances) at
the solar equatorial crossing in February 1995. The second polar pass will
begin when the spacecraft exceeds 70 degrees north latitude between June and
September 1995. This will end the primary Ulysses mission, although the
spacecraft will remain in a 1.3 by 5 AU orbit and will have the potential to
remain operational and provide limited data acquisition for one additional
solar orbit.
2.2.2 Mission Launch Ooerations
The Ulysses mission can be launched only during specific periods
depending on the positions of the planets and the capabilities of the launch
vehicles. The principal opportunity for launch occurs in October 1990.
Planetary missions have a relatively short launch period during each launch
opportunity where the Earth is properly positioned. In 1990 this period is 19
days for the Ulysses launch (10/5/90 to 10/23/90). Since technical problems
with the launch vehicle or the spacecraft, or adverse weather conditions,
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could occur which would cause the launch opportunity to be lost in this
period, NASA has identified a contingency launch period. The contingency
launch period for Ulysses occurs in November 1991.
When a mission delay causes a launch opportunity to be missed, spacecraft
trajectories and mission operations must be redesigned and generally mission
budgets must be augmented. The redesign of the mission operations requires
modified plans for communications, spacecraft tracking, and mission operation
facilities support. These new plans affect not only the delayed missions but
also other missions that depend on the resources of these facilities. Because
of the specialized nature of space exploration missions such as Ulysses,
trained personnel and the use of supporting facilities must be retained when
missions are delayed between launch opportunities. These factors all result
in large additional costs and program disruption associated with delaying a
mission.
2.2.3 Spacecraft Description
The Ulysses spacecraft weighs 80g pounds and is illustrated in Figure
2-2. The spacecraft is spin-stabilized with an antenna on top, one
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG), a boom used for selected
scientific experiments, and a main body that contains the remainder of the
science experiments and the spacecraft subsystems.
The portions of the spacecraft that are relevant to assessing potential
environmental impacts are the power and propulsion subsystems. The particular
elements of these subsystems that are of interest are the RTG use in the power
subsystem and the propellants in the attitude control and propulsion
subsystem.
2.2.4 SDacecraft Power System
Alternate power sources include fuel cells, batteries, photovoltaic
systems, RTGs, alkali metal thermoelectric converters, and turbine energy
conversion. These potential power systems and the specific power system
performance criteria for the Ulysses mission are discussed below.
2.2.4.1 Power System Performance Criteria
The Ulysses spacecraft 5-year mission through the solar system imposes
stringent performance criteria on spacecraft systems and components. The
following performance criteria apply to the power system:
(I) Safe passage through the asteroid belt
(2) Operation during and after passage through the intense radiation
field of Jupiter
(3) Sufficient power to operate at Jupiter's distance from the Sun
(4) Low weight-to-power ratio
(5) Maximum reliability.
NASA and other agencies of the Federal government support a wide range of
research and technology development programs in spacecraft power systems. An
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analysis of alternate power sources was summarized in the Tier I EIS (NASA
Ig88a, Section 2). In response to scoping comments, an updated and expanded
analysis of alternative power systems is presented below.
2.2.4.2 Alternative Spacecraft Power Systems
Spacecraft power sources include fuel cells, batteries, photovoltaic
power systems, advanced solar dynamic (ASD) power sources, a new type of
radioisotope thermoelectric converter known as an alkali metal thermoelectric
converter (AMTEC), and radioisotope driven turbine converters (TECs). Table
2-I summarizes the analysis of these alternatives with respect to their
ability to satisfy the power requirements for the Ulysses mission. While fuel
cells and batteries have a proven record of reliability and safety, their
large weight (over 15,000 kg in each case) to achieve the required power
precludes their use as sole power sources for any long duration planetary
mission.
Because of the necessity to turn the spacecraft away from the Sun to
perform a trajectory correction maneuver, the use of photovoltaic power would
have to be augmented by the additional use of batteries and associated control
equipment. Solar power technologies have not yet progressed to a stage of
development consistent with the requirements of the Ulysses mission and use of
available launch vehicles. Since the Ulysses spacecraft must fly by Jupiter
where solar intensity is only 4 percent that at Earth, the large solar array
for a Ulysses mission would require a complete spacecraft system redesign. A
conceptual design study using state-of-the-art array technology indicates that
this system would require an increase in the total spacecraft mass by about
1,200 pounds. This would require at least a Titan/Centaur/3-axis stabilized
kick stage launch vehicle which would require the development of the 3-axis
stabilized kick stage. No such launch vehicle configuration currently exists.
Even with the Advanced Photovoltaic Solar Array (APSA), now in the ground
demonstration phase, with a specific power of 130 W/kg which is about 4 times
the specific power of the current state-of-the-art planar rigid array, a
complete spacecraft redesign would be needed. Moreover, the state of
development of light-weight photovoltaic technology is such that technology
readiness cannot be expected before 1993, after which flight testing and
spacecraft adaptation will have to be made. Such a process normally will take
another 5 years before an actual array is ready to be integrated with and used
on a spacecraft. However, because of the newness of the design and the lack
of flight experience, use of such a system would greatly increase the risk of
spacecraft failure during the mission. Although APSA would be lighter than
the rigid array design, a launch vehicle capability greater than the
STS/IUS/PAM-S would be required.
Improved isotope powered systems are also in an early state of
technological readiness with the earliest ground demonstration expected in the
late-19gOs. Initial laboratory models of the AMTEC systems have been
constructed which indicate that AMTEC may be capable of a power density of
about 20 W/kg. However, AMTEC development will not progress to the point of
flight testing until the mid to late Igg0s. The radioisotope-driven TECs are
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only in the preliminary design phases. Therefore, these systems cannot be
considered for use to power a spacecraft on missions such as Ulysses for any
launch prior to 2000.
2.2.4.3 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG)
The RTG provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to NASA for use
on the Ulysses spacecraft uses the general purpose heat source (GPHS) as its
source of energy. The GPHS is the culmination of almost 25 years of design
evolution of heat source technology. The RTG (see Figure 2-3) is designed to
provide a minimum of about 284 Watts at the beginning of the Ulysses mission.
RTGs have been used on 22 previous U.S. space missions. These applications
have included some of the Nation's most impressive successes, including
Voyager, Pioneer, Viking, and all but the first of the manned Apollo landings
on the Moon.
The RTG consists of a heat source and a thermoelectric converter that
converts heat into electricity. The RTG heat source consists of a stacked
column of 18 individual modules containing a total of 10.75 kg (23.7 lbs) of
plutonium dioxide* fuel (DOE 1990a) The plutonJum dioxide is basically a
ceramic material with a density of i1.5 grams/c# and a molecular weight of
270. Each GPHS module contains one graphite block, called an aeroshell, that
encases two graphite cylinders called graphite impact shells (see Figure 2-4).
Each cylinder contains two pellets of plutonium dioxide encased in
iridium/tungsten alloy metal; i.e., two fueled clads. Each clad contains 0.15
kg (0.33 lbs) of plutonium dioxide fuel. The graphite blocks provide
protection against atmospheric heating and subsequent release of the plutonium
dioxide in the event that the modules are released in an accident and fall
back to Earth. The graphite cylinders provide protection from ground or
debris impacts in the event of an accident. The iridium/ tungsten metal
contains the fuel and provides an additional layer of protection. The
plutonium dioxide generates heat by the natural radioactive decay largely of
the Pu-238 isotope. Table 2-2 provides a breakdown and isotopic composition
of the 10.75 kg (23.7 lbs) of plutonium dioxide used to manufacture an RTG.
* Ptutonium is radioactive etement 94. it can exist in • number of tsoteO|c forIm, from Pu-212 to Pu-246.
Isotopes of an eLumnt have d|fferant atomic weights (e.g., 238, 2.39, etc.) but have the same or very
similar chorales& characteristics. The isotope, Pu-2_, form the basis for the fuel in an IITG, while Pu-
2]9 is the weapons-grKle isotope. PLutonJLm-2]9 ccms from neutron capture by naturally occurring
urani,m-2]8, while ptutanJua-Z38 cams from the neutron I:Kmberclmnt of neptun|ul-2]7. Ptutonium-2]8
decays w|th an 87.7 year haLf-Life to form nature&ty occurring UraniumP2_. The curie content,
rad|oact|ve hmtf-Lives, speciftc activ|ty of each of the plutonium radio|sotopes, and the weight percent
of plutonium in the ULysses RT; is shown in Table 2-2.
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TABLE 2-2. CHARACTERISTICS AND ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION OF RTG FUEL
Plutonium
Isotope
Specific
Weight radioactivity Total
Percent at Half-Life (Curies/gram of Curies
Manufacture (Years) plutonium) (10/90)*
236 5.27 x 10 .5
238 *85.03
239 12.85
240 1.70
241 0.35
242 0.08
Other
radioisotopes 0.11
TOTALS 100%
2.85 532 0.4
87.7 17.1 130,000
24,100 0.0621 75.5
6,560 0.227 36.4
14.4 103.2 2,360
376,000 0.00393 <0.1
132,500
Based on computation of isotopic composition by Mound Laboratory for the
launch date in October 1990. The radioisotopic fuel for the Ulysses RTG
is a mixture of plutonium dioxide (Pu02) containing 85 percent (plus or
minus I percent) Pu-238 and totalling 10,754 grams (Campbell 1989).
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The DOE safety philosophy for the design of the RTG requires containment
or immobilization of the plutonium fuel to the maximum extent possible during
all mission phases, including ground handling, launch, and unplanned events
such as reentry, impact_ and post-impact situations. Safety is a principal
engineering design goal of the heat source. The safety-related design goals
are to: I) contain or immobilize the fuel to the maximum extent possible
under normal and accident environments, and 2) ensure compatibility with the
power generation system. The following is a brief summary of relevant safety
environments and the GPHS response to testing (also see additional data
available in DOE 1989b):
Explosions: Fueled clads contained in GPHS modules and intact RTGs
were shown to survive overpressure of 2,210 psi without any release;
bare fueled clads withstood pressures of 1,070 psi without breaching.
Solid Propellant Fires: Bare fueled clads and clads contained in the
Graphite Impact Shell (GIS) were shown to survive in solid propellant
fires (i.e., temperature calculated at 2,360°C or 4,280°F, DOE IggOf),
without fuel release. [Liquid propellant fires, which reach a lower
temperature than solid propellants, would not damage fueled clads
contained in a GIS (DOE 1990b).]
Hiqh Velocity Fraaments: Tests with bare fueled clad exposed to small
high velocity projectiles indicate that, given the protection afforded
by the RTG case and the GPHS module, projectiles of this type will not
result in damage to the clads. Further tests, representative of Solid
Rocket Booster (SRB) fragment impacts (I/2 inch thick steel), indicate
that the RTG will survive face-on fragment impacts at a velocity up to
212 m/s (695 f/s) with no release of fuel; edge-on fragment impacts at
95 m/s (312 f/s) breached only the leading clads of the GPHS module
impacted.
• Reentry: GPHS modules survive Earth-escape-velocity-reentry ablation
and thermal stress with wide margins.
• hEJJC_t___I._L__C_t:GPHS modules were designed to survive impact on hard
surfaces (granite/steel/concrete) at terminal velocity (maximum speed
reached by falling object) of 53 m/s (]72 f/s). Test results show no
failures of clads against sand up to 250 m/s (820 f/s), no clad
failures against concrete at terminal velocity, and small releases
against steel or granite at terminal velocity.
The design features for the GPHS incorporate many safety-related
considerations. The fuel used in the GPHS design is plutonium-238 dioxide,
high-flred and hot-pressed into 62.5 Watt capacity ceramic fuel pellets. In
this form, plutonium dioxide is virtually insoluble in ground or sea water
should such exposure occur. In fact, GPHS modules survive water impact and
will resist significant fuel release for virtually unlimited periods when
submerged.
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The primary protective material used to encapsulate and immobilize the
fuel is an alloy of iridium. Iridium is a unique noble metal found in
deposits of gold and platinum. It is compatible with the fuel material to
over 1,500°C (2,700°F), resists oxidation in air to 1,000°C (1,800°F), and
melts at 2,447°C (4,437°F). Each clad also contains a vent designed to
release the helium generated by the fuel alpha particle decay and to prevent
the release of the plutonium dioxide.
The graphitic materials in the GPHS perform several functions. The
primary function is to provide reentry protection for the fueled clads through
the use of the aeroshell. A second major function is impact protection. This
is accomplished by both the aeroshell and the impact shell. The impact shell
also serves as a redundant reentry aeroshell. The third function is to
provide a mounting structure for the clads to survive normal ground handling
and launch dynamic loads. The material used for the aeroshell and impact
shell is called fine weave, pierced fabric (FWPF). FWPF is a carbon-carbon
composite material woven with high-strength graphite fibers in three
perpendicular directions. Upon impregnation and graphitization, the material
has an extremely high thermal stress resistance as required for reentry
protection. FWPF has a very fine structure that results in uniform ablation
characteristics leading to high confidence in ablation margins. This
material, used primarily by the Air Force for missile nose cones, is one of
the best available for reentry applications.
The GPHS deliberately was designed to be composed of small, modular units
so that reentry heating and terminal velocity would be lower than they were
for previous heat sources. A modular heat source tends to minimize the amount
of fuel that can be postulated to be released in a given accident. For
example, for a high-velocity fragment impact resulting from a severe explosion
that penetrates the GPHS, only a few of the fueled clads would be expected to
release fuel. This is an improvement over earlier heat source designs.
Overall, the DOE has spent 9 years in engineering, fabricating, and
safety and environmental testing of the GPHS, building on the experience
gained from previous heat source development programs and a data base that has
accumulated since the 1950s. Test results have demonstrated the present
design exceeds the already stringent safety standards achieved by earlier heat
source models.
The RTG systems also have a proven record of reliability and are the only
power source available that satisfies all of the performance criteria
associated with the Ulysses mission.
2.2.4.4 RTG Performance History
RTGs have been used in the U.S. space program since 1961 and have powered
some of this Nation's most successful missions including the Apollo Lunar
Surface Experiment Packages (ALSEPs), the Viking Lander on Mars, Pioneers 10
and 11 and Voyagers 1 and 2. In all, there have been 40 RTGs involved in 22
previous U.S. space missions (see Table 2-3).
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Three U.S. spacecraft powered by RTGs have failed to achieve their
intended mission and two have involved accidental reentries. In each case the
malfunction was neither caused by nor related to the RTG, and in fact, the
RTGs on these spacecraft performed entirely as intended. The RTGs on each of
these spacecraft responded to the reentry environment as designed.
Early RTG models carried only a few pounds of radioactive material and
were built to burn up at high altitude during accidental reentry. When the
Navy's Transit-5BN-3 navigational satellite malfunctioned in 1964 and failed
to achieve orbit, the RTG on board met the design criteria by burning up in
the upper atmosphere upon reentry. A total of 17,000 curies were dispersed
high in the stratosphere. Local dose levels were small compared to background
radiation (see DOE 1980).
Since 1964, RTGs have been designed to contain or immobilize their
plutonium fuel to the maximum extent possible during all mission phases
regardless of the accident environment. This design philosophy has performed
flawlessly in two subsequent mission failures where RTGs were present. In May
1968, two SNAP 19B2 RTGs landed intact in the Pacific Ocean after a Nimbus B
weather satellite failed to reach orbit, and the fuel was recovered. Even
though the recovery operation took 5 months, there was no release of
plutonium. In April 1970, the Apollo 13 lunar module reentered the atmosphere
and its SNAP 27 RTG heat source, which was jettisoned, fell intact into the
20,000 feet deep Tonga Trench in the Pacific Ocean. The corrosion resistant
materials of the RTG are expected to prevent release of the fuel for a period
of time equal to 10 half-lives of the Pu-238 fuel or about 870 years (DOE
1980).
2.2.5 Soacecraft Propulsion Subsystem
The Ulysses spacecraft propulsion subsystem uses hydrazine
monopropellant, which spontaneously ignites by catalytic decomposition within
the propulsion subsystem thrust chambers. This propellant is the most
efficient, space-storable (i.e., can be stored without any special temperature
control equipment) propellant available for the mission, and the use of any
other space-storable propellants would result in unacceptable weight increases
for the spacecraft. The propellant tank of the spacecraft is loaded at the
KSC. The Ulysses spacecraft carries 34 kgs (74 Ibs) of hydrazine. NASA has
prescribed specifications concerning the storage and handling of this
propellant.
2.2.6 STS/IUS/PAM-S Launch Confiauration
The STS/IUS/PAM-S launch configuration consists of the STS Shuttle launch
vehicle to achieve Earth orbit, and a two-stage IUS supplemented with a PAM-S
third stage for use to propel the spacecraft on its interplanetary trajectory.
The IUS/PAM-S and attached spacecraft are carried into Earth orbit in the
Shuttle cargo bay. Figure 2-5 illustrates the configuration of the IUS/PAM-S
and spacecraft in the Shuttle cargo bay for launch. Figure 2-6 shows the
configuration of the spacecraft assembled with the IUS/PAM-S. The selection
of the STS/IUS/PAM-S launch vehicles was addressed in the Tier I FEIS (NASA
1988a).
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The STSconsists of a piloted reusable vehicle (the Shuttle) mounted on a
non-reusable External Tank (ET) containing liquid hydrogen and oxygen
propellants and two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). The Shuttle has three main
rocket engines and a cargo bay 60 feet long by 15 feet in diameter (NASA
1978).
At launch, both SRBs and the Shuttle's rocket engines burn simul-
taneously. After approximately 128 seconds into the flight, the spent SRB
casings are jettisoned and subsequently recovered from the ocean. The ET is
jettisoned before the Space Shuttle goes into Earth orbit. The Shuttle's
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) is then used to propel the Shuttle into the
desired Earth orbit. Once the IUS with its payload is deployed, the OMS is
used to take the Shuttle out of orbit. The Shuttle is piloted back to Earth
for an unpowered landing. A more detailed description of the Shuttle can be
found in Appendix B of the Galileo Tier 2 EIS (NASA 198ga) and the Shuttle EIS
(NASA 1978).
Once deployed from the Shuttle, an "upper stage" propels the spacecraft
into higher Earth orbits or to Earth-escape velocities needed for planetary
missions. The upper stage for use on the Ulysses mission is a two-stage solid
fuel rocket IUS supplemented with the solid fuel PAM-S booster.
2.2.7 Rlnae Safety Considerations
2.2.7.1 General
The Eastern Space and Missile Center (ESMC) at Patrick Air Force Base is
responsible for range safety for any NASA/KSC space launch. The goal of Range
Safety is to control and contain the flight of all vehicles, precluding the
impact of intact vehicles or pieces thereof in a location that could endanger
human life or damage property. Although the risk can never be completely
eliminated, Range Safety attempts to minimize the risks while not unduly
restricting the probability of mission success.
Each STS flight vehicle carries a Range Safety Flight Termination System
(FTS). When activated by an electronic signal sent by the Range Safety
Officer, the FTS activates explosive charges designed to destroy the vehicle.
The STS FTS enables the Range Safety Officer to destroy the SRBs and ET if the
flight trajectory deviates unacceptably from the planned course.
2.2.7.2 Electromagnetic Hazard Conditions
Various potential electromagnetic hazard conditions exist for aerospace
launch vehicles and payloads. These include:
• Lightning
• Powerful electromagnetic transmitters (radars, radio transmitters,
etc.) also referred to as the electromagnetic environment (EME)
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• Charging effects (triboelectric charging effects and resultant
electrostatic discharges)
• Electromagnetic emissions of the vehicle, itself.
These conditions are a design concern for NASA, both with respect to the total
vehicle as well as ordnance (explosives and explosive detonators/fuses),
fuels, exposed skins of the vehicle, and critical electronic systems which
must have highly reliable operations. These special concerns are well-known
and have been given specific names by the specialists who address these
issues. These include:
m Electromagnetic radiation on ordnance
• Electromagnetic radiation on fuels
• _lectrostatic _ischarges (ESD)
• _lectromagnetic interference (EMI).
A large body of technical literature exists on these subjects and has been
used by NASA in designing safeguards. To better understand these hazards, a
brief description of these conditions and hazards is presented in the
following paragraphs.
Lightnina
Lightning is the well-known electrical discharge typically occurring in
thunderstorms. Large electrical current which can approach several hundred
thousand amperes can flow from cloud to cloud or from cloud to ground in a
fraction of a second. If a vehicle is in the vicinity of a thunderstorm,
there is a chance that all, or some, of the electrical current can flow into
or through the vehicle. This is mitigated both by avoiding flight through
thunderstorms, and through special vehicle designs to prevent the serious
effects of lightning strikes.
The conditions whereby lightning is likely to occur can be monitored by
measuring the local electric fields around the vehicle. Large electric fields
indicate the presence of large amounts of electrical charge present in the
overhead clouds. Since lightning results from an electrical discharge built
up in these clouds, these fields are an indicator of the likelihood of
lightning activity in the area. NASA conducts monitoring of electrical fields
at and around KSC during launch times.
NASA employs rigorous design specifications and testing of systems (e.g.,
Military Standard MIL-B-OSO87B, "Bonding, Electrical, and Lightning Protection
for Aerospace Systems," 30 July 1954 as amended 31 August 1970) and subsystems
to mitigate the potential effects of lightning strikes, and has strict
meteorological criteria for launch of the Shuttle to avoid subjecting the
vehicle and its payload to unacceptable environments. The meteorological
launch criteria are summarized in NASA (1988b). In addition to visibility,
ambient temperature and surface wind restrictions, there are severe-weather
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restrictions. These restrictions are strictly enforced, and address the
maximum weather-induced ground-level (launch and landing site) and flight path
electrical fields acceptable for launch (I kilovolt/meter). There are no
plans by NASA to relax any Launch Commit Criteria (LCC).
Electromagnetic Environment
The electromagnetic radiation found in our environment has, in recent
years, become stronger and more prevalent. This is due primarily to the
increased number of radar systems and other radio transmitters around the
world.
Response of the Shuttle and payload systems to the electromagnetic
environment is controlled through two means: control of the radiated power of
transmitters in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle; and use of proven,
effective electrical system design techniques. These techniques include
shielding, controlling any naturally occurring electromagnetic leaks in the
shields, proper electrical bonding and grounding, filtering out and/or
suppressing undesired effects in the electrical system, and using special
signal computer "software" which recognizes interference and works around it.
Techniques used by NASA to qualify systems to this environment are prescribed
in MIL-STD-B-SO87B and NASA custom-tailored versions of military standards 461
and 462. In addition, the effective radiated power levels of ground emitters
at the Eastern Test Range and at the Shuttle landing sites (e.g., Edwards Air
Force Base), and their associated electromagnetic environments are rigidly
controlled to yield an electromagnetic field within NASA Program Requirements
Documents, during both launch and landing of the Shuttle.
Charoinq Effects
Electrical charging effects can be associated with picking up an
electrical charge which can be suddenly discharged when the person touches a
metallic object. Such discharges are known as electrostatic discharges or
ESD. These effects are also known as triboelectric effects from the Greek
word "tribo" which means "to rub." The effect results from rubbing or
touching and parting two dissimilar materials together.
Charging can be produced by space vehicles flying through dust, and
clouds which are composed of water droplets. Such discharges can lead to
electrical interference (EMI).
Techniques to mitigate the effects of ESD are well-known and generally
depend upon proper bonding and grounding of the external and internal vehicle
assemblies and parts. This prevents large differential charges from building
up between surfaces and arc discharging. Most vehicle charge resides on
external and payload bay surfaces. NASA uses Class S bonding as prescribed by
MIL-STD-B-SOSlB to preclude electrostatic discharging effects.
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ElectromaQnetic ComDatibility
Electromagnetic compatability (EMC) is defined as the condition which
prevails when telecommunication (communication/electronic) equipment are
collectively performing their individual designed functions in a common
electromagnetic environment without causing or suffering unacceptable
degradation due to electromagnetic interference to or from other equipment and
systems in the same environment.
All payload manufacturers are required by NASA to conduct EMC testing of
their unintentional radiated and conducted emissions. Test data are reviewed
by NASA against strict specifications. When a piece of equipment, system or
subsystem is found to have an inadequate Electromagnetic Interference Safety
Margin (EISM), appropriate action is taken, (e.g., redesign, substitution, or
additional protection). The concerns for payload to payload, payload to
Shuttle, and Shuttle to payload radiated emissions are thus thoroughly
addressed and resolved before flight readiness is attained.
Many well-known techniques are available to achieve electromagnetic
compatibility. The procedures used by NASA to achieve this operational
compatibility are prescribed in Military Standard, MiI-E-6051D,
"Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements System," dated 5 July 1968, and
supporting procedures. All Shuttle avionics equipment have been EMC qualified
per NASA, USAF, and contractor specifications. All EMC reports are presented
and reviewed at a series of cargo integration reviews involving all contractor
and government elements. Problems are resolved during these reviews. In
addition, all payload and Shuttle EMC requirements are in constant review and
are updated whenever new information becomes available.
Ordnance and Fuels
Ordnance and Fuels represent special concerns. Electrostatic and
electrodynamic energy can potentially trigger fuel ignition or special
ordnance known as _lectro_xplosive devices or EEDs. This can lead to
undesired ordnance ignition and possibly equipment separations. Due to the
fuel containment design, it takes rather substantial amounts of energy from
the RF environment or electrostatic discharge to trigger the liquid and solid
fuels.
Techniques used to protect such ordnance and fuels from lightning, the
electromagnetic environment, and discharges are well-known and used in many
aircraft and missile systems. These techniques, used by NASA, are prescribed
in Military Standard 1576 ('United States Air Force Electroexplosives
Subsystems Safety Requirements and Test Methods for Space Systems'), and Mil-
E-6051D which includes "provisions to protect ordnance subsystems from
inadvertent ignition or duddlng caused by any form of electromagnetic or
electrostatic energy." Special designs of fuel tanks and fuel delivery
subsystems are used to prevent ordnance ignition.
On the Ulysses spacecraft, for example, there are three types of such
devices: NASA Standard Initiators, Dimple Motors and Cable Cutters. These
are low-yield devices that present no threat to the Ulysses RTG. All three
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are designed to specifications which require an inability to "fire" when I
watt or I ampere is applied to the device. These devices are controlled by 10
redundant firing circuits which are inhibited during launch by a separation
switch. The switch is armed after separation of the spacecraft from the
IUS/PAM-S.
Electromagnetic interference is also a design consideration with respect
to the pyrotechnic devices on the IUS and the PAM-S. These devices and the
firing circuits are designed to perform to Military Standard 1512 - "Electro-
explosive Systems, Electrically Initiated, Design Requirements, and Test
Methods for Space Transportation Systems (STS) Payloads." The firing circuits
of the devices on the IUS are not armed until just prior to ignition of the
solid rocket motor which occurs at least 45 minutes after deployment from the
Shuttle. The firing circuits on the PAM-S are, in turn, armed by commands
from the IUS. All spacecraft and upper stages that fly on the Shuttle are
required to undergo an intensive review of their susceptibility to
electromagnetic radiation in accordance with strict NASA specifications.
Hazard reports must be prepared and closed out for devices that do not meet
the specifications. There have been no such reports to date for the Ulysses
spacecraft.
The pyrotechnic devices on the Shuttle reflect the design and operational
experience gained from the entire U.S. launch vehicle/spacecraft history to
date. Shuttle design requires that three separate, distinct electrical
signals in the proper sequence, be received to initiate firing outputs from
the pyrotechnic initiator controllers. Circuit designs have been developed to
ensure that shorts to either ground or power will not cause premature firing
of these devices. In addition, the explosive materials in these devices have
been chosen after extensive material test programs and development testing
under flight conditions to ensure that they will not auto-ignite in the flight
environment which includes electromagnetic radiation.
2.2.8 Mission Contingencies
2.2.8.1 Intact Aborts
The STS vehicle has an intact abort capability in the event specific
failures (e.g., engine loss, electrical/auxiliary power failure, etc.) occur
during the early phases of launch. Intact abort is defined as safely
returning the Shuttle crew and cargo to a suitable landing site. Five basic
abort modes exist providing continuous intact abort capability during ascent
to orbit: Return To Launch Site, Transoceanic Abort Landing, Abort-Once-
Around, Abort-To-Orblt, and Abort-From-Orbit. These intact, safe abort
capabilities enable protection of the crew and the payload after anomalies and
may avoid loss of missions. Manned systems offer an abort capability that
does not exist on expendable launch vehicles that is unique to this type of
launch vehicle. The planned U.S. and tentative foreign intact abort landing
sites for the Ulysses mission are as follows.
Tyge of Abort Site
Return To Launch Site Kennedy Space Center
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Transoceanic Abort Landing
Abort-Once-Around
Abort-From-Orbit
Ben Guerir, Morroco
Alternate -
Moron, Spain
Banjeel, Gambta
Zaragoso, Spain
Dakar, Senegal
Edwards Air Force Base, CA
Alternates -
White Sands Space Harbour, NM
Kennedy Space Center
Edwards Air Force Base, CA
Alternates -
White Sands Space Harbour, NM
Kennedy Space Center
2.2.8.2 Contingency Aborts
Contingency abort conditions are defined when two of the three Shuttle
main engines fail prior to single engine Transoceanic Abort Landing capability
or when all three engines fail prior to achieving an Abort-Once-Around
capability. These conditions result in a crew bailout and subsequent ocean
impact of the Shuttle.
There is a possibility of performing a Return To Launch Site abort if
two or three main engines fail within 20 seconds after launch or a
Transoceanic Abort Landing if three engines fail during the last 30 seconds of
powered flight. During the remainder of the ascent phase; however, two or
three main engine failures result in a contingency abort scenario.
2.2.8.3 On-Orbit SpacecraFt Aborts
It is also possible to abort the Ulysses mission if problems occur after
deployment of the Ulysses/lUS/PAM-S from the STS Shuttle up to the point of
IUS ignition. In the event any upper stage motor fails to ignite, the
IUS/PAM-S will continue to sequence through subsequent burns and spacecraft
separation, assuming the IUS sequencing continues to function. If the lUS
attitude control is operating, then the nominal IUS stage I and stage 2 burns
will leave the PAM-S/spacecraft on an escape trajectory without the PAM-S
burns. If either or both IUS stages were not to burn, then the PAM-S burn
alone would place the spacecraft on an escape trajectory.
The percent of anomalous burns occurring in one of the three stages in
the IUS/PAM-S assembly that still achieve an escape trajectory are 34, 58, and
99.6 percent for the IUS Stage 1, IUS Stage 2, and PAM-S, respectively.
Overall 66 percent of the trajectories for which a single motor anomalous burn
has occurred result in an escape trajectory (NASA 1988b).
2.3 ALTERNATIVES EVALUATED AND ELIMINATED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION
The only launch configuration other than the STS/IUS/PAM-S potentially
capable of achieving the launch requirements of the Ulysses mission is the
Titan IV/IUS/PAM-S. The Titan IV is a military launch vehicle which is
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procured by the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force has informed NASA that a Titan
IV ]aunch vehicle will not be available to NASA before 1995 (Mahon 1990).
Therefore, the STS/IUS/PAH-S launch configuration is the only feasible launch
configuration available to NASA for the U]ysses mission.
Since the only launch configuration available is the STS/IUS/PAM-S, and
since environmental impacts of an STS/IUS/PAH-S launch are the same whenever
the ]aunch occurs, the delay alternatives will have the same environmental
impacts as the proposed action. Furthermore, the discussion of alternative
power systems (Section 2.2.4) also indicated that the proposed power system is
the only feasible alternative for achieving the Ulysses mission with currently
available launch systems. Therefore, as neither alternative power systems nor
alternative launch configurations will be available before the late 1990s to
achieve this mission, and delays involving the same systems as proposed would
not yield different impacts even if undertaken at a later date, this EIS does
not consider a delay of the launch as a separate alternative.
The Ulysses mission has the objective of collecting data on the three-
dimensional nature of the heltosphere. A key element of that objective is to
relate the behavior of the solar wind and solar magnetic field lines close to
the Sun (as observed by Ulysses) with their behavior in the outer solar
system. With a launch of the Ulysses spacecraft in the 1990 or 1991
opportunity, the timing is such that the tracking and data collection systems
of the Deep Space Network (DSN) will be capable of acquiring outer solar
system data from the Pioneer 10 and 11 and Voyager 1 and 2 spacecraft in 1994,
1995, or 1996. It ts estimated that the DSN could receive data from both of
the Pioneer spacecraft until possibly as late as 1997 or 1998. However, with
later launches of Ulysses, the continuing deterioration of the Pioneer
spacecraft makes it unlikely that these spacecraft will be able to provide
outer planet measurements. No alternative power system or launch vehicle will
be available prior to 1995. So, for example, if the launch of Ulysses were
delayed until 1995, then its solar passes would not occur until 1999 and 2000;
therefore, outer solar system data from the Pioneers would be lost (see
Section 1.3).
2.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE
The no-action alternative would result in the termination of this
mission.
2.5 COHPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
The criteria pertinent to a comparison of the proposed action with the
no-action alternative are summarized in Table 2-4 and have been separated into
those related to normal missions and those related to accidents.
2.5.1 Environmental Imoacts of the Mission
2.5.1.1 Environmental Impacts from Normal Mission
None of the alternatives, including the proposed action, are expected to
result in any significant environmental impacts to the physical environment.
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TABLE 2-4. SUMMARY COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
PROGRN4MT I C CONSIDERATIONS
i
LAUNCH OPPORTUNITY
Vehicte Avaitabitity
Launch Period
- First PossibLe Launch Date
- Ler4lth
Deity Launch window
Nisaion Narginm:
- Power
- PropeL i_t
SCIENCE RETURN
Jupiter Arrival Date
High SoLar Latitude ArrivaL Date
SCIENCE PROGPJU4
TOTAL ESTINATED NISSION COST *
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Supporting FaciLity AvaiLabiLity
Personnel AvaiLabiLity
SAFETY & EMVIROKWENTAL INPACT
Expected (NormaL Launch)
• Land Use
• Air QumLity
PROPOSED ACTION
I
I
I I
STS/IUS/PAN-S
IN 1990
(AND 1991 BACKUP)
F i m Conmi tment
Launch Pad 39-11
on Oi scovery
October 5, 1990
19 Days
up to 120 Minutes
Adequate
Adequate
February 1992
June 199_
FuLL Return
ProbabLe
1;210 MiLLion
Firm Commitment
Project Tell in PLace
No significant adverse
impacts on non-Launch
related Land uses.
Short-tem degrIKiatton
of air utity within
tm_nch cloud and near-
fieLd (apout 1,600 feet
frm Launch pod).
No significant adverse
impacts outside the near-
ftetdenvirommnt.
Short term LocaLized
decrease in ozone, with
rapid recovery.
we ACTION
NIA
NIA
NIA
NIA
N/A
N/A
N/A
NOne
None
No Substitute
Nimmion Ptarrmd
Surd( Cost of
$150 Wittion
Not ReclUired
None
No Effect
No Effect
* United States costs.
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TABLE 2-4. SUMMARY COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES (Continued)
SAFETY & ENVIRONNENTALINPACT
• Sonic Room
• Hydrology end Water Quality
• Biological Systems
Endangered and Threatened
species
• Socioeconomic Factors
Expected (Balance of Nission)
ttPotential Accidents:
quantity of PLutonium Dioxide
Released to the Biosphere in the
Event of an Accident cJuring
Mission.
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Release:
- 14es_ Values: 0 - 10 sac.
11 - 20 sec.
21 - 70 sec.
i PROPOSEDACTION '! I
I I
! I
' STS/I US/PAM-S iI !
' IN 1990 '! I
I I
, (AND 1991 iiAClO_) ,
I I
I I
Mo sustained mciverse
impacts.
Me significent adverse
Long-term impacts.
Short-tens increase in
the acidity of nearby
water i_ts.
Short-term vegetat ion
damage contributes to
tong-term decrease in
species richness in
near-field over tim
with Shuttle operations.
Fish kills in near-by
waterways possible
with each Shuttle
Launch. We s(gn|f(cent
edverse effects outside
the near- field
No impact.
Me significant adverse
effects. Short-term
economic benefits from
tourism.
No significant adverse
effects.
65.6 Ci 0 3.36x 10 "6
Probability
12 Ci 8 8.47 x 10 "7
ProbabiLity
3.7Ci a4.37x 10"7
ProbabiLity
I I
NO ACTION
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
None
Based on information contained in the Final Safety AnaLysis (DOE 19909) and Appendix C
Report for the ULysses mission.
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TABLE 2-4 SUMMARY COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES (Continued)
SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTALINPACT
Lifetime Increaentat Cottettive
(Poputation) Dose in the Event of
a Mission Accident-Total.
Launch Vicin|ty Accident Causing
Ret ease:
- Toter Dose - Ne@n Vs(qes
0 - 10 set.
11 - 20 set.
21 - 70 set.
- Tots[ Dose-_ Percentite Vatue
0 - 10 set.
11 - 20 set.
21 - 70 set.
Incremental Cancer Fstetities among
Exposed PopJtation in the Event of
a Mission Accident.
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Retease:
- Cancer Fatstitfes-Ne_n VaLue
Phase I: 0 - 10 set.
11 - 21 set.
21 - 70 set.
- Cancer Fatati_i_-_ P_rcentit¢
wtue
Phase 1: 0 - 10 set,
11 - 20 set.
21 - 70 set.
14axfuDose to the Individual:
- NeenVs|ues
Phase 1: 0 - 10 set.
11 - 20 met.
21 - 70 set.
Phase 2:
Phase 3:
Phase 4:
PROPOSEDACTION
STS/IUS/PAH-S
IN 1990
(AND 1991 BACKUP)
NO ACTION
t !
77.8 person ram
12.4 person rum
2.15 person ram
457 person rea 8
3.36 x 10 .8 Probabitity
157 person ram 8
8.47 x 10 .9 Probability
person._ea a
4.37 x 10 " Probability
0.04
0.01
0.00114 i 1.1 x 10"_
Probabi t i ty
0.12
0.06
0.00852 ii 4.37 x 10 "y
i
Prob_| t i ty
3.84 arm
1.64 area
O. 19 arm
4.67 arm
13.1 area
13.1 area
t I
NOi'le
None
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TABLE 2-4. SUMMARY COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES (Continued)
SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
I
- 99 Percenttte VaLue
Phase 1: 0 - 10 sac.
11 - 20 sec.
21 - 70 sac.
71 - 105 sac.
106 - 170 sac.
Phase 2:
Phase 3:
Phase 4:
In|Ird Area PotentiaLLy Affected
by Deposition exceeding 0.2 #C|/m 2
in Event of an Accident.
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Retosse:
- Nean VaLue: 0 - 10 sac.
11 - 20 sac.
21 - 70 sac.
>71 sac.
- 99 Percentite vatue:
0 - 10 sac.
11 - 20 sac.
21 - 70 sac.
>71sac.
In|lnd Area Potentiatty Requiring
Ctosrx4) and Mitigation at Second
Year Fo{to_ing Accident (i.e.,
Annuat Dose Rate Exceeding
10urea/yr).
Launch V|cinityAcciclent Causing
ReLease:
- 14een Value: 0 - 10 sac.
11 - 20 sac.
21 - 70 sac.
- _ Ptrcenttte Vatue:
0 - 10 sac.
11 - 20 sac.
21 - 70 sac.
i
PROPOSEDACTION
$TS/IUS/PAN-S
IW 1990
(AND 1991 BACKUP)
22.6 urea
20.8 men
2.6 urea
0.0009 urea
0.0013 urea
73.2 urea
197 urea
197 urea
!
4.650.52
0.85 ion'?"
<0.0001 rJ 2
111 rJn2 8 3.36 x 10.8
Prob_i t i ty
9 Km" 8 8.47 x 10 .9
Probabi _ i ty
22.8 lOW"8 4.37 x 10 .9
Prol_bJ L| t_
<0.0001 ga"
0.024 Ka2
0.015 _20.024
0.204
0.517 rJu2
i
NO ACTION
None
None
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The proposed action will result in limited short-term air, water quality, and
biological impacts in the immediate vicinity of the launch site. These
impacts have been previously addressed in other National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) documents (NASA 1978, NASA 1986, NASA 1988a, NASA 1989a, USAF 1986,
USAF 1988) and are associated with the routine launch operations of the STS
and Titan IV launch vehicles. The impacts were determined to be localized to
designated areas and, therefore, insufficient to preclude Shuttle operations.
This EIS is intended to support decision-making with respect to the Ulysses
mission, a Shuttle payload, rather than the operation of the Shuttle system,
per se. The following paragraphs briefly summarize the impacts described in
Section 4.
Proposed AqtiQn
Short-term air quality degradation at the launch site and downwind of the
launch will occur from the hydrochloric acid and aluminum oxide emissions from
the solid rocket booster engines. The greatest effect will be in the "near
field" (i.e., within about 900 feet of the launch pad). Additional deposition
will occur outside this area in lower concentrations, with most deposition
expected to occur over the ocean.
Short-term impacts on natural vegetation and biota could be acute near the
launch pad. Damage would be confined to vegetation and biota near the launch
pad. Acidification of mosquito impoundments near the launch pad also may
occur. These impacts are similar to those observed during the past 10 years
and are on KSC land. At the time of launch, birds are expected to be startled
by the noise, but no long-term consequences are expected. No adverse impacts
on endangered species are expected (based on experience with Shuttle launches
to date).
Beneficial impacts on the local economy will result from the influx of
tourists who come to view the launch. Additional benefits will result from
the science returns, as discussed previously.
NQ-Action Alternativ_
The no-action alternative, while not creating any direct environmental
impacts, could limit the scientific base for future technological advances.
On the other hand, successful completion of the mission under the proposed
action would result in new scientific knowledge that could lead to
technological advances that could have significant long-term positive benefits
as discussed in Section I.
If NASA did not proceed with the Ulysses mission, the potential scientific
returns of this mission would not be obtained. In addition, cancellation of
the mission would leave the European Space Agency (ESA} without the means for
launching or powering their Ulysses spacecraft; such an action by NASA would
likely have severe repercussions on the future prospects for
U.S./International cooperation in space exploration.
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2.5.1.2 Possible Environmental Impacts of Mission Accidents
Prooosed Action
For the proposed action, detailed analysis indicates that the chance is
remote of any accident occurring that could release plutonium dioxide (NASA
Ig88a, NASA 1989a, and Section 4 of this EIS); and even in the remote instance
of such an accident, the consequences of release are quite limited.
The DOE conducts a detailed program of safety verification testing and
analysis to determine the chances and consequences of releasing plutonium
dioxide from the spacecraft's RTG in the event of an accident. The goal of
the DOE program is to ensure the integrity of RTGs, predict their response to
a broad range of accident conditions, and estimate the environmental impact,
if any, of an accident. The results of analyses available to date are
presented in Section 4 and are briefly summarized in Table 2-3.
For the mission as a whole, the accident with the highest probability of
release is an IUS failure during Phase 4 (at interplanetary injection) which
leads to reentry, RTG breakup, and impact of the modulesy The probability of
the initiating accident and impact on land is 1.66 x 10TM. The mean (i.e.,
expectation) value release has a subsequent conditional probability of 0.129
for a total probability of release of 2.14 x I0"" (or I in 4,670). The
expectation release is 0.084 Ci. This is conservatively assumed to be
available for transport even though test data indicate that the release may
well be contained within the graphite impact shell. The mean collective
population dose over a 50-year period would be 0.19 person-rem. The "maximum"
collective dose is predicted to be 3 person-ram with a probability of
approximately I in 60,000. The ability of the modules to survive Earth
orbital reentry heating without a loss of fuel has been demonstrated by test
and operational experience. The release could occur only in the event of
reentry and impact on rock or a similar unyielding surface. If the RTG
reenters and lands in the ocean, statistically the most likely occurrence,
there would be no release.
NQ-Action Alternative
There are no adverse health or environmental impacts from the no-action
alternative.
2.5.2 Scooe and Tlmina of Mission Science Returns
Evaluation of the alternatives indicates that there are no significant
health or environmental impacts outside the immediate vicinity of the launch
pad associated with a normal mission. There are, however, major adverse
fiscal and programmatic impacts attendant with the no-action alternative.
The proposed action would accomplish NASA's scientific objectives for the
Ulysses mission's study of the Sun. The proposed action would result in the
earliest collection of this scientific data at a most optimum time because of
the position of other spacecraft.
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The no-action alternative, by eliminating the previously cited small risk
of consequences from its operation, would result in not obtaining any science
data and therefore would effectively prevent the United States and the ESA
from achieving their solar system exploration objectives. Most significantly,
the scientific investigations of scores of scientists who have worked many
years to conduct experiments as part of the Ulysses mission would be
terminated.
2.5.3 Launch PreDaration and Ooeration Costs (Mission Only)
The proposed Ulysses mission, with an estimated cost to completion (United
States cost only) of approximately $210 million (excluding launch vehicle
costs), represents the minimum cost alternative to NASA for meeting the
objectives of the Ulysses mission. The November 1991 backup contingency
launch date, if necessary, would add an additional $14 million in U.S. costs,
excluding launch vehicle costs.
The no-action alternative would represent the least cost alternative for
NASA but would render useless the $150 million current investment.
2.5.4 Launch Schedules and Launch Vehicle Availabilltv
Consistent with the planning for the proposed action, the Ulysses mission
has been manifested for flight on board the STS in October 1990. There are no
plans within the existing launch manifest to launch Ulysses on board the STS
in 1991; however, if NASAwere unable to launch Ulysses in 1990, a contingency
plan would be to rearrange the manifest and attempt a launch in 1991.
2.5.5 Facility and Personnel Availabllitv
To maintain the proposed action, the necessary NASA and ESA Scientific and
engineering personnel are in place to implement the Ulysses mission in 1990.
NASA's Deep Space Network is prepared to meet the project's tracking and data
relay requirements.
Selection of the no-action alternative would immediately result in loss of
the significant investment in facilities and personnel to date, and loss of a
Shuttle mission opportunity. The currently existing engineering and
scientific work force would be dispersed and may be irretrievably lost.
2.5.6 _ummarv
The launch of the Ulysses mission in 1990 or 1991 will allow collection of
data during the solar minimum. These data will be less complicated to analyze
and should yield a better understanding of the solar processes. An additional
benefit will be the collection of data simultaneously with the Pioneer 10 and
11 and Voyager 1 and 2 spacecraft in the outer heliosphere and will enable a
three-dimensional study of the hellosphere. In the event that the mission
were delayed well beyond 1991, some of the data acquisition in the Ulysses
science program would be lost. As discussed in this section, the only
combination of spacecraft, power source, and launch vehicle configuration that
can meet the objectives is the currently designed Ulysses spacecraft, the use
of an RTG as the power source, and the STS/IUS/PAM-S as the launch vehicle.
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The STS/IUS/PAH-S launch vehicle option is the only technica]]y feasible
choice for launches prior to January 1994 because approximate]y three years is
required from the time a decision is made to use a parttcu]ar ]aunch vehicle,
such as the Titan IV expendable ]aunch vehic]e, to the time that the requisite
modifications can be comp]eted to the spacecraft and launch vehtc]e. The U.S.
Air Force, which procures the Titan IV ]aunch vehtcle, notified NASA in
November of 1988 that it cou]d not provide a Titan IV vehic]e for the 1991
]aunch opportunity due to high priority Department of Defense requirements.
Consequent]y, NASA terminated a]] mission p]anntng and preparation for the
Titan IV p]anetary back-up (i.e., back-up launch capability for the Mage]]an,
Ga]t]eo, and Ulysses missions). Furthermore, the U.S. Air Force has indicated
that the first avat]abt]tty of a Titan IV vehtcle wt]l be in 1995. Therefore,
only the STS/IUS/PAH-S is both capab]e of performing the mission and avai]able
to NASA for missions in the ear]y 1990s.
The issue of alternative power systems was addressed in the Tier 1EIS
(NASA 1988a), and no new information has been brought to light which would
a]ter the ear]ier decision to use an RTG power system. Information on a
number of potentia] power source a]ternatives for the spacecraft were
presented in Section 2.2.4. The on]y power source current]y avai]able which
can perform reltab]y during all phases of the mission is the RTG.
Developmental work current]y underway is expected to provide additional
potentta] power sources in the mid to ]ate lggOs. To await those systems
wou]d, however, entatl an indefinite de]ay.
In summary, no a]ternative to the proposed ]aunch vehic]e is avai]ab]e
before 1995, and no a]ternattve to the RTG as a power source is avai]ab]e
before the ]ate 1990s. Therefore, a]ternative launch vehicles and power
sources have been eva]uated and eliminated from further consideration.
The proposed action of completion of preparation and operation of the
U]ysses mission, including tts p]anned ]aunch in October 1990, with November
1991 as a back-up opportunity, is the on]y reasonab]e a]ternatlve for
accomp]tshtng the Ulysses mission in a time]y manner and wtthout major
disruption to the NASA and ESA scientific programs. The no-action alternative
Involves cance]]atton of the mission, ]oss of the sunk costs, ]oss of the
potentta] for co]]ecttng significant scientific data (see Section 1.3). The
U]ysses mission has been a key scientific objective of the United States and
the European science communities. It has received continuing support from the
U.S. and the European governments for over a decade. The scientific resu]ts
of the mission have potentta] practical benefits for peop]e here on Earth, as
we]l as for potential activities in space. Adoption of the no-action
alternative would have severe adverse Implications for the U.S. space program.
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3. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
This section addresses those elements of the human environment that could
potentially be affected by the proposed and alternative actions addressed
within this document. The section is divided into three major parts
addressing: (I) the region in which the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) launch areas are located, (2) the local
area encompassing the STS and Titan IV launch sites, and (3) the "global
commons" or the global environment. A brief discussion of plutonium levels in
the environment is included in the third subsection to provide the reader with
a perspective regarding the types, sources, and levels of environmental
plutonium on a broad scale.
The affected environment has been discussed in detail in a previous (Tier
2) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Galileo mission (NASA 1989a).
Refer to that document for additional maps of environmental resources.
3.1 REGIONAL OVERVIEW
For the purpose of this document, the region is defined as the six county
area (Brevard, Volusia, Seminole, Lake, Orange, Osceola counties) which
encompasses KSC and CCAFS, as shown in Figure 3-I.
3.1.1 Land Use
About 8 percent (328,000 acres) of the total region (4.1 million acres)
is urbanized (ECFRPC 1987), with the largest concentrations of people
occurring in three metropolitan areas: (I) Orlando in Orange County, with
expansions into the Lake Mary and Sanford areas of Seminole County to the
north; and into the Kissimmee and St. Cloud areas of Osceola County to the
south; (2) the coastal area of Volusia County, including Daytona Beach, Port
Orange, Ormond Beach, and New Smyrna Beach; and (3) along the Indian Lagoon
and coastal area of Brevard County, specifically the cities of Titusville,
Melbourne, and Palm Bay. Approximately 85 percent of the region's population
lives in developed urban areas.
The majority of the region is considered rural, which includes
agricultural lands and associated trade and services areas, conservation and
recreation lands, as well as undeveloped areas. Agricultural activities
include citrus groves, winter vegetable farms, pastureland and livestock,
foliage nurseries, sod farms, and dairy land. Citrus farming has been harmed
in recent years by canker outbreaks and freezes, and the majority of groves in
Lake, Seminole, Volusia, and Orange counties remain vacant and unused (ECFRPC
1987). With over 5,000 farms, nurseries, and ranches in the region, about 35
percent (1.4 million acres) of the regional area is devoted to agriculture.
Conservation and recreation lands account for almost 25 percent of the
total acreage in the region, or slightly over 1 million acres (ECFRPC
Undated). About 866,600 acres are land resources, and about 156,000 acres are
water areas. The region also contains about 5,400 acres of saltwater beaches
and about 48 acres of archaeological and historic sites.
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FIGURE 3-1. LOCATION OF REGIONAL AREA OF INTEREST
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A number of areas within the region have special status land use
designations. These include a portion of the Ocala National Forest, the
Canaveral National Seashore adjacent to KSC, one State preserve, seven State
wildlife management areas, and two national wildlife refuges including the
Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge at KSC.
3.1.2 Me_eoroloav and Air Qualitv
The climate of the region is subtropical with two definite seasons:
long, warm, humid summers and short, mild, dry winters. Rainfall amounts vary
both seasonally and from one year to the next. Average rainfall is 51 inches;
the monthly high occurs in July and the low usually in April. These
fluctuations result in frequent, though usually not severe, episodes of
flooding and drought. Temperature is more constant than precipitation with
prolonged cold spells and heat waves being rare. Tropical storms, tropical
depressions, and hurricanes, all of which can produce large amounts of
rainfall and high winds, occasionally strike the region. The last hurricanes
to affect the area were David in September 1979 which paralleled the coast
(ECFRPC 1987), and Hugo in September 1989 which went ashore in South Carolina.
There are 14 air monitoring sites in the region: 7 are for total
suspended particulates, 2 each for sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide and ozone,
and I for nitrogen dioxide. Lead is not monitored anywhere in the region.
Most of the monitoring sites are located in the Orlando urban area; there are
no air quality monitoring sites in Lake or Osceola Counties.
Air quality is generally good. Orange County is the only county in the
region that had been designated a non-attainment area (in this case, for
ozone). Data from the period 1984-1986 indicate that ozone standards were
being met (State of Florida 1987). Orange County was redesignated by EPA
(5/13/87) as an ozone "attainment" area (52 FR 17953).
3.1.3 Hydroloqy and Water Oualitv
The region not only borders the Atlantic Ocean, but contains
approximately 2,300 lakes, 2 major estuaries, and about 700 miles of streams
and rivers.
Almost all (8g percent) of the fresh water used in the region is drawn
from groundwater supplies, principally the artesian Floridan Aquifer. Some
small users withdraw water from the nonartesian surficial aquifers that
overlie the Floridan Aquifer. The Floridan Aquifer covers 82,000 square miles
and is 2,000 feet thick in some areas. In portions of the region, such as the
coastal zone and an area bordering the St. Johns River, the Floridan Aquifer
is too saline for potable water use (ECFRPC 1987). Wells tapping the
surficial, unconfined aquifer are largely used for non-potable or individual
domestic uses, although this source is also used for some municipal public
supply systems (e.g., the cities of Mims and Titusville, about 15 miles
northwest of the KSC/CCAFS launch sites; and Palm Bay, about 40 miles south of
the KSC/CCAFS launch sites, in Brevard County). Lake Washington, in Brevard
County, about 32 miles south of the KSC/CCAFS launch sites, is the only
surface water used as a potable water supply in the region, supplying the City
of Melbourne (ECFRPC 1987).
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Groundwater reserves are recharged by the percolation of rainwater. The
region contains some effective recharge areas for the Floridan Aquifer (Figure
3-2). These areas are located primarily in the upland portions of Lake,
Orange, Seminole, Osceola, and Volusia Counties and are composed of very
porous, sandy soils. Rainfall quickly percolates through the soils into the
aquifers below. In the most effective recharge areas, approximately 15 inches
of rainfall enter the Floridan Aquifer each year -- almost 30 percent of the
total rainfall.
The major surface water resources in the region are the upper St. Johns
River basin, the Indian River Lagoon system, the Banana River and a portion of
the Kissimmee River along the western border of Osceola County. The St. Johns
River, from its headwaters in the marshes at the southern end of Brevard
County to the northernmost part of Lake Washington, is classified by the State
as Class I water (potable water supply), and as noted earlier, serves as the
source of potable water for the City of Melbourne and much of the surrounding
population in that area. The remainder of the St. Johns within the region is
Class III water (recreation and fish and wildlife propagation).
The Kissimmee River (and its system of lakes) is a major contributor of
flow into Lake Okeechobee to the south of the region, and is the major
drainage for Osceola County and a portion of eastern Orange County. The river
system is characterized by a series of control structures and channeled
connections between the lakes for the purposes of flood water level control
and navigation (FSU ]984).
Waters with special status within the region include the:
• Weikiva River; a federally designated Wild and Scenic River, which
forms the border between northwestern Seminole County and eastern Lake
County
• Mosquito Lagoon portion of the Indian River Lagoon which is a State of
Florida Aquatic Preserve
I Southern portion of the Banana River from the southern end of CCAFS
south and the Indian River Lagoon between Malabar and Sebastian Inlet,
also designated as Aquatic Preserves
Portions of the Banana River and Mosquito Lagoon, as well as the
northern portion of the Indian River within the confines of KSC
designated by the State as Outstanding Florida Waters, along with the
Weikiva River, the Butler chain of lakes, and the Clermont chain of
lakes.
In total, the region contains 4 aquatic preserves, 24 bodies of surface water
designated as Outstanding Florida Waters, and I Area of Critical State Concern
- the Green Swamp.
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FIGURE 3-2. GENERALIZED MAP OF POTENTIAL GROUND WATER RECHARGE AREAS IN
EASTERN CENTRAL FLORIDA
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3.1.4 GeolQqy and Soi15
The region is underlain by a series of limestone formations with a total
thickness of several thousand feet. The lower formations (the Avon Park and
Ocala group) constitute the Floridan Aquifer. Overlying these formations are
beds of sandy clay, shells, and clays of the Hawthorn formation which form the
principal confining beds for the Floridan Aquifer. Overlying the Hawthorn
formation are Upper Miocene, Pleiocene, and recent deposits which form
secondary semi-confined aquifers and the surficial aquifer.
3.1.5 Bioloqical Re_o_r¢e$ and Endanaered SDecies
As noted in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3, the region has a large number of
terrestrial and aquatic conservation and special designation areas (e.g.,
wildlife management areas and aquatic preserves), which serve as wildlife
habitat, and comprise about 25 percent (about 1 million acres) of the total
land and water acreage within the region (about 4.1 million acres).
Figure 3-3 provides an overview of land cover types found throughout the
six county region, with a county-by-county breakdown provided in Table 3-I.
Freshwater and coastal wetlands comprise about 23 percent of the total area of
the six county region, followed by xeric grassland (21 percent), scrub and
bush (17 percent), water (12 percent), and hardwood/pine forest (11 percent)
being the dominant cover types in the region.
A total of 141 species of freshwater, estuarine, and marine fish have
been documented within the northern portions of the Indian River Lagoon near
KSC (ECFRPC 1988). Of these, 65 species are considered commercial fish and 85
are sport fish and/or are fished commercially. One species known to inhabit
the river, the rainwater killiflsh (_), while not on the Federal
or State threatened and endangered lists, has been listed by the Florida
Committee on Rare and Endangered Plants and Animals as "imperiled statewide"
(S2), and by the Florida Natural Areas Inventory as a "species of special
concern."
The St. Johns River supports both fresh and saltwater fishing (DOE
1989a). Sport fish include largemouth bass, bluegill, black crappie, bowfin,
gar, bullhead, bream, and catfish. The St. Johns River basin is heavily
fished, as indicated by an estimated 50,000 man-hours of fishing effort in
1983 in Lake Washington and Lake Harney alone.
As noted in Section 3.1.6.2, commercial fishing is an important economic
asset to the region. Brevard County and Volusta County ranked fifth and sixth
respectively, among the 12 east coast Flortda counties in terms of 1987
finfish landings. Brevard ranked first in invertebrate landings (crab, clams,
oysters, etc.) and first in shrimp landings, with Volusia fifth in both
categories.
Important terrestrial species in the region include migratory and native
waterfowl (ringneck, pintail, and bald pate ducks, for example), as well as
turkey, squirrel, white-tailed deer and wild hogs. Black bear also are known
in the region. The St. Johns River basin is an important waterfowl hunting
area. The seven State wildlife management areas in the region are hunted for
small game, turkey, hogs, or deer.
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The Federal government's Endangered or Threatened Species List, prepared
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), currently recognizes 19
endangered or threatened species in this region. Another 55 species are
"under review" for possible listing, of which 35 are plants. The State of
Florida list includes 47 species considered endangered or threatened. The
Florida Committee on Rare and Endangered Plants and Animals, a group
consisting largely of research biologists, gives endangered or threatened
status to 55 species. The Florida Natural Areas Inventory, run by the Nature
Conservancy under contract to the Florida Department of Natural Resources,
includes 62 species in its top two most endangered categories. Roughly half
of all the endangered and threatened species identified by these lists occur
in wetlands, principally estuarine environments; the other half depend on
upland habitats (ECFRPC 1987).
3.1.6 $9_ioeqonomic Environment
The socioeconomic environment of the six counties that could be affected
by the launch includes fast growing communities and urban areas that have
adopted long-range plans reflecting the rapid influx of development in the
regional area.
3.1.6.1 Population
The existence of three separate metropolitan areas is reflected in the
designation of three Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) within the region
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (ECFRPC 1987). These MSAs are the Orlando
MSA (Orange, Osceola, and Seminole Counties), the Daytona Beach MSA (Volusia
County), and the Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay MSA (Brevard County). The
population in Lake County, though growing faster than the State average, is
split between many small-to-medium-sized municipalities and rural areas.
Growth Rate
The regional population is growing at a rate faster than the State--
during 1960 the region contained 12.8 percent of the state population; in 1970
and in 1980 the growth rate flattened out and the region contained 13.6
percent and 13.7 percent of the State population, respectively. In June of
1980 the disproportional growth of the region resumed. The 1980 regional
population was 1,336,646, a 45 percent increase from the 1970 census. The
estimated growth from 1980 to 1986 was a 33.6 percent increase (an addition
448,898 persons). Current estimates (1987) are that the growth rate is higher
in recent years than at the beginning of the decade, and that between 1986 and
1987 the population increased 4.6 percent (77,711 people), placing 14.6
percent of Florida's population in the region. This trend is projected to
continue through 1991. The 1987-1991 growth is expected to be almost 20
percent, or approximately 337,000 people (ECFRPC Undated).
All counties are expected to show increases in population. In the early
1990s, it is anticipated that 2,000,000 people will be living in the region.
By the year 2000, official estimates show the region will have about 2,300,000
residents, 40 percent more than in 1985 (ECFRPC 1987).
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Orange County is expected to remain the most populated county, growing to
673,200 in 1991, followed by Brevard (428,200), Volusia (373,400), Seminole
(302,100), Lake (153,000), and Osceola (115,200). Osceola is projected to
have the fastest population growth rate over the 1987 to 1991 time frame with
an increase of 39.5 percent. Seminole is projected to have a 25.2 percent
increase, followed by Brevard (19.9 percent), Lake (17.6 percent), Volusta
(17.1 percent) and Orange is expected to show the slowest growth rate (16.5
percent). This projected population growth is summarized in Table 3-2 (ECFRPC
Undated).
TABLE 3-2. PROJECTED POPULATION GROWTH, EAST CENTRAL FLORIDA REGION
(1986-1991)
Popul at i on Change 1986-1991
Area 1986" 1991 Number Percent
Brevard 357,000 428,200 7],200 19.9
Lake 130,100 153,000 22,900 17.6
Orange 577,900 673,200 95,300 16.5
Osceola 82,600 115,200 32,600 39.5
Seminole 241,300 302,100 60,800 25.2
Volusia 319,000 373,400 54,400 17.1
TOTAL 1,707,800 2,045,100 337,300 19.8
(average)
* April 1986 estimate
(rounded to nearest 100).
(Source: ECFRPC Undated)
3.1.6.2 Economics
The region's economic base is tourism and manufacturing. Tourism related
jobs, although difficult to define, include most jobs in amusement parks,
hotels, motels, and campgrounds as well as many jobs in retail trade and
various types of services. Manufacturing jobs, while probably outnumbered by
tourism jobs, may provide more monetary benefits to the region because of
higher average wages and a larger multiplier effect (as jobs are added to the
economy in one sector, needs are created which lead to an expansion of
employment in other sectors) (ECFRPC 1987).
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Economic Base
Tourism in the region now attracts more than 20,000,000 visitors
annually. Walt Disney World and Sea World, near Orlando, along with KSC, are
among the most popular tourist attractions in the state (ECFRPC 1987).
Manufacturing employs approximately 100,000 people regionwide. Orange
and Brevard counties account for about 70 percent of this employment. Retail
and wholesale trade provide jobs for more than half (58.9 percent in 1984) of
the regions' employed persons. Other economic sectors that provide
significant employment in the region include: construction (7.5 percent),
transportation, communication and utilities (5.6 percent), finance, insurance,
and real estate (5.9 percent), and agriculture (2.7 percent).
Commercial fisheries of the two regional counties bordering the ocean
(Brevard and Volusia) landed a total of 21,401,683 pounds of finfish,
invertebrates (clams, crabs, lobsters, octopus, oysters, scallops, squid,
etc.), and shrimp in 1988 (State of Florida 198g). Brevard and Volusia ranked
third and fourth, respectively, among the east coast counties of Florida in
total 1988 finfish landings. Brevard led east coast counties in invertebrate
landings with about 13.2 million pounds. Volusia County ranked fifth with
about 0.4 million pounds. Brevard ranked third on the east coast with 1.1
million pounds of shrimp; Volusia was fifth with about 0.2 million pounds.
The region's agricultural activities include citrus groves, winter
vegetable farms, pastureland, foliage nurseries, sod, livestock, and dairy
production (ECFRPC 1987). In the central region, 30 percent of the land is
forested and supports silviculture, including harvesting of southern yellow
pine, cypress, sweetgum, maple, and bay trees. Large cattle ranches occupy
almost all of the rural land in Osceola county (ECFRPC 1987). Agricultural
employment declined in 1986 to 2.2 percent of the region's employment base
(ECFRPC Undated).
KSC's Contribution to the Economy of the Stat_ of Florid_
Contracts and employment at KSC added $1.24 billion to Florida's economy
during the Federal government's Fiscal Year 1989, ending September 30, 1989.
Of these expenditures, $1.07 billion went to contractors operating on-site at
the space center, $7 million went to off-site business in Brevard County, and
about $14 million involved other purchases and contracts awarded to Florida
businesses outside of Brevard County. At least 70 percent of the on-site and
Brevard County expenditures were estimated to have stayed in the local area in
the form of payrolls and purchases (KSC 1989).
Civil service salaries through the end of FY8g amounted to $102 million,
an increase of about $13 million over the previous year. Permanent Federal
employees at KSC edged over the 2,400 mark during the period. While 3,800
individuals were employed through construction and tenant jobs at KSC, the
majority of workers at KSC are employed by the on-site contractors and number
almost 12,000. Overall, approximately 18,000 workers were employed at KSC
through the close of the Fiscal Year (KSC 1989).
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Reaional Emolovment
About 49 percent of the residents in the region are employed, ranging
from 56 percent in Orange County to 33 percent in Lake County with 55 percent
in Seminole, 4g percent in Osceola, 45 percent in Brevard, and 41 percent in
Volusia. The region's labor force and employment have risen each year since
the mid-lg70s, and employment is expected to continue to increase through 1991
to a total of ].08 million civilian jobs by 1991 from 0.83 million in ]986.
The region's unemployment rate in 1986 was 5.1 percent (ECFRPC Undated).
Regional Income
Income in the region has been increasing faster than inflation. The 1985
to 1986 average annual wage rose 3.7 percent (about two times faster than the
inflation rate of 1.9 percent). The 1986 average wage over all sectors was
$17,604. Per capita income in the region has risen steadily since 197g from
$7,799 to $12,273 in 1984. The highest income was tn Orange County ($12,901),
followed by Brevard ($12,235) and Osceola ($11,026). The regional per capita
income for 1987 to 1991 is projected to increase at a rate somewhat greater
than inflation, perhaps surpassing the national average in 1991 (ECFRPC
Undated).
3.1.6.3 Transportation
The region's airports, for the most part, still are able to accommodate
increasing numbers of passengers. Orlando International Airport, already the
43rd busiest airport in the world in number of passengers, Is an exception.
The Greater Orlando Airport Authority has recently announced plans to double
its capacity to 24,000,000 passengers annually. Two other major airports are
Daytona Beach Regional and Melbourne Regional (ECFRPC 1987).
The region's road network includes five major ]1mired access highways:
Interstate 4, Interstate 95, Florida's Turnpike, the Spessard L. Holland East-
West Expressway, and the Martin L. Andersen Beeline Expressway. In addition,
numerous Federal, State, and county roads are located in the region (ECFRPC
1987).
The remainder of the region's transportation network is varied. Rail
service for freight is available in all counties, but passenger service is
limited. Ports at Cape Canaveral and Sanford provide access for water-borne
shipping and cruises. Mass transit or paratranslt Is currently operating in
all counties of the region except for Osceola (ECFRPC 1987).
3.1.6.4 Public and Emergency Services
Nearly go percent of the people in the region rely upon public supplies
of potable water, while the remainder use private wells. Problems with
saltwater intrusion into ground water is already evident, especially in
coastal Brevard County (ECFRPC 1987).
Health care within the region ts available at 28 general hospitals, three
psychiatric hospitals, and two specialized hospitals. Over 6,600 beds are
provided tn the general hospitals. Doctors, dentists, and other heath care
professionals, as well as nursing homes are located throughout the region
(ECFRPC 1987).
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3.1.6.5 Historical/Cultural Resources
There are 45 sites within the region that are listed in the National
Registry of Historic Places, 2 in the National Registry of Historic Landmarks,
and one area (Kissimmee River Prairie) that is a potential addition to the
National Registry of Natural Landmarks.
3.2 LOCAL ENVIRONMENT
The local environment is defined as the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
(CCAFS) and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The following brief descriptions
use the Air Force Environmental Assessment for the Complementary Expendable
Launch Vehicle (later renamed the Titan IV) at CCAFS (USAF 1986), the 1988
supplement to that document addressing an increase in the number of Titan IV
launches from CCAFS (USAF 1988), and the KSC Environmental Resources Document
(NASA 1986) as primary sources for data and figures.
The KSC/CCAFS area is located on the east coast of Florida, in Brevard
County near the City of Cocoa Beach, approximately 15 miles north of Patrick
Air Force Base (PAFB), about 30 miles south of Daytona Beach and 40 miles due
east of Orlando (see Figure 3-4). The local area is part of the Gulf-Atlantic
coastal flats and occupies Cape Canaveral and the north end of Merritt Island,
both of which are barrier islands.
3.2.1 Land Use
KSC (Figure 3-5) occupies almost 140,000 acres, 5 percent of which is
developed land (6,558 acres) and the rest (133,444 acres) is undeveloped.
Nearly 40 percent of KSC consists of open water areas, such as portions of
Indian River, the Banana River, Mosquito Lagoon and all of Banana Creek.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains
operational control over about 4.7 percent of KSC (6,507 acres). This area
comprises the functional area that is dedicated to NASA operations. About 62
percent of this operational area is currently developed as facility sites,
roads, lawns, and maintained right-of-ways. The undeveloped operational areas
are dedicated as safety zones around existing facilities or held in reserve
for planned and future expansion. For areas not directly utilized for NASA
operations, land planning and management responsibilities have been delegated
to the National Park Service (Cape Canaveral National Seashore within KSC) and
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (Cape Canaveral National Seashore
outside KSC, and the 75,400 acre Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge).
These agencies exercise management control over agricultural, recreational,
and various environmental management programs at KSC.
CCAFS occupies approximately 15,800 acres (a 25 square mile area) of the
barrier island that contains Cape Canaveral (USAF 1986). Approximately 3,800
acres or 25 percent of the Station is developed and consists of launch
complexes and support facilities (see Figure 3-6). The remaining 75 percent
(about 12,000 acres) consists of unimproved land. The Titan IV Launch Complex
41 is located at the northernmost section of CCAFS, occupying 28.4 acres of
land. This complex was previously used along with Launch Complex 40 for test
flights of the Titan Ill A, Ill C, and Centaur Vehicles in the early 1960s.
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FIGURE 3-6. EXISTING LAND USE AT CCAFS
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3.2.2 Meteorology and Air Ouality
Like the region, the climate of KSC and CCAFS is subtropical with summers
that are hot and humid, and winters that are short and mild. Mean
temperatures range from the low 60s in the winter months to the low 80s in the
summer months. Precipitation is moderately heavy with an average annual
rainfall of 45.2 inches. Hail falls occasionally during thunderstorms, but
hailstones are usually small and seldom cause much damage. Snow is rare.
In general, the winds in September through November occur predominantly
from the east to northeast (see Figure 3-7). Winds from December through
February occur from the north to northwest, shifting to the southeast from
March through May, and then to the south from June through August. It should
be noted that the radiological impact assessments found in Section 4 and
Appendix B, use launch window-specific wind roses (see Figure 3-7) and
meteorological conditions. While those specific wind roses are consistent
with the seasonal conditions illustrated here, they do vary slightly for
individual launch windows. Sea breeze and land breeze phenomena occur
commonly during the day due to unequal solar heating of the air over land and
over ocean. Land breeze occurs at night when air over land has cooled to a
lower temperature than that over the sea. Temperature inversions occur
infrequently (approximately 2 percent of the time).
Tornadoes may occur but are rare. The U.S. Air Force (USAF 1986) cited a
study which concluded that the probability of a tornado hitting a point within
the Cape Canaveral area in any given year is 0.00074, with a return frequency
of approximately once every 1,300 years.
Tropical depressions and hurricanes occur throughout the wet season in
Florida. While the possibility for winds to reach hurricane force (74 miles
per hour or greater) in any given year in Brevard County is approximately I in
20 (USAF 1986), only 24 hurricanes have passed within ]15 miles of KSC and
CCAFS since 1887 (NASA 1986). Hurricane David (September 1979)and Hurricane
Hugo (September 1989) were the last hurricanes to affect the area.
Air quality at KSC/CCAFS is considered good, primarily because of the
distance of the launch sites from major sources of pollution. There are no
Class I or nonattainment areas (for ozone, NO_, SO2, lead, CO, and
particulates) within about 60 miles of KSC/CC_FS, except Orange County to the
west, which is a nonattainment area for ozone (USAF 1986).
The ambient air quality at KSC is influenced by NASA operations, land
management practices, vehicle traffic, and emission sources outside of KSC
(NASA 1986). Daily air quality conditions are most influenced by vehicle
traffic, utilities fuel combustion, standard refurbishment and maintenance
operations, and incinerator operations. Air quality at KSC is also influenced
by emissions from two regional power plants which are located within a 10 mile
radius of KSC. Space launches, training fires, and fuel load reduction burns
influence air quality as episodic events.
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Ambient air quality at KSC is monitored by two Permanent Air Monitoring
System (PAMS) stations (NASA 1986). PAMS A is located at the Environmental
Health Facility Site, about 5 miles south of Launch Complex 39, and PAMS B is
located east of Kennedy Parkway and north of Banana Creek, about 4 miles west
of Launch Complex 39.
A summary of air quality parameters collected from the PAMS A facility in
1985 is provided in Table 3-3. The primary standard for NO2 was exceeded in
January. The 109 ug/m _ of NO2was 221 percent greater than the highest level
recorded in the State during the year. KSC 24-hour maximum levels for SO2
during 1984 and 1985 were also among the highest along the east coast of
Florida NO2 and SO2 levels and prevailing westerly winds indicate that power
plants to the west of KSC are the primary source of these emissions (NASA
]986).
Although never exceeding established standards, ozone is the most
consistently "high" criteria pollutant at KSC (NASA 1986). There have been
several ozone exceedances in recent years.
3.2.3 Hydroloqy and Water Oualitv
3.2.3.1 Surface Waters
Major inland water bodies in the CCAFS and KSC area are the Indian River,
Banana River, and Mosquito Lagoon (Figure 3-8). These water bodies are
shallow lagoons, except for the portions maintained as part of the
Intercoastal Waterway, between Jacksonville to the north and Miami to the
south. The Indian and Banana Rivers join at Port Canaveral and form a
combined area of 150,000 acres in Brevard County, with an average depth of 6
feet. This area receives drainage from 540,000 acres of surrounding area
(USAF 1986).
The surface water shorelines at KSC are dominated by mosquito control
impoundments. The water levels in these impoundments are raised and lowered
seasonally as a control technique to reduce mosquito populations. These
impoundments are typically fringed by mangrove or salt marsh communities. The
shallow submerged bottoms range from unvegetated sand shell bottoms to meadows
of seagrasses.
The Banana River and Indian River were historically connected by Banana
Creek. This connection was severed in 1964 with the construction of the
Launch Complex 39 crawlerway. Navigation locks within Port Canaveral
virtually eliminate any significant oceanic influence on the Banana River.
Public navigation on the Banana River is prohibited north of State Road 528
(see Section 3.2.5.3).
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FIGURE 3-8. MAJOR SURFACEWATERBODIES NEAR KSC
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3.2.3.2 Surface Water Quality
In compliance with the Clean Water Act, the state of Florida has
classified the surrounding surface waters, according to five classifications
based on their potential use and value.
All of the Mosquito Lagoon area within KSC boundaries and the
northern-most segment of the Indian River are designated as Class II waters
(Shellfish Propagation and Harvesting) (see Figure 3-g). Class II waters
establish stringent limitations on bacteriological and fluoride pollution.
The discharge of treated wastewater effluent is prohibited, and dredge and
fill projects are regulated to protect the area from significant damage. The
remainder of surface waters surrounding KSC are designated as Class Ill (Body
Contact Recreation and Fish and Wildlife Propagation) waters (Figure 3-9).
Banana Creek water quality (Class III) is influenced by non-point source
runoff from the Shuttle Landing Facility, the Vertical Assembly Building area,
Kennedy Parkway, and undeveloped areas of the Merritt Island National Wildlife
Reserve. Banana Creek has experienced fish kills in the summer when high
temperature and extensive cloud cover reduce the dissolved oxygen levels in
the shallow waters of the Creek.
There are about 21,422 acres of mosquito control impoundments in 75 cells
at KSC. These impoundments dominate the shoreline of KSC. Water levels are
managed by the USFWS for mosquito control purposes.
Limited water quality data and the applicable standards for the Indian
River, Banana Creek, the Banana River, and Mosquito Lagoon are provided in
Table 3-4. These data indicate that with the exception of the mosquito
control impoundments north of Pad 3g-B, the State of Florida standards are not
exceeded.
The surface waters within the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge
have been designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFWs) (see Figure 3-10).
The OFW designation supersedes other surface water classifications, and water
quality standards are based on ambient water quality conditions or the
designated surface water standard, whichever is higher. This level of
protection prohibits any activity that would reduce water quality below the
existing levels. The entire Mosquito Lagoon has been designated by the State
of Florida as an Aquatic Preserve (see Figure 3-11).
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TABLE 3-4. SURFACE WATER QUALITY AT KSC*
Dissolved Turbidity
Water Body Salinity (ppt) I_t Oxygen Nitrogen Phosphorous (JTU)
Indian River 30.2 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.06 3.64
(Titusvitte - north)
(FDER Class II)
Indian River
(Titusvttte - south
to NASA PsrkwayWest)
(FDER Class Ill)
Indian River
(NASA Parkuay West
south to Bennett
Csusoway)
(FDER Class II1)
14osquito Lagoon
(st KSC)
(FDER CLass II)
Banana Creek
(FDER Class LLl)
Nosquito Control
I_ts
(north of Launch
Complex 39)
28.4 8.1 6.9 0.04 0.06 3.75
27.8 8.1 7.2 0.06 0.05 5.0
31.8 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.08 4.9
11.4 8.2 9.8 0.003 0.38 7.5
9.4 8.8 11.1 <0.02 0.31 14.8
Banana River 25.9 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.05 4.3
(NASA Cl_aBet_y,
north to near Titan
IV Launch Complex 41)
(FDER CLass Ill)
..................................... ....... .... .. .... . ............................... ° ............
FDER Class II chtoridus 6.5-8.5 5.0Xeen (See 0.0001 29 NTU
Stancbrds 10_ atx_e (1 unit 4.0 Win. note A) (etenmfltst) above
background variation) (See background
(marine) note C)
FDER truss Ill chtorldee 6.5-8.5 (fresh) 5.0 Win. (See 0.0001 29 NTU
Standards IOZ above 6.5-8.5 (mrtne) (fresh) note R) (elen_tst) above
background (1 unit 4.0 Hin. (urine) background
(marine) variation) (nmrine) (See note 0)
*ALL measurements are in moJt untees otherwise noted.
NOTES:
A. No alteration so us to cause Iduetance tn neturst population.
B. No alteration so us to cause tndoetance tn natural population.
C. Total P - no alteration so u to cause tduellwce in natural population.
D. Total P - no alteration so as to cl_me inlbetnnce in natural pooutstton.
Source: NASA 1986.
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The Florida Department of Natural Resources (FDNR) in its capacity to
manage marine fisheries has established water classifications that regulate
the harvesting of shellfish. Shellfish may be harvested from "approved" or
"conditionally approved" areas only, with "conditionally approved" areas
closed to harvesting for 72 hours after rainfalls which exceed predetermined
amounts. Prohibited and unclassified areas can not be harvested. Shellfish
harvesting classification of the waters surrounding KSC/CCAFS are illustrated
in Figure 3-12.
Launch Complex 41 at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) is
bordered by the Banana River Aquatic Preserve to the west and the Atlantic
Ocean to the east. The Banana River is classified by the State of Florida as
a Class Ill water for body contact recreation and the propagation and
maintenance of diverse fish and wildlife. Surface runoff from Launch Complex
41 flows toward the Banana River. Basic water quality data for the Banana
River can be found in Table 3-4.
3.2.3.3 Ground Waters
Three geohydrologic units underlie KSC and the CCAFS. In descending
order, these units are: a Surficial Aquifer, Secondary Semi-Confined Aquifers
(found in the confining layer underlying the Surficial Aquifer), and the
Floridan Aquifer.
Surficial AQuifer
The Surficial Aquifer (an unconfined hydrogeologic unit) is contiguous
with the land surface and is recharged by rainfall along the coastal ridges
and dunes, with little recharge occurring in the low swampy areas. The
recharge area at KSC/CCAFS for the Surficial Aquifer is shown in Figure 3-13.
In general, water in the Surficial Aquifer near the groundwater divide of
the island has potential gradients that tend to carry some of the water
vertically downward to the deepest part of the Surflcial Aquifer and
potentially to the upper units of the Secondary Semi-Confined Aquifers (NASA
1986). East and west of this zone, water in the Surficial Aquifer has
vertical and horizontal flow components. Farther toward the coastline,
circulation becomes shallower until, at some point, flow is essentially
horizontal to the water table (Figure 3-14). Major discharge points for the
Surficial Aquifer are the estuary lagoons, shallow seepage occurring to
troughs and swales, and evapotranspiration. Inland fresh surface waters are
primarily derived from surficial groundwater.
Secondary Semi-Confined Aouifers and the Floridan Aouifer
Groundwaters under artesian and semi-confined conditions, the Floridan
and Secondary Aquifers, have upward flow potentials. Because of the thickness
and the relatively impermeable nature of the confining units, however, it is
thought that no significant Inter-aquifer leakage is occurring from the
Floridan Aquifer naturally. The general horizontal direction of flow in the
Floridan Aquifer is northerly and northwesterly. The great elevation
differential between the Floridan Aquifer recharge areas (e.g., Polk and
Orange Counties) and discharge areas along the Atlantic Coast provides the
3-27
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FIGURE 3-12. KSC SHELLFISH HARVESTING AREAS
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potential for the flowing artesian pressure experienced at KSC. Recharge to
the Secondary Aquifers is dependent on leakage through the surrounding lower
permeability beds.
3.2.3.4 Quality of Groundwater
Water from the Floridan Aquifer at KSC and CCAFS is highly mineralized
(principally chlorides) and is not used as a potable water source.
Florida groundwater criteria have been established as four classes:
Class G-I through G-IV, with Class G-I being the most restrictive. The
majority of the State's groundwaters are classified as G-II (potable water
use), and for all practical purposes, there are no G-I or G-IV classifications
in Florida.
Overall, water in the surficial unconfined aquifer at CCAFS is of good
quality and meets State of Florida Class groundwater quality standards for
potable water use with the exception of chloride, iron, and total dissolved
solids. The elevated concentrations of these parameters are due to the
influence of adjacent saline surface waters. No potable water wells are
located at Launch Complex 41 or in its vicinity. At KSC, high chloride
concentrations occur on the north, east, and west fringes due to intrusion
from surrounding saline water bodies. Thus, water quality improves towards
the north-south axis of KSC because this is where prime areas of freshwater
recharge occur and where potentiometric (water table) heads have prevented
seawater intrusion.
Preliminary data for the Secondary Semi-Confined Aquifer show that some
of these aquifers may be marginal water sources; however, it appears that they
are not capable of sustaining large scale development.
3.2.3.5 Offshore Environment
The Atlantic Ocean offshore environment at KSC/CCAFS can be described
according to its bottom topography and characteristics of ocean circulation in
the area.
Out to depths of about 60 feet, sandy shoals dominate the underwater
topography. The bottom continues seaward at about the same slope out to about
34 miles where the bank slopes down to depths of 2,400 to 3,000 feet to the
Blake Plateau. The Blake Plateau extends out to about 230 miles from the
shore at KSC/CCAFS. Figure 3-15 shows the bathymetry of the offshore areas.
Offshore currents in general reflect the general northern flow of the
Gulf Stream, as illustrated by Figure 3-16 (NOAA 1980). Studies of water
movements in the area indicate a shoreward direction of the current for the
entire depth, surface to bottom, in the region out to depths of 60 feet (18
nautical miles) at speeds of several miles per day. Wind-driven currents
generally determine the current flow at the surface. During the autumn (Oct.-
Nov.) the prevailing winds are out of the northeast, with occasional episodes
of winds out of the south. The prevailing winds transport surface waters
toward the shore, with an offshore component in shallow bottom waters which
diminishes rapidly with distance offshore (INSRP 1989). The net effect is
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that material suspended in the water column tends to be confined to the area
near the coast as is the heavier material found on the bottom.
The occasional episodes of northward winds results in a net movement of
subject waters offshore, with an inshore movement of the higher density bottom
waters. Materials suspended in the surface waters are transported in an
offshore direction, with the heavier bottom materials moving in shore.
In the region out to the sloping bank, the flow is slightly to the north
tending to move eastward when the winds blow to the south. Water over the
Blake Plateau flows to the north most of the time and is known as the Florida
current of the Gulf Stream (USAEC 1975).
3.2.4 Geoloay and Soi1_
KSC/CCAFS is located on a barrier island composed of relict beach ridges.
This island parallels the shoreline separating the Atlantic Ocean from the
Indian River, Indian River Lagoon, and Banana River. The area is underlain by
limestone formations a few thousand feet thick. The formations, from oldest
to youngest, respectively are: the Avon Park and the Ocala; overlying the
artesian Floridan Aquifer are the confining beds of the Hawthorn Formation;
the confining beds are overlain by Pleistocene and Recent Age unconsolidated
deposits.
Soils in the area of KSC/CCAFS have been mapped by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Soil Conservation Service (SCS). Five major soil associations
have been identified by the SCS. (The locations of the major soils
associations can be found in NASA 1986.) The soils in the immediate vicinity
of Launch Complex 39 at KSC consist of poorly drained, nearly level saline to
brackish soils. The principal soils association at Launch Complex 41 are
moderately to excessively drained, sandy soils on level or moderately sloping
topography.
3.2.5 Bioloqical Re$oqrce_
3.2.5.1 Terrestrial Biota
Vegetation communities and related wildlife habitats are representative
of barrier island resources of the region (Figure 3-17). Major natural
communities include beach, coastal strand and dunes, coastal scrub, and
wetlands. Coastal hammocks and pine flatwoods found on KSC to the northwest
increase the ecological diversity and richness of the area. About 90 percent
of the total KSC land area (about 73,300 acres) is undeveloped, and falls into
these community types. About 77 percent (about 12,000 acres) of CCAFS is
undisturbed or has reverted back to natural conditions.
Ma_or Plant Communities and Related Habitat
The principal communities in the vicinity of Launch Complex 39 at KSC and
41 at CCAFS are beach, coastal strand and dune, coastal scrub, and wetlands.
Beaches of KSC and CCAFS are largely unvegetated, but provide significant
wildlife resources. The tidal zone supports a high number of marine
invertebrates, as well as small fish that are food for many shore birds.
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Several species of gulls, terns, sandpipers, and other birds use beaches of
the Cape Canaveral area. In addition, research indicates that these beaches
are very important to nesting sea turtles (see Section 3.2.5.3).
Coastal strand and dune communities are marked by extremes in temperature
and prolonged periods of drought. Vegetation on the dunes are dominated by
sea oats. Other grasses, such as slender cordgrass and beach grass, also
occur. Shrubs such as beach berry and marsh elder, occur in the dune
community along with herbs, such as beach sunflower and camphorweed. The
strand occurs between the coastal scrub community and the salt spray zone of
the dune system. Growth characteristics of strand vegetation produces a low
profile that is maintained by nearly constant winds. Plants that can tolerate
strand conditions are saw palmetto, wax myrtle, tough buckthorn, cabbage palm,
partridge pea, prickly pear, and various grasses.
Coastal scrub is the largest natural community at CCAFS, covering
approximately 9,400 acres at CCAFS and almost 20,000 acres at KSC. The
coastal scrub association is characterized by xeric tree species, including
scrub oak, live oak and sand live oak, and myrtle oak. The scrub community is
a harsh environment limited by low soil moisture conditions. Herbaceous and
shrub vegetation is sparse and includes wire grass, saw palmetto, tar flower,
lantana, wax myrtle, greenbriar, prickly pear, gopher apple, and others.
Wetlands within and surrounding the launch area are important wildlife
resources. About 18 percent of KSC, for example, is considered wetland
habitat. Wetland types that are found in the area include freshwater ponds
and canals, brackish impoundments, tidal lagoons, bays, rivers, vegetated
marshes, and mangrove swamps. These wetlands provide resources for a vast
assemblage of marine organisms, waterfowl, and terrestrial wildlife.
Pine flatwoods occur principally in the northwest and central portions of
KSC. Dominant tree species are pines, including slash pine, longleaf, and
sand pine.
Coastal hammocks are characterized by closed canopies provided by cabbage
palms, which is the dominant tree species. Additional tree species in
hammocks are red bay, live oak, and strangler fig.
Ruderal vegetation dominates sites disturbed by or created by past human
activity, such as construction and agriculture. Vegetation communities
include Brazilian pepper, Australian pine, wax myrtle and melaleuca. Citrus
groves, the only agricultural community currently occurring within KSC, occupy
about 2,500 acres of land, slightly over 3 percent of the total KSC land area.
The groves occur in the northern portion of KSC along Mosquito Lagoon and on
the Merritt Island portion of KSC south of Banana Creek.
Wildlife
Nearly 60 species of reptiles and amphibians are known to inhabit the
area. Three of the resident species (the American alligator, the eastern
indigo snake, and the Atlantic salt marsh snake) are federally protected.
KSC and the surrounding coastal areas provide habitat for nearly 300 bird
species. Nearly go species are resident breeders while over 200 species
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overwinter at KSC. The breeding, wintering, and migratory bird species and
their relative occurrence within 17 habitat types at KSC have been documented
and are found in NASA 1986.
The expansive areas of wetlands provide ideal feeding, roosting and
nesting habitat for nearly two dozen species of wading birds. Many of the
wetlands within the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge are managed to
provide wintering habitat for approximately 200,000 waterfowl.
Colonial nesting birds occur within 11 rookeries at and near KSC/CCAFS,
with 4 rookeries located within 2 miles of Launch Complexes 39 and 41. Among
the species utilizing these locations are egrets, ibis, heron, cormorant, and
anhingua.
More than 20 species of mammals are known to inhabit the Merritt Island
land mass. Mammals include mice, voles, raccoons, opossum, rabbit, wild hog,
and aquatic mammals, such as the manatee and bottlenose dolphin.
3.2.5.2 Aquatic Biota
The coastline from Daytona south to Melbourne and extending seaward to a
depth of 100 fathoms is one of the most productive marine fishery areas along
the southern Atlantic Coast. The inshore waters support an important sea
trout and redfish sport fishery. The lagoons and rivers support commercial
fishery operations for blue crab and black mullet.
Shellfishing is an important component of the commercial and recreational
fishing effort. In 1988 Brevard County produced about 86 percent of total
State landings of hard clams (quahogs) and scallops (State of Florida 1989).
The commercial scallop fishery predominates off shore; it is estimated that
10.8 million pounds of calico scallops were harvested off Cape Canaveral in
1988, or almost 90 percent of the total State landings. A number of renewable
oyster leases are held in the waters near KSC. The southern quahog is the
most frequently taken species with large numbers being gathered from the tidal
mud flats by both commercial and recreational fishermen. See Figure 3-12 for
shellfish harvesting areas around KSC/CCAFS.
The lagoon system surrounding KSC provides both recreational fin and
shrimp fishing. It is estimated that, in 1985, 90,300 recreational fishermen
utilized the fishery resources surrounding KSC. The fish fauna of the Indian
River lagoon system has received considerable attention. The fresh and
brackish waters associated with the KSC area are reported to support 141
species.
Benthic macroinvertebrates of the northern Indian and Banana Rivers can
be classified as estuarine-marine animals. A total of 122 species of benthic
macroinvertebrates have been reported from brackish lagoons surrounding Launch
Complex 39A and the northern Banana River. Although shrimp species of
commercial importance were collected, the northern Indian River is not
considered an important nursery area for these species. Mosquito Lagoon,
however, is considered an important shrimp nursery area. Blue crabs also were
determined to spawn in the area.
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3.2.5.3 Endangered and Threatened Species
The USFWS and Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission (FGFWFC)
protect a number of wildlife species listed as endangered or threatened under
the Federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 (as amended), and under the Florida
Endangered and Threatened Species Act of 1977 (as amended), respectively. A
list of the protected species at KSC/CCAFS is found in Table 3-5. The Federal
list contains seven species as endangered and three species as threatened.
The State of Florida lists two additional species as threatened.
A review of CCAFS endangered or threatened species shows that only three
species (southeastern Kestrel, Florida scrub jay, eastern indigo snake)
potentially occur in the immediate vicinity of Launch Complex 41. An
additional three species (woodstork, bald eagle, peregrine falcon) may
occasionally occur in wetlands located to the east of the complex.
Caribbean manatees, green turtles, ridley turtles, and loggerhead turtles
are known to occur in the Banana River, Mosquito Lagoon, and along Atlantic
Ocean beaches. Of the remaining two species, dusky seaside sparrow is now
thought to be extinct, and the red-cockaded woodpecker is not expected to
occur in the vicinity of Launch Complex 41 due to the absence of suitable
habitat.
Ten nesting locations that have been used by the bald eagle have been
located at KSC. A 1985 survey noted that 5 locations were active, with 10
adults producing 7 eaglets. Nesting typically occurs between October and mid-
May. Eagles are susceptible to disturbance during the mating and rearing
cycle from courtship through about the first 12 weeks of nesting.
With respect to the West Indian Manatee, the following areas at KSC/CCAFS
have been designated as Critical Habitat by the USFWS: the entire inland
section of water known as the Indian River, from its northernmost point
immediately south of the intersection of U.S. Highway I and SR-3; the entire
inland section of water known as the Banana River; and all waterways between
the Indian and Banana Rivers (exclusive of those existing manmade structures
or settlements that are not necessary to the normal needs of the survival of
the species). On March 11, Iggo, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
established the waters of the Banana River north of State Road 528 as a
manatee refuge. This area will be actively managed for this species, and
public boat traffic is prohibited.
Osprey, listed by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna were thought to be actively utilizing a total
of 25 nesting sites near KSC. The closest site was a nesting area about 2
miles to the west of KSC Launch Complex 3g (about 3 miles approximately
northwest of CCAFS Launch Complex 41).
3.2.6 Socioeconomics
3.2.6. I Popul ation
The demographics of the local area sites are based upon the workforce
employed at CCAFS and KSC and are influenced by the influx of people and their
distribution prior to and during launches. During a launch, approximately
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TABLE 3-5. ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RESIDING OR
SEASONALLY OCCURRING ON KSC/CCAFS AND ADJOINING WATERS
Species
@¢atu 
USFWS* FGFWFC**
Mammals
Caribbean manatees (Trichechus manatus) E E
Birds
Wood stork (#ycteria american) E
Bald eagle (Haliaeetus 7eucocephalus) E
Peregrin falcon (Falco peregrinus) T
Southeastern kestrel (Falco sparverius)
Red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borealis) E
Florida scrub jay (Ahpelocome coerulesens)
Dusky seaside sparrow (Amospiza maritima) E
E
T
E
T
T
T
E (last known
individual died
in captivity in
I987)
Reptiles
Atlantic green turtle (Chelonia mydas) E
Atlantic ridley turtle (Lepidochelys kempi) E
Atlantic loggerhead turtle (Caretta caretta) T
Eastern indigo snake (Drymarchon corals) T
E
E
T
T
KeY
*U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
**Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
E = Endangered.
T - Threatened.
Source: USAF 1986
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6,000 employees may be onsite. The population may increase during launches of
special interest by more than 100,000 spectators, varying with the time of day
and year, and the weather. These individuals occupy nearby beach areas and
line the public roads in the area. Onsite population at launch time is
increased by about 17,300 visitors and press personnel (Harer 1988). These
additional people are distributed among various viewing areas as follows:
• 2,000 people at the #I VIP Site (Static Test Area)
g,o00 people at the #2 VIP Site (east of the Banana River Causeway
drawbridge; total could increase to 11,000-13,000 people if #I VIP
Site cannot be used)
• 2,000 press members at the site west of the Banana River
drawbridge
• 4,000 people at the Indian River Causeway Site (east of the drawbridge
for I mile)
• 250 people at the O&C Building and 50 people at the LCC Building.
3.2.6.2 Economy
The economy of the surrounding area is influenced by the presence of both
CCAFS and KSC, but the area's dependence upon them has lessened in recent
years. NASA civilian employment in Brevard County accounted for about 11
percent of county employment in 1987, whereas in 1967 it accounted for about
25 percent of county employment (Brevard County Ig88a). KSC contracts,
however, provide a substantial amount of income, totaling about $720 million
in 1987.
3.2.6.3 Transportation
The area is serviced by Federal, State, and local roads. Primary
highways include Interstate 95, US-I, State Route (SR)-AIA, and SR-520. Urban
areas on the beaches and Merritt Island are linked by causeways and bridges.
Road access to KSC is from SR-3 and the Cape Road from the south, NASA
Causeway (SR-405) and the Beach Road (SR-406) from the west, and Kennedy
Parkway from the north. There are about 211 miles of roadway at KSC; 163
miles paved and 48 miles unpaved. CCAFS is linked to the highway system by
the South Gate via SR-AIA, NASA Causeway, and Cape Road.
Rail transportation in the area is provided by Florida East Coast
Railway. A mainline traverses the cities of Titusville, Cocoa, and Melbourne.
Launch Complex 41 is serviced by a branch line from Titusville through KSC.
At KSC, approximately 40 miles of rail track provide heavy freight transport
to KSC.
Melbourne Regional Airport is the closest air transportation facility and
is located 30 miles south of CCAFS. CCAFS contains a skid strip used for
Government aircraft and delivery of launch vehicles. Any air freight
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associated with operation of Launch Complex 41 uses the CCAFS skid strip.
Ferrying and support aircraft serving KSC utilize the Shuttle Landing
Facility.
Port Canaveral is the nearest navigable seaport and has a total of 1,578
feet of dockage available at existing wharf facilities.
3.2.6.4 Public and Emergency Services
A mutual agreement exists between the City of Cape Canaveral, KSC, and
the Range Contractor at CCAFS for reciprocal support in the event of an
emergency or disaster. Two fire stations located in the Vertical Assembly
Building (VAB) Area and the Industrial Area provide for effective coverage of
KSC.
Security operations include access control, personnel identification,
traffic control, law enforcement, investigations, classified material control,
and national resource protection. The Brevard and Volusia County Sheriff's
departments, the USFWS and the National Park Service supplement KSC security
forces in patrolling non-secure areas of KSC (e.g., Cape Canaveral National
Seashore, Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge) (NASA 1986).
Medical services are provided at the facilities and by hospitals at
Patrick Air Force Base and in Cocoa, Titusville, and Melbourne. CCAFS is
equipped with a dispensary under contract to NASA. Medical services are
provided to KSC by an Occupational Health Facility and an Emergency Aid
Clinic.
No public school facilities are present on CCAFS or KSC. All school-age
children of the KSC and CCAFS workforce attend school in the vicinity in which
they live.
No recreational facilities are present on CCAFS, except for those
associated with the Trident Submarine Wharf, a service club, and a naval
recreation facility. Cultural facilities on station include the Air Force
Space Museum, tow facilities, and Mission Control, all located at the southern
portion of the base. Offbase military and civilian personnel utilize
recreational and cultural facilities available within the communities.
KSC has a 238 acre recreational area (Complex 99) located on the Banana
River near the southern limit of KSC property (NASA 1979). The Visitor's
Information Center at KSC, located about 6 miles east of U.S. Highway I,
provides exhibits, lectures and audio-visual displays, and bus tours on the
facility for visitors.
KSC and CCAFS obtain their potable water from the City of Cocoa water
system under a contract that provides for some 9 million gallons per day.
Approximately half that amount is normally used by the two facilities. The
on-site distribution systems are sized to accommodate the constant high volume
flow required by the launch deluge system. The city's well field in Orange
County has a capacity of 32 million gallons per day (USAF 1986).
KSC also enforces procedures, plans and personnel training with respect
to the use and handling of radioactive sources. Comprehensive radiological
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contingency plans have been developed to address all launch phase accidents
that could potentially involve the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG)
aboard the Ulysses spacecraft. These plans conform to the requirements of the
Federa] Radiological Emergency Response Plan that involves the efforts of
numerous government agencies including NASA, DOE, the Department of Defense,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the State of Florida.
3.2.6.5 Historic/Archaeologic Resources
A map showing the relative locations of State listed archaeologic sites
is provided in Figure 3-18.
A systematic survey of areas in the Merritt Island National Wildlife
Refuge was conducted in 1978 (NASA 1986). No significant cultural resources
were found other than four historic sites: Sugar Mill Ruins, Fort Ann, the
Old Haulover Canal, and the Dummett homestead.
Two locations were assessed in 1981 (NASA 1986). One area covered 6
acres where Peacock Pocket Road marks the east boundary and SR-402 borders on
the north; the other area was located on the south edge of SR-402
approximately 2,300 feet west of Peacock Pocket Road. No significant
archaeological sites were found on either of the two locations. No
significant cultural resources were found as the result of other surveys,
which included a 1982 survey of the United Space Booster Facility tract on
Herritt Island and of the Space Shuttle Soltd Rocket Booster Faciltty site.
An archaeological/historical survey of CCAFS was conducted in 1982 (USAF
1986). It was determined that Cape Canaveral had been inhabited for 4,000 to
5,000 years. The survey located 32 prehistoric and historic sites and several
uninvestigated historic localities. The initial results of the field survey
indicated that many of the archaeological resources had been severely damaged
by construction of roads, launch complexes, powerlines, drainage ditches, and
other excavation. None of these sites are located in the vicinity of Launch
Complex 41.
Recently, NASA developed a site along Banana Creek to allow VIPs to view
Shuttle launches. Because it was determined that this site contained state
listed archaeologic site BR170, NASA funded an extensive archaeologtc dig of
this site that was complete in 1988 in conjunction with the development of the
area.
3.3 GLOBAL COMHONS
This section provides a general overview of the global commons in terms
of overall population distribution and density, general climatological
characteristics, and surface type (i.e., ocean, rock, sot1), and also provides
a brief discussion of the global atmospheric inventory of plutonium. The
information provided was extracted primarily from the "Overall Safety Manual"
prepared for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1975 (USAEC 1975). The
"Overall Safety Manual" uttltzed worldwide population statistics and other
information compiled into 720 cells of equal size. The cells were derived by
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SOURCE: BREVARO COUNTY 1988b
• d
FIGURE 3-18. GENERAL LOCATIONS OF HISTORICAL/ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES IN
THE VICINITY OF KSC/CCAFS
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dividing the entire Earth from pole to pole into 20 latitude bands of equal
area. Each latitude band was then segmented into 36 equal size cells for a
total of 720 cells. Given that each of the cells covered an area of the Earth
equal to 273,528 square miles, it has been assumed for the purposes of this
discussion that while worldwide population, for example, has certainly changed
since the reference was prepared, the change is not significant relative to a
given 273,528 square mile cell.
3.3.1 PoDulation Distribution and Density
Figure 3-19 illustrates the distribution of the Earth's population across
each of the 20 equal area latitude bands. It should be noted that the
population scale is logarithmic. Figure 3-20 illustrates the land-adjusted
population densities within the latitude bands.
From these exhibits it can be seen that, with the exception of the four
more southern latitude bands, the total population among the bands varies by
about one order of magnitude. In addition, Figure 3-19 indicates that the
bulk of the population within most of the bands can be found in rural areas.
The greatest population densities (Figure 3-20) occur in a relatively narrow
grouping of the four northern bands between latitudes 17 and 44 degrees north
(bands 4 through 7).
3.3.2 _limatoloqY
Worldwide climatic types, which range from the perpetual frost of the
polar climates to the dry desert climates, are illustrated in Figure 3-21.
3.3.3 Surface TYpes
The distribution of surface types, worldwide, is an important
characteristic in considering the potential consequences of accident scenarios
analyzed for the Ulysses mission. Table 3-6 provides a breakdown, by each of
the 20 equal area latitude bands noted previously, of the total land fraction
and the total ocean fraction broken down by two ocean depth categories -
surface depth, i.e., 75 meters (246 feet) average depth; and intermediate
depth, i.e., 500 meters (1,640 feet) average depth. The land fraction was
further subdivided by the fraction consisting of soil cover and rock cover.
For the most densely populated bands (bands 4 through 7), it can be seen that
the land fraction varies from about 34 percent (band 7) to about 46 percent
(band 4), and within those four bands the soil fraction is dominant (75
percent in band 4 to g2 percent in band 7). It can also be seen (by
subtracting the total land fraction from 1.0) that the bulk of the Earth's
surface is covered by water.
3.3.4 WQrldwide Plutonium Levels
Plutonium-238, the primary fuel of the Ulysses spacecraft RTG, already
exists in the environment as a result of atmospheric testing of nuclear
weapons and a 1964 launch accident. The following paragraphs describe the
worldwide, national, and regional levels of plutonium in the environment.
This information is relevant to analyzing the scope of postulated incremental
releases of plutonium into the environment that could result from a Ulysses
mission accident.
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Source: USAEC 1975
FIGURE 3-19o TOTAL AND URBAN WORLD POPULATION BY EQUAL AREA LATITUDE BANDS
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TABLE 3-6. SURFACE TYPE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH LATITUDE BAND
Latitude Total Land Ocean Surface Ocean Intermediate Land Soil
Band Fraction Depth Fraction Depth Fraction Fractien
e ,
I 0.4739 0.1648 0.1444 0.0"
2 0.5845 0.1247 0.0704 0.0"
3 0.5665 0.0441 0.0452 0.749"
4 0.4580 0.0349 0.0429 0.749
5 0.4353 0.0357 0.0290 0.847
6 0.3980 0.0312 0.0365 0.912
7 0.3391 0.0358 0.0334 0.924
8 0.2545 0.0214 0.0300 0.942
9 0.2444 0.0400 0.0368 0.923
10 0.2211 0.0400 0.0197 0.916
11 0.2500 0.0326 0.0263 0.956
12 0.2199 0.0387 0.0299 0.945
13 0.2169 0.0329 0.0200 0.915
14 0.2480 0.0128 0.0319 0.911
15 0.2231 0.0088 0.0155 0.908
16 0.1372 0.0185 0.0172 0.888
17 0.0465 0.0191 0.0256 0.704
18 0.0223 0.0172 0.0427 0.704"
19 0.0034 0.0036 0.0115 0.0"
20 0.5438 0.0077 0.0850 0.0"
Land Rc,c]:
Fra ction
1.00"
1.00"
0.251"
0.251
0.153
0.088
0.076
0.058
0.077
0.084
0.044
0.055
0.085
0.089
0.092
0.112
0.296
0.296*
1.00"
I .00"
* Assumed Values Source: USAEC 1975
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Over the period 1945 through 1974, above-ground nuclear weapons tests
produced about 440,000 curies of plutonium in the environment (EPA 1977, USAEC
1974). About 97 percent (about 430,000 curies) of this plutonium was Pu-239
and Pu-240 which are essentially identical both chemically and with respect to
their radiological emission energies. The remainder (about 10,000 curies)
consisted primarily of Pu-238 (about 9,000 curies), as well as Pu-241 and
Pu-242. Consequently, above-ground nuclear testing represents the major
source of the worldwide distribution of plutonium in the environment.
Table 3-7 indicates that the Pu-238 inventory from weapons tests (about
g,o00 curies) was increased by a space nuclear source, specifically from the
1964 reentry and burn-up of a SNAP-gA Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator
releasing 17,000 curies. This release of plutonium into the atmosphere was
consistent with the RTG design philosophy of the time. Subsequent RTGs,
including the RTG on the Ulysses spacecraft, have been designed to contain the
Pu-238 fuel to the maximum extent possible recognizing that there are mass and
configuration requirements relative to the spacecraft and its mission which
must be weighed against the design and configuration of the power source and
its related safety requirements. Since 1964, essentially all of the SNAP-gA
release has been deposited on the Earth's surface (USAEC 1974). About 25
percent (approximately 4,000 curies) of that release was deposited in the
northern latitudes, with the remaining 75 percent settling in the southern
hemisphere. Table 3-7 does not account for the approximately 8,000 curies of
Pu-238 released to the environment from the Chernobyl accident of April 1986
(DOE et al. 1987).
The SNAP-Z7 RTG released from the Apollo 13 spacecraft during reentry,
survived intact and has since been resting in one of the deepest areas of the
Pacific Ocean, the Tonga Trench with no evidence of any radioactive release
(see Section 2.2.4.4).
The total plutonium released to the ocean environment by overseas nuclear
reprocessing plants between 1967 and ]987 is on the order of 20,000 Ci (IAEA
1976; NCRP 1987; UNSCEAR 1977, 1982, ]988). Assuming that 15 percent of the
total was Pu-238 (based upon the 1980-85 fraction in Britain's Sellafield
releases), then about 3,000 additional Curies of Pu-238 have been added from
these sources, bringing the total of Pu-238 dispersed into the environment up
to about 29,000 Ci.
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TABLE3-7. MAJOR SOURCES AND APPROXIHATE ANOUNTS OF PLUTONIUM-238
DISTRIBUTED WORLDWIDE
Amount
Sources (Curies)
Atmospheric Testing 1945-74
Deposited near testing sites
and world wide
Space Nuclear - SNAP-gA, 1964
Overseas Nuclear Reprocessing Plants
Total
9,000
17,000
3,000 (estimated; see text)
29,000
NOTE:
The SNAP-27 RTG from Apollo 13 landed intact in the Tonga Trench of the
Pacific Ocean. The inventory of this RTG has not been included in the
worldwide total since there have been no indications of release from this RTG;
hence, it is considered unavailable to the biosphere (DOE 1980).
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4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
4.1.1 Implications of Completion of Prelaun{h Preoar_iQn of the Spacecraft
The activities associated with completing the preparations to the
spacecraft primarily involve the completion of post-test spacecraft mechanical
assembly, integration tests with the launch vehicle, and final launch
preparation. There are no environmental consequences associated with these
activities.
4.1.2 Environmental Conseauences of Normal Launch Qf the Shuttle
The environmental consequences of normal operations and normal launches
were most recently addressed in the Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the Galileo mission (NASA IgB9a), and are summarized in
Table 4-I. The consequences of major interest associated with the normal
launch of the STS were identified in the previously published EISs on the
Space Shuttle Program (NASA 1978), the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) (NASA 1979),
the KSC Environmental Resource Document (NASA 1986), and the Tier I EIS for
the Galileo and Ulysses Missions (NASA 1988a). This EIS is to support
decision-making associated with the Ulysses mission, a Shuttle payload, rather
than the basic operation of the Shuttle system, per se. The following
sections summarize and update, for information purposes only, NASA's
understanding of the impacts of Shuttle operations.
4.1.2.1 Effects of the Exhaust Gases on Vegetation and Shallow Water
During the first half minute after ignition, a ground cloud is formed.
This cloud consists of exhaust from the solid rocket motors and Shuttle
engines, products from afterburning of this exhaust, a large quantity of
deluge water (used for acoustic vibration damping during launch), and most of
the heat energy generated during the launch (NASA 1988a). This cloud contains
high concentrations of HCl acid and particulates that can settle on and affect
the local environment.
The ground cloud contains nearly 22 percent by weight of hydrogen
chloride (HCl) and over 30 percent by weight of aluminum oxide particles
(Dreschel and Hall 1985). Much of the deluge water sprayed during the launch
is also found as water vapor or aerosol droplets in the cloud.
Most of the droplets and particles fall from the cloud and are deposited
on the ground in the near-field environment (i.e., within abou t 0.3 to 0.6
miles of th_ launch site). Actual deposition of up to 100 g/m (of chlorides
and 200 g/m _ of particulates have been collected from the near-field area
(Dreschel and Hall 1985, NASA 1986). The HCl gas in the ground cloud is
scavenged and condensed into water droplets which can be very acidic (pH as
low as 0.5). The deposition decreases rapidly with distance. The exhaust
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TABLE 4-1. SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCESOF NORMAL LAUNCH
OF THE STS AND BALANCE OF A NORMAL ULYSSES MISSION
Environmental Components Impacts
NORMAL LAUNCH
Land Use
Air Quality
Sonic Boom
Hydrology and
Water Quality
Biological
Systems
Endangered and
Threatened
Species
Socioeconomic
Factors
Radiation Ex-
posure of
Occupational
Personnel and
Public from
Handling of RTG
NORMAL
MISSION
No significant adverse impacts on land uses not related to
the launch.
Exhaust emissions consist principally of chlorides and
particulates (aluminum oxide). Short-term degradation of
air quality within launch cloud and near-field environment
(about 1,600 feet from launch pad). No significant adverse
impacts outside the near-fleld environment. Short-term
localized decrease in stratospheric ozone density with no
permanent or Iong-lastlng effects. Short-term decrease in
ion and electron concentration in localized area of upper
ionosphere. No significant effects on radio transmission.
No significant adverse impacts.
No significant adverse long-term impacts. Short-term
increase in the acidity of nearby water impoundments.
Short-term vegetation damage contributes to long-term
decrease in species richness in near-field over time with
Shuttle operations. Fish kills in nearby lagoons and
mosquito control impoundments expected with each Shuttle
launch. No significant adverse effects outside the near-
field.
Studies to date indicate no significant adverse effects.
No significant adverse effects. Short-term economic
beneficial effects from tourism.
No health effects to workers and public. Radiation from
RTG is very short ranged. All movement and handling
operations under strict control and supervision.
No significant adverse effects. Some soluble products from
residual solid rocket booster (SRB) fuel introduced into
ocean environment. Impacts short-term and localized. Sonic
boom during reentry from orbit and landing of STS.
Source: NASA 1989a
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products in the ground cloud are typically dispersed over an area extending
about g miles from the launch site. In the far-field (i.e., areas of
deposition extending beyond the near-field) chloride deposition has been
measured at levels of 0.025 to 5_3 g/m'; with particulate deposition measured
at levels of 0.0003 to 0.108 g/m'.
The acidic material deposited from the ground cloud in the near-field
environment causes acute vegetation damage and can result in fish kills in
nearby shallow waters (NASA 1986). Over time, with a succession of Shuttle
launches, the near-field environment experiences significant changes in
vegetative community structure. Total vegetative cover is reduced and
unvegetated areas expand. Thin-leafed herbaceous species, and shrubs with
succulent leaves, are more sensitive to launch cloud deposition than dune
grass species. Launch of the Shuttle results in acute vegetation damage in
the near-field environment where the heaviest acidic deposition occurs. The
Ulysses mission will contribute to the longer-term reduction in species
richness and vegetative cover of the near-field area. The area outside the
near-field (i.e., the far-field), where much less deposition will occur, can
extend out to g miles from the launch site, depending upon wind conditions.
In the far-field environment, some leaf spotting of vegetation can occur, but
acute damage is unlikely.
Particulate emissions within the ground cloud can be expected to
temporarily exceed Federal and State air quality standards (24-hour average is
150 pcj/m_); however, ambient air quality outside the launch cloud should not
be significantly impacted. The two Permanent Air Monitoring Systems (PAMS)
sites located between 3 and 5 miles to the west and southwest, respectively,
of the launch complex, had not recorded any significant deterioration in air
quality associated with the numerous Shuttle launches up to 1986 (NASA 1986).
The hydrogen chloride gas in the launch cloud, as well as gaseous HCl
which revolatilizes from acidic droplets after deposition, can remain at
levels as high as g ppm at the launch site for a few hours post-launch
(Anderson and Keller 1990). The American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists has determined a threshold limit value of 5 ppm as the
occupational exposure limit (American Industrial Hygiene Association 1989).
NASA is well aware of the potential impact of gaseous HCl on the launch site
work force that returns to the area after a launch. The air quality of the
area is sampled and monitored, including sampling for the gaseous HCf. The
KSC Environmental Health Staff, depending upon the results of that sampling
prescribe an array of worker protection measures (including self-contained
breathing apparatus and skin protection measures), if indicated.
Surface waters in the near-field area affected by the heaviest deposition
can also be affected by a Shuttle launch. Acidic deposition can cause a
sudden drop in pH of shallower waters (NASA 1986). The sudden drop in pH is
typically accompanied by a fish kill which usually involves smaller species.
Fish kills associated with Shuttle launches have ranged from less than 100
individuals to more than 1,000 individuals depending on the pattern and
season. A fish kill in shallow surface waters within the near-field can be
expected to occur with launch of the Shuttle for the Ulysses spacecraft.
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EachShuttle launch requires about 863,000 gallons of deluge and washdown
wastewater (NASA 1986). While much of the deluge water is vaporized and
dispersed with the ground cloud, up to 326,000 gallons of washdown water (with
an unknown amount of deluge water) is collected in tanks at the launch pad.
This water is highly acidic. The wastewater is neutralized to a pH of 8.5
within 72 hours of launch and is landspread over the adjacent pad area.
Groundwater monitoring of this area has shown no cause/effect relationship
between Shuttle launches and the detectable concentrations of aluminum,
cadmium, chromium, iron, and lead found in the groundwater.
4.1.2.2 Effects of Exhaust Gases on the Ozone Layer
The effects of Shuttle launches on atmospheric ozone were first addressed
in the Shuttle Program EIS of 1978 (NASA 1978), were summarized in the Final
(Tier I) Environmental Impact Statement for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions
(NASA Ig88a) and again in the Galileo Mission EIS (Tier 2) (NASA Ig8ga), and
again here in the Ulysses Mission EIS (Tier 2).
The NASA Upper Atmosphere Program presented a report to Congress dated
January 25, 1990 (Prather et al. 1990). This report addresses the connection
between Shuttle launches and potential ozone depletion, presenting the results
of studies using 3 models to assess the effects of Shuttle exhaust plumes.
The following discussion summarizes that report.
The solid rocket motor exhaust from the Shuttle is about 22 percent by
weight hydrochloric acid (HCl). Each launch injects about 68,000 kg of HCf
into the stratosphere. The current background chlorine level in the
stratosphere is about 3 parts-per-billion (ppb), due to the photochemical
degradation of natural and industrial hydrocarbons in the stratosphere.
Approximately 300,000,000 kg of halocarbons are added to the stratosphere
annually from industrial sources, thus the input from a Shuttle launch is
minor in comparison (0.02 percent compared to industrial sources).
A single Shuttle launch has inconsequential effects on global ozone
levels. The immediate exhaust plume from the Shuttle contains about 0._8
percent HCl by volume. If the exhaust plume were mixed within a 100 km area
of the stratosphere (10 km x I0 km), the resulting HCl concentration would
exceed 1,000 ppb. However, an area this size constitutes only about 0.000001
percent of the midaltitude stratosphere, plus the chlorine released from the
exhaust is in the form of HCl which must be chemically converted over time to
more catalytically active forms to impact ozone levels. Since the flight path
of the Shuttle is lateral as well as vertical, the exhaust are spread over a
lateral trending corridor extending over a distance of more than 1,000 km in a
day. Thus, a local "hole" in the ozone column over the launch site is not
produced.
To have a significant effect on global stratospheric ozone levels, the
exhaust plume would have to mix with the stratospheric environment and lead to
perturbations over an area of at least 1,000 x 1,000 km. In the first few
days post-launch, stratospheric winds will transport and disperse the exhaust
plume over 1,000 km. The average increase in stratospheric chlorine within
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that area would be about 2 percent, with a maximum of 5 percent over an area
within 20° latitude by 20 ° longitude. Within one-month post-launch, however,
the impact on ambient chlorine levels decreases rapidly to about 0.2 percent
above background with lateral mixing in the stratosphere.
For illustrative purposes the long-term cumulative effects of a
postulated series of nine Shuttle and six Titan IV launches, annually, were
also estimated (Prather et al. 1990) by running their models over several
model-years until a steady state distribution of chlorine additions to the
stratosphere was reached. A launch schedule such as this would lead to a
modest accumulation of additional chlorine in the stratosphere. Modeling
indicated that the increase in stratospheric chlorine attributable to this
launch schedule would range from 0.2 to 0.6 percent over the northern
latitudes, with much less effect felt in the tropics and southern latitudes,
(by about a factor of 2 or more). The associated ozone depletion would be
even less; about 0.25 percent locally and less than 0.1 percent in the total
column.
With respect to the "Antarctic ozone hole," the above postulated schedule
of Shuttle/Titan IV launches would be expected to decrease stratospheric ozone
levels in that area by less than 0.1 percent. Corresponding losses over the
Arctic were estimated at less than 0.5 percent.
The potential role of aluminum oxide particulates from solid rocket motor
exhaust on the stratosphere were also addressed (Prather et al. Iggo). The
finer particles (0.1 micron or less), do not settle out of the stratosphere
rapidly, and have the potential to act as ice deposition nuclei in the lower
stratosphere. They may also react with HCI in the exhaust to form chlorides
which in turn could degrade ozone levels in the lower stratosphere.
4.1.3 Non-Radioloqical Consequences of Shuttle Launch Accidents
The nonradiological consequences of Shuttle accidents were addressed in
the Shuttle Program EIS (NASA 1978), the Tier I Galileo and Ulysses missions
EIS (NASA IgI_Ba), and the Tier 2 Galileo EIS (NASA Ig8ga). The anticipated
nonradiological consequences are summarized in Table 4-2. The Ulysses mission
uses the Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) third stage, but the presence
of the PAM-S would not be expected to alter the previous analysis to any
significant extent. Therefore, the nonradiological impacts of Shuttle launch
accidents for the Ulysses mission are expected to be the same as documented in
the Final (Tier 2) Galileo EIS.
As will be discussed below, accidents are possible which could result in
the Ulysses spacecraft reentering the atmosphere. In this case it is expected
that the spacecraft would break up and the hydrazine fuel from the spacecraft
would be dispersed in the atmosphere. The hydrazine would not reach the Earth
in concentrations sufficient to be of concern.
4-5
TABLE4-2. NONR._DIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNPLANNED EVENTS
Event Nonradiological Consequences
On-Pad Propellant Spills
On-Pad Fire/Explosion
Ascent Accident
External Tank Jettison
Jettison of Solid Rocket
Booster
Orbiter Landing Accident
No significant impact. Spills collected in
sumps and catch basins for proper disposal.
Fire -- Ground-level concentrations of SRB
propellant combustion products would be reduced
by heat and cloud rise from main engine exhaust.
Explosion -- Significant blast effects could be
experienced if sudden rupture of external tank
occurred. Worst-case prediction indicates glass
breakage at 4,000 meters from pad.
If vehicle departs radically from nominal flight
path, Range Safety Office has capability to
terminate flight (vehicle destruct) to prevent
impact on land area.
Tank jettisoned into ocean with early mission
abort. No toxic materials in external tank
(only hydrogen and oxygen). Only effect is from
physical impact of tank. Aircraft and ships
receive prior advisory on launch corridor.
Propellant combustion products same as for
normal launch. Products disbursed into air or
ocean water; unburned propellants would slowly
disburse into ocean with localized toxic effects
on biota.
Consequences similar to large airplane crash
except less fire due to small fuel inventory on-
board STS.
Ocean crash would release STS fuel (mono-methyl
hydrazine) into the water. Some fish may
succumb in localized area near STS, but no
large-scale or permanent effects on ocean
environment.
Small quantities of hydrocarbon on-board STS
would float to the surface with no significant
impact.
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4.1.4 PrQcedure for Analy@is of R_ioloaical A_ciden_@ _n_ Conseauences
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducts a detailed analysis of the
safety of the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) systems used on
space missions. DOE documents the analysis for each mission in a Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR). The elements of the analysis and the information flow
are summarized in Figure 4-I. For the Ulysses mission, work on the FSAR (DOE
IggOd, DOE IggOe, DOE Iggof, DOE IggOg) has been underway since mid-lgsg. The
Ulysses mission will use the Shuttle/IUS launch configuration, as did the
Galileo mission. So the analyses performed for Galileo contributed greatly to
the analysis of the Ulysses mission. DOE prepared a Safety Status Report (DOE
IggOa, DOE IggOb, DOE IggOc) to provide the basic safety data used in the
Draft (Tier 2) EIS. The analytical steps and the information flow used in
preparing this interim report were the same as those for the FSAR. Research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of RTGs has been an ongoing activity
within DOE for over 3 decades and continues at the present time.
As indicated in Figure 4-1, the safety analysis for each specific mission
begins with NASA's identification of accident scenarios and environments which
may affect the RTG along with the probability of their occurrence. DOE then
calculates the response of the RTG to the environments making use of the
extensive DOE data base on RTG materials and their performance under a wide
range of conditions. If an accident environment leads to a release of
plutonium dioxide (PuO_), that release is called a "source term." The amount
of release, particle slze distribution, and the location of the release are
tabulated along with the conditional probability of the release. An analysis
is then conducted to determine the health and environmental consequences of
the release. Additional information on the safety analysis is contained in
Appendices B and C.
4.1.4.1 Accident Scenarios, Environments, and Probabilities
An extensive review of the potential failure modes in each of the major
elements of the Shuttle system identified accidents which could result in
accident environments posing a potential threat to the RTG. The accidents of
concern were then arrayed by mission phase in which they could occur. (See
Appendix B for a detailed discussion of the mission phases.) The probability
of each of these accident scenarios occurring was estimated by NASA and
provided to DOE for use in the FSAR (see FSAR, Volume II; DOE Iggof). These
values were subsequently updated by NASA and incorporated into this FEIS
(Appendix G). As indicated above, the safety evaluation of space nuclear
power systems is an on-going activity within the DOE. Testing and analysis
for the Galileo mission continued even after preparation of the mission's
formal documentation (the Galileo FSAR and EIS). The results from that
continued testing were published in the Galileo FSAR Supplement (DOE Ig8gb).
The Supplement showed that the Galileo FSAR presented a conservative estimate
of the risks. It should be noted that, on the basis of test and analysis data
published in the Supplement, certain accident scenarios and environments were
eliminated as contributors to fuel releases. These were principally:
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• The RTG case and General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) failure criteria
for a solid rocket booster (SRB) fragment impact were revised to
incorporate results from the Large Fragment Test series (Cull 1989).
This indicated that, for all practical purposes, only edge-on impacts
could cause a release.
• The amount of propellant that can mix with air in a vapor cloud
explosion following an in-flight failure of the external tank (ET) was
reduced based upon the findings of the NASA/DOE/DOD Interagency
Explosion Working Group's evaluation of the Challenger and Titan 34-
Daccidents (NASA et al. Ig8g). This had the effect of eliminating
vapor cloud explosions as a threat to the RTG.
• The threshold for damage to the RTG from payload bay wall impact was
found to be overly conservative by a factor of 5 for removal of the
RTG case, and a factor of about 1.5 for removal of the case plus GPHS
aeroshell and the graphite impact shell. This had the effect of
eliminating Phase 0 fuel spill explosion and subsequent payload bay
implosion as a threat to the RTG.
Sequential Impact Tests conducted at LANL indicated that a previously
impacted fueled clad could withstand a subsequent impact up to a
distortion of over 40 percent without releasing plutonium dioxide.
These data apply, for instance, to a fueled clad liberated from a GPHS
module as a result of an SRB impact. The bare clad then falls to the
ground experiencing a second (sequential) impact. The Galileo FSAR
used a secondary impact release threshold of 15 percent.
Incorporating the Sequential Impact Test data, the Supplement updated
that release threshold to 35 percent. This had the effect of reducing
ground releases following SRB fragment impact.
4.1.4.2 Accident Source Terms and Consequences
Not all accidents will lead to a release. For instance, in an SRB case
rupture scenario, the most probable result is that the SRB fragments will miss
the RTG. To analyze possible accidents indetail, an extensive Monte Carlo
based computer program was developed. This program is called the Launch
Accident Scenario Evaluation Program (LASEP). The program a11ows for the
generation of SRB fragments (by random failure or range destruct action) and
tracks the trajectory of each fragment. If the fragment strikes the RTG, the
program utilizes a model to calculate fueled clad distortion. Then, based on
test data and analysis, the distortion is used to calculate the amount and
particle size characteristics of any release.
After the first stage ascent phase, the accident scenarios of interest
are those which result in reentry of the RTG. Extensive testing and
operational experience indicate that RTG modules will survive suborbital and
earth orbital reentry heating conditions without release of plutonium. The
only situation in which release can occur is when a module survives reentry
but lands on a very hard surface (rock or steel). So the analysis of the
scenario is conducted on a probabilistic basis.
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For the first stage ascent phase, the results of the source term analysis
using LASEP were then used as input to the consequence analysis. This began
with aggregation of the source terms according to atmospheric dispersion
pathway (i.e., fireball, ground release, or at-altitude). Atmospheric
dispersion models then estimated the transport and deposition of released
material. The average source term for each phase or subphase was run for all
40 meteorological data sets of interest and the consequences were averaged
over all 40 metrorological data sets to define the base case for further use
in the integrated risk assessment. For Phases 2, 3, and 4, a modified
dispersion calculation was performed again using average source terms to
estimate consequences for these phases (see Appendix C). Phase 2, 3, and 4
point estimates also served in the base case for the integrated risk
assessment.
4.1.4.3 Risk Assessment
The environmental consequences of normal Shuttle launches are well known
and have been addressed in other NEPA documentation. The objective of this
EIS is to address the radiological implication of accidents which may affect
the Shuttle payload and its RTG power system. The assessment characterizes
the distribution of possible accidents and the distribution of their possible
radiological consequences. This assessment uses the techniques of
probabilistic risk assessment. There is an extensive data base derived from
the development, test, and evaluation of launch systems and from the test,
operation, and evaluation of RTG systems and materials. The probabilistic
approach used here incorporates modelling, simulation, and other analyses
based upon the DOE's safety verification testing and analysis activities.
The consequence analysis for the early first stage ascent phase uses
meteorological, geographic, and demographic data specifically for the Kennedy
Space Center and the Cape Canaveral region of Florida.
After about 70 seconds mission elapsed time, any high altitude release
will be dispersed worldwide. For these analyses, a globally averaged
population distribution was used for land areas under the ground track of the
mission (i.e., between 28 North and South latitude) for ground releases. High
altitude releases lead to global dispersion but with small local doses.
The results of the analyses are summarized in Table 4-3, which lists the
average source terms, and Table 4-4, which lists the consequences. Table 4-3
presents the source terms utilized in the Risk Analyses for the Ulysses
mission (DOE 1990g). Tables 4-4 and 4-5 provide the estimated radiological
consequences associated with those source terms. For the first stage ascent
phase, the phase value is the probability weighted consequence summed over the
five time intervals. For later phases, the consequences are taken to be
uniform over the whole phase. Note that as in Appendix C, the first stage
ascent phase is divided into five subphases based on the accident
probabilities of the SRBs and the characteristics of the mission profile. The
aim is to provide greater resolution in the analysis. In addition, the first
stage ascent phase results are summarized in terms of an expectation
(probability weighted) source term and probability weighted consequences.
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In Tables 4-4 and 4-5, column three lists the total probability of a
release for the subphases of Mission Phase I. For Phase 2, 3, and 4, column
three lists the probability of modules hitting land. There is a further
conditional probability of one or more modules hitting rock and one or more
clads having a release; the value is 0.102 for Phase 2, and 0.129 for Phases 3
and 4. Now there is a further conditional probability that there will be a
consequence of a certain extent, given that the release has occurred.
Column 4 lists the total probability of the health effect (column 6) dependent
upon the accident and the release occurring.
In Table 4-4, columns 5 and 6 list Collective Dose and Health Effects,
respectively. As the released material is dispersed, it becomes more dilute
and has a lower dose potential, but a larger population is exposed. The
collective dose counts each person exposed and the level of their exposure.
By Health Effect is meant the number of conditional incremental cancer
fatalities, over and above the normal value, that could occur in the
population as a result of the accidental release of plutonium from this
mission.
Health effects are calculated on the basis of the collective or
population dose multiplied by a health effects factor (number of cancer
fatalities per rem of exposure). The health effects factor utilized by DOE in
the FSAR was developed as follows.
Since plutonium-Z38 is an alpha emitter, the guidance provided by BIER IV
(Nat. Res. Coun. 1988) was considered appropriate in deriving a health effects
estimator for use in the Ulysses risk analysis. It should be noted that the
recently released BEIR V Report (Nat. Res. Coun. 1990) deals primarily with
the effects of gamma radiation, not the alpha radiation that is emitted by the
plutonium dioxide RTG fuel. BEIR V incorporates, without change, the
recommendations of BIER IV with respect to alpha radiation. In deriving a
health effects factor, consideration was given to the method of calculating
internal doses based on ICRP-30 (ICRP 1978), which uses organ weighing factors
based on low-LET radiation. When this is done in conjunction with the central
estimates for health effects due to internally deposited alpha emitters based
on BEIR IV, an appropriate health effects estimator can be derived as
described in the FSAR (DOE IggOg). The result of this calculation, specific
for plutonium dioxide and reflecting all particle sizes and ingestion
pathways, can range from 3.2 x 10"" to 3.5 x 10 TM excess cancer fatalities per
person-rem. For the purposes of calculating health effects for the base
cases, a value of 3.5 x ]0.4 has been used.
Column 7 of Tables 4-4 and 4-5 list Maximum Individual Dose. Calcula-
tions of both collective dose and maximum individual dose both use a 50-year
dose commitment, as explained in Appendix C. The whole dose is, however,
taken to be delivered in the first year. By assuming the dose is delivered in
the first year, a conservative comparison can be made to Table 4-6 which lists
radiation exposures routinely encountered by the general public.
Columns 8 and 9 in Table 4-4 list the areas of deposition in which the
dose levels during the first year after plume passage would be greater than 25
and 10 mrem, respectively. For the purposes of this analysis, based on
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TABLE 4-6. AVERAGE ANNUAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT OF IONIZING
RADIATIONS TO A MEMBER OF THE U.S. POPULATION
Source
Dose Eouivalent'
mrem
Effective Dose Eauivalent
mrem % of Total
Natural
Radon ° 2,400 200
Cosmic 27 27
Terrestrial 28 28
Internal 3g 39
Subtotal--Natural -- 300
Human-Made
Medical
X-ray diagnosis 3g 39
Nuclear medicine 14 14
Consumer Products 10 10
Other
Occupational o.g <I
Nuclear fuel cycle <1.0 <I
Fallout <1.0 <I
Miscellaneous c <1.0 <I
Subtotal--Human-Made -- 63
55
8.0
8.0
11
82
11
4.0
3.0
<0.3
<0.03
<0.03
<O.03
18
Total Natural and
Human-Made -- 360 100
Source: adapted from Nat. Res. Coun. 1990
m To soft tissues.
b Dose equivalent to bronchi from radon daughter products. The assumed
weighting factor for the effective dose equivalent relative to whole-body
exposure is 0.08.
c Department of Energy facilities, smelters, transportation, etc.
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interim EPA and DOE guidance (DOE 1990g), if the annual dose rate exceeds 100
mrem/yr, cleanup is indicated to ensure that administrative controls on land
use (to limit individual risk) are not required for extended periods of time.
The level of 25 mrem/yr is used solely for illustrative purposes in order to
estimate an order of magnitude for cleanup costs since no areas exceeded 100
mrem/yr; however, some limited areas would exceed the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) screening level indicating that monitoring would be
required to determine the actual concentrations, as noted in Column 10.
Column 10 of Tables 4-4 and 4-5 list the land areas estimated t_ receive
deposition at or above an EPA suggested screening level of 0.2 _Ci/m" at which
monitoring is recommended (EPA 1977). (See Section 4.2.1 and Appendix C for
more detail.)
Tables 4-4 and 4-5 can be compared as follows: Table 4-4 lists the mean
value results and Table 4-5 lists the ggth percentile value results from the
FSAR's integrated risk assessment. As explained in greater detail in Appendix
C and in the FSAR, Volume Ill, Book I, Section 4, the analysis first presented
radiological consequences in terms of base cases. That is, the consequences
were the mean values resulting from dispersion calculations using average
source terms, calculated for all 40 meteorological conditions, with the set of
pathway parameters and assumptions representing central estimates. The
integrated risk assessment then characterized variations about the base case
taking account of the entire distribution of source terms from LASEP, the
entire range of meteorological conditions, and ranges of variation in
parameter values and differing analytical assumptions affecting radiological
consequences. This approach was implemented through use of the SPASM Code, a
general purpose Monte Carlo simulation program designed to propagate
variabilities through a system model. The result is a distribution of
magnitude of consequence in terms of probability of occurrence. The result is
probabilistic because the parameters are combined in a way that reflects their
frequency of occurrence. Large source terms are infrequent and extreme
weather is infrequent, so the combination has a low probability.
We define the expectation value of a consequence as the risk of that
consequence. The data can also be used to estimate a mean value of the
consequence, as well as, say, the 9gth percentile consequence, as indication
of values near the tail of the distribution.
Considering Table 4-4, results indicate that the probability of a
plutonium dioxide release is small, and even in the rare event of a release,
the consequences will be small The most probable release is in Phase 4 with
a total probability of land impact of about 1.66 x 10.3 (or 1 in 602) and no
health effects would be expected as a result of a subsequent release. It
should be noted that the conditional probability of one or more clads having a
release (given land impact) is 0.129.
The analysis indicates that a release near the end of first stage ascent
could lead to a small collective dose (2,270 person rem) to a very large
affected population (5 billion people). In the absence of the de minimis
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principle (a health effect dose threshold of I mrem/yr) there could be one
incremental cancer fatality, worldwide, over a 50-year dose commitment period.
The largest mean value of maximum individual dose (13.1 mrem) relates to
a release due to Earth orbital reentry. This level is small compared to
average background radiation levels of about 150 mrem/yr (not including
radon).
Considering the ggth percentile results, the consequences are greater but
at much reduced levels of probability. The most probable release (Phase 4)
would still have no health effects. Releases in the latter two phases of
first stage ascent could lead to very small collective doses to large
populations. On the basis of the linear hypothesis,° without de minimis (see
Appendix Section C.5), at a probability of 2.3 x 10 TM (1 in 43.5 million)
there could be as many as 15 cancer fatalities in a population of 5 billion
people over a 50-year period.
The largest launch area value of maximum individual dose is also small,
less than 23 mrem. The health risk would be about the same as one medical x-
ray over a lifetime.
Now addressing the results for land deposition: Columns 8 and g of
Tables 4-4 and 4-5 indicate the land area where dose levels due to deposition
would exceed 25 mrem/yr and 10 mrem/yr, respectively. Column 10 lists the
area where deposition would exceed the EPA screening guideline of 0.2 _Ci/m z.
At lower levels of deposition, long-term monitoring would not be indicated.
Based upon DOE guidelines, cleanup is indicated where dose levels exceed
100 mrem/yr. There were no areas where such dose levels are anticipated,
either for mean values or the 99th percentile end of the distribution. Other
dose levels are associated with small areas. The EPA screening level is
exceeded in a 4.65 km= region for the case of an early first stag_ release in
the mean value. The 99th percentile value is estimated as 111 km_.
It should be noted that in case of a real accident, mitigation activities
would be based on thorough monitoring and evaluation at that time. This
analysis was only intended to be indicative of the situation that might
pertain.
In order to compare the health risks of the Ulysses mission to risks
encountered elsewhere, one may calculate an average individual risk as is
shown in Table 4-7. The Ulysses FSAR (Volume Ill, Book ]) defines the total
risk associated with each mission phase or subphase as the product of the
total probability of release and the mean value of the health effect for that
phase or subphase. For instance, in Phase I, 106-120 seconds, the mean health
effect is 0.861 and the total probability of release is 2.27 x 10.6. So the
subphase risk is 1.95 x 10TM health effect. Without the de minimis assumption
(see Appendix C.5), the collective dose is associated with an affected
population of five billion people, because the release takes place high in the
stratosphere which will lead to global dispersal. There would be a small dose
to a large population. The risk per individual, or average individual risk,
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is then the quotient of the risk divided by the affected population. For 106-
120 seconds, the value is 3.9 x 1016 . This number is very small compared to
the risks data listed in Table 4-8. The mission can be taken as the sum of
the phase values.
Appendix C summarizes the DOE Final Safety Analysis Report for the
Ulysses mission and describes the work of the DOE to characterize the
distribution of consequences in a mathematically rigorous way.
4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES
Accidental releases can occur in the Kennedy Space Center vicinity only
during the ascent phase and at unspecified areas worldwide during later launch
phases. Section 3 presented a description of the environments that could be
affected by radioactive deposition. Two different impact assessment
methodologies were developed to analyze these releases. One is for the
Kennedy Space Center vicinity during the early first stage ascent phase. The
other is global for later phases. The methodology for estimating potential
economic costs resulting from the accidents is also provided.
As a measure, solely for illustrative purposes in this EIS, a cleanup
level of 25 mrem/yr is used to estimate cleanup costs. That is, the land area
contaminated to a level greater than 25 mrem/yr would be cleaned up to a level
as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The Galileo EIS used a level of 25
mrem/yr as an estimate of ALARA based upon Federal agency experience and draft
guidance. Since this item was a subject of some discussion, and since the
estimates are purely illustrative, this Ulysses EIS has adopted a somewhat
more conservative approach. It should be emphasized that in the event of an
accident, post-accident mitigation would be based upon detailed monitoring and
assessment conducted at that time. Actual cleanup levels will depend upon a
number of factors, such as the location and use of the specific area
contaminated, potential threat to the public, evaluation of the specific
exposure pathways, and the specific particle size distribution of the
contamination.
Not withstanding this estimate, actual mitigation activities and cleanup
levels will be based upon a separate specific environmental analysis.
4.2.1 Kennedy Space Center and Vicinity
The method used to assess impacts from accidents in the early first stage
ascent phase (up to about 70 seconds after launch) proceeds as follows. The
first step is the identification o_ areas where there could be deposition
above a specified level (0.2 _i/m_ by mission phase (Table 4-4). For the
purposes of this EIS, the level chosen is based on EPA guidance (EPA 1977) for
contamination of soil by unspecified transuranic elements, including PuO , and
is expressed in mi_rocuries per square meter (/_Ci/m). This EPA screening
level is 0.2 _Ci/m'. EPA suggests that areas contaminated above the 0.2
_Ci/m 2 level should be evaluated for possible mitigation actions. The
recommended screening level was selected on the basis of limiting the
additional annual individual risk of a radiation induced cancer death to less
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TABLE4-8. CALCULATED INDIVIDUAL RISK OF FATALITY BY VARIOUS CAUSES °
Accident Type
Number of
Fatalities
for ]987
Approximate
Individual Risk
Per Year c
Motor Vehicle
Falls
Drowning
Fires and Flames
Poison
Water Transport
Air Travel
Manufacturing d
Railway
Electrocution
Lightning
Tornadoes b
Hurricanes b
Suicide
Homicide and Legal Intervention
(Executions)
Guns, Firearms, and Explosives
Suffocation
All Accidents
Diseases
48,290
11,733
4,360
4,710
5,315
949
1,263
1,200
624
760
99
114 b
46 b
30,796
21,103
1,656
3,688
95,020
1,993,381
2 x 10.4
5 x 10.5
2 x 10.5
2 x 10.5
2 x 10.5
4 x 10.6
5 x 10.6
5 x 10 .6
2.5 x 10 .6
3 x 10 .6
4 x 10 .7
5 x 10 .7
2 x 10"z
1.2 x 10.4
9 x lO"s
7 x 10.6
1.5 x 10 .5
4 x 10.4
8 x 10 ]
ALL CAUSES 2,123,323 9 x 10"]
• USDHHS 1989.
b 1946 to 1984 average.
c Fatalities/Total Population. (USBC 1988).
d Source USBC 1986.
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than one chance in one million. Given that humans are generally considered
the species most sensitive to radiation effects, contamination below the
screening level is conservatively judged to have minimal impacts on other
plant and ani_al species. Thus, for EIS purposes, areas that do not exceed
the 0.2 /_Ci/m" screening level are considered to have negligible potential for
significant environmental impact and are not analyzed.
The last step in environmental assessment methodology is the
identification of the nature and magnitude of the impacts in the areas
affected. A brief discussion of how PuO2 moves through the ecosystem and how
it could affect plant and animal species is presented in Section 4.3.
Potential exposure effects are determined through a survey of PuOz research
literature. In addition to effects caused by exposure to PuOz in the
environment, decontamination and mitigation activities employed to reduce PuOz
exposure could also affect natural habitats and human land uses. Potential
decontamination and mitigation methods are also presented in 4.3, along with
an analysis of the impacts resulting from mitigation activities.
Because PuO2 deposition is partially dependent upon the distribution of
PuO2 particles released during an accident, two fundamental assumptions were
made. The first is that particles of released PuOz will be distributed such
that the majority of large particles are deposited closer to the accident/
impact site, with the size of particles decreasing with distance. The second
assumption is that the highest concentrations of released curies are closer to
the release point, and that concentrations will tend to decrease with
distance.
4.2.2 Global Assessment
Beyond 70 seconds of the first stage ascent, about 99 percent of any
potential release would be deposited in the ocean. The remainder consists of
small particles (less than 10 microns in size) which would be subject to long-
term residence time and transport in the upper atmosphere before settling to
Earth.
In the latter stages of Phase I and for Phases 2, 3, and 4, release may
occur due to reentry, RTG breakup, and ground impact of heat source modules.
The environmental impacts are estimated based upon global average population
data and general environmental conditions.
4.2.3 Economic Imoact
Due to the uncertainty in defining the exact magnitude of economic costs
associated with the radiological impacts, a range of mitigation costs were
estimated in order to bound the costs which could result from ascent phase
accidents. The minimum economic impact is based on the estimated cost of a
radiological monitoring program. This estimate represents the costs of
equipment and personnel needed to develop and implement a comprehensive
long-term monitoring program. The maximum economic impact is defined as
comprehensive mitigation actions undertaken on all areas contaminated above a
25 mrem/yr dose level (see Appendix C for details). The economic costs
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following a potential accident could be reasonably expected to fall within
this range. Only economic impacts associated with the effects of radioactive
deposition are estimated in this analysis.
The post-accident monitoring program builds on the initial monitoring
effort in place at the time of the launch. Before launch, monitoring teams
and equipment from DOE, EPA, NASA, and the State of Florida will be in place
and commence monitoring. In the event of an accident, these teams would
continue monitoring for at least 30 days, after which EPA assumes
responsibility for long-term monitoring. A large percentage of the costs
associated with this program occur in the first year or two when a program
plan must be developed, equipment must be purchased, and personnel must be
hired and trained. After the program has been initiated and a shakedown
period has been completed, costs decrease to a maintenance level necessary to
run the program in the succeeding years. The minimum cost estimates are
presented in Table 4-9.
A number of factors can affect the cost of radiological decontamination
and mitigation activities, including:
Location - The location can affect the ease of access to the
deposition (e.g., a steep hillslope could be mere expensive to cleanup
than a level field), as can access to the site location and necessary
decontamination resources, such as heavy equipment, water, clean soil,
etc.
Land Cover Tvoe - The characteristics of some kinds of land covers
make them more difficult and therefore more expensive to decontaminate
(e.g., plowing and restoration of a natural vegetation area could be
more costly than using the same technique in an agricultural area).
Initial Contamination Level Higher levels of initial contamination
can require more sophisticated and more costly decontamination
techniques to meet a particular cleanup standard than a lower level of
initial contamination.
Decontamination Method - More sophisticated decontamination methods,
such as wetland restoration, are much more expensive than simple
actions, such as water rinses.
Disoosal of Contaminated Material_ - Disposal of contaminated
vegetation and soils onsite could be much more cost effective than
transportation and disposal of these same materials to a distant
repository.
e Cleanuo standard.
In setting the level at which specific mitigation efforts will be taken,
the characteristics of the material deposited must be taken into account.
Plutonium dioxide has extremely low solubility in water and has a low
bioaccumulation rate within the food chain; its alpha emissions are short
range, and the primary concern is inhalation of respirable fines.
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TABLE 4-9. MONITORING PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES
Period Activity Cost
Year one
Year two
Year three
Year four and
each succeeding
year
Transition from launch monitoring
activity, plan development,
supplemental equipment purchases,
hiring of personnel.
Testing and shakedown of program
methods and monitoring network,
monitoring of mitigation actions.
Transition to long-term monitoring
of impacts and mitigation actions.
Program maintenance.
$1,000,000
$ 500,000
$ 250,000
$ I00,000
Source: NASA 1989a
4-23
In the event of an accident, the ground monitoring program will be based
upon:
• Measurement of ground concentrations to characterize the nature and
extent of contamination
• Airborne measurements of the amount and characteristics of the release
• Atmospheric model estimates of the amount and location of material
deposited, using recent climatological data.
The need for cleanup, however, would be based upon actual conditions, as
characterized by the monitoring program initiated following an accident.
While the actual cost of cleanup associated with a potential Phase I accident
can not be predicted with great precision because the number of factors
involved (see above), an approximation can be developed from data provided in
an EPA report (EPA 1977). That report indicated that in 1977, cleanup costs
could range from approximately $250,000 to $2,500,000 per square kilometer
($1,000 to $10,000 per acre) if removal and disposal of contamination is not
required. Removal and disposal of contaminated soil at a near-surface
facility could cost from approximately $36,000,000 to $47,500,000 per square
kilometer ($145,000 to $190,000 per acre). In terms of 1990 dollars, these
costs should be approximately doubled. (It is estimated that cleanup without
removal and disposal would range from $500,000 to $5,000,000; and with
disposal could range from $72,000,000 to $g5,000,000.)
In addition, there are significant secondary costs associated with the
decontamination and mitigation activities, such as:
• Temporary or longer term relocation of residents
• Temporary or longer term loss of employment
• Destruction or quarantine of agricultural products, including citrus
crops
• Restriction or bans on commercial fishing
• Land use restrictions (which could effect real estate values and
tourism activity)
• Public health effects and medical care.
To gain an appreciation for the potential magnitude of these secondary
costs, results from a nuclear reactor risk assessment model were used. A U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) document (NRC 1975) presents results from
a probabilistic risk assessment and an economic cost distribution for
accidents at commercial nuclear power plants. Although the kinds of
radioactive contamination resulting from a potential nuclear reactor accident
are quite different from the contamination resulting from an RTG accident, the
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treatment of secondary costs for decontamination and mitigation activities is
employed here as a useful guide. The cost distribution study found that
decontamination costs account for approximately 20 percent of the total
economic cost of an accident. In other words, the total cost of a radioactive
contamination accident could be as much as five times the direct
decontamination costs. This multiplier of 5, however, applies only to those
types of areas that would incur secondary costs, such as the urban and
agricultural land.
The potential range of cleanup methods that could be utilized is listed
in Table 4-10. Cleanup costs estimated in this EIS are solely for
illustrative purposes. Actual post-accident mitigation activities would
result from detailed monitoring and assessments at that time. The cost
estimates discussed in Section 4.3.2.3 are based on draft guidance discussed
in the FSAR (Volume Ill) and presume cleanup of areas where contamination
could lead to dose levels exceeding 25 mrem/yr during the first year following
plume passage.
4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS RELEASING RTG FUEL
This section presents the environmental consequences of an accident in
which plutonium dioxide is released to the environment. A brief discussion of
how PuO2 behaves in the environment precedes the impact analysis. The
description of the affected environment is found in Section 3.
It should be emphasized that the following discussions are provided for
illustrative purposes and are not intended to reflect a definitive statement
regarding specific areas that would be contaminated in the event of an
accident involving a release of plutonium dioxide fuel. In the unlikely event
such an accident occurred, the amount of contamination and the specific
affected areas would be determined and appropriate actions taken. This would
include evaluation of alternatives in accordance with the National Contingency
Plan and development of appropriate cleanup levels for contaminated sites.
4.3.1 Plutonium Dioxide in the EnvirQnment
The extent and magnitude of potential environmental impacts caused by
PuO 2 releases resulting from STS/IUS/PAM-S accidents are dependent on the
mobility and availability of PuO z in the environment. The mobility and
availability of PuO 2 in turn, is directly controlled by a number of physical
and chemical parameters, including: particle size, potential for suspension
and resuspension, solubility, and oxidation state of any dissolved PuO.. It
is these factors, in conjunction with the three potential exposure pathways
(i.e., surface contact, ingestion, and inhalation), that determine the impacts
on marine, aquatic, and terrestrial ecosystems.
The size of PuO z particles is an important factor in assessing impacts to
environmental resources resulting from an accidental release. Particle size
can affect the rate of dissolution of PuO_ in water and the initial suspension
and subsequent resuspension of particles in air and water. The dissolution
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and the suspension/resuspension potential ultimately control the mobility and
availability of PuO z to plant and animal species. Generally speaking, larger
particles have less potential for suspension and resuspension; as particle
size decreases, particles are more easily kept in suspension.
Chemically, plutonium oxide is extremely resistant to dissolution,
especially in lung or digestive fluids of the human body. Since uptake of
ingested plutonium oxide (e.g., in water or food) is extremely low (on the
order of one part per million), such plutonium is normally excreted in the
feces. The major risk to humans is from accidental inhalation of respirable
particles (about 10 micrometers or less in size), since natural removal from
the pulmonary parts of the lung takes many years.
Particle sizes have been predicted for the first stage ascent phase
accident in which accident released plutonium dioxide can be incorporated into
the resulting fireball. Plutonium dioxide particle size is inversely related
to deposition range. For a fireball accident representative of SRB case
failure accidents in the period 0 to 10 seconds of the first stage ascent
phase, approximately g2.8 percent of the released curies will be deposited as
particles greater than 44 microns, and the greatest number of these particles
will fall in an area from 0 to 10 km from the accident. Approximately 2.5
percent of the released curies will be deposited as particles in the range of
30 to 44 microns, and the greatest number of these particles will fall in an
area from 10 to 20 km from the accident. Approximately 3.4 percent of the
released curies will be deposited as 10 to 30 micron particles, and the
majority will fall within the range of 20 to 50 km from the accident. The
smallest particles, those less than 10 microns, account for approximately 1.3
percent of released curies, and the majority will trave] greater than 50 km.
The greater the distance over which a release will be transported, the more
dilute will be the ground level deposition. These finer particles could also
be more easily resuspended by subsequent wind action and human disturbance.
However, resuspended material available for inhalation is on the order of I x
10.6 (one-millionth) of the ground deposition, thus high levels of ground
concentration would be required to constitute a risk to animals through this
route. Given the deposition levels estimated in the safety analysis (see
Appendix C), this risk is not likely to be significant.
In marine and aquatic systems, larger particles will quickly settle to
the bottom sediments, while smaller, silt-size particles may remain in
suspension within the water column indefinitely. Smaller particles may not
even break the water surface due to surface tension, instead forming a thin
layer on the water surface and subsequently transported to the shoreline.
Resuspension of smaller particles from the bottom can occur due to physical
disturbance of the sediments by wave action, recreational use of the water
bodies (e.g., swimming, boating, and fishing), as well as by the feeding
activity of various marine and aquatic species. Plutonium dioxide particles,
as a component of the bottom sediments, may also be transported toward and
along the shoreline by wave action and currents in near-shore environments.
The prevailing southerly winds during the launch period (autumn -
October/November) as noted in Section 3.2.3.5, would tend to keep the fine
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material which is suspended in the water column confined to the inshore area.
Heavier particles settling to the bottom would also tend to remain in that
area. During those autumn periods when episodic wind reversal occurs (i.e.
northerly winds), suspended fines would tend to move offshore, with the
heavier bottom material tending to move inshore. A 3-year study of inshore
sediment transport due to coastal currents near Cape Canaveral using tracers
(dyed sand) injected at 3 and 6 m depths, indicated that partlcles persisted
in the area for at least the 3-year study period (INSRP 1989). Particles
injected at depth of 6 m or less moved rapidly on to the beach over the study
period, and moved at least 4 km north and south of the test site.
A number of factors can affect the solubility of PuOz in water.
Physiochemical parameters most important to the solubility of plutonium
dioxide are the reactive surface area and oxidation state of PuOz and the
water chemistry including pH, reduction/oxidation potential, and temperature.
Mass to surface area ratios of particles affect reactivity and solubility,
with solubility being inversely related to particle size. The dissolution
rate of the plutonium dioxide fuel in the RTG is very small, ranging from 1.2
to 90 _Ci/m'/sec in sea water and fresh water, respectively, based upon the
dissolution rate per unit surface area of the fuel.
Plutonium dioxide entering into a water/sediment system would be
preferentially taken out of solution and bound in saturated sediments in
amounts 10 to 100,000 times greater than the amounts that would remain in the
associated water column.
Plutonium dioxide may be carried into the soil by a number of routes,
including percolation of rainfall and subsequent leaching of particles into
the soil, animal burrowing activity, and plowing or other disturbance of the
soil by humans. Migration of the PuOz particles into the soil column is of
concern, primarily because of the potential for PuOz to reach ground-water
aquifers used as drinking water supplies. The opportunity would most likely
occur where surface contamination is deposited on primary aquifer recharge
zones. Once deposited on soil, plutonium dioxide appears to be extremely
stable. Soil profile studies have shown that generally more than 95 percent
of the plutonium dioxide from fallout remained in the top 5 cm of surface soil
after 10 to 20 years of residence time in undisturbed areas (DOE 1987).
Direct contamination of an aquifer where it reaches the surface is remote
but possible. It would be expected that clays, organics, and other anionic
constituents would bind most of the PuO 2. The binding of PuO2would occur in
the first few meters of sediment, thereTore greatly reducing _he concentration
of this constituent with depth. This natural filtering of PuO2 would probably
reduce concentrations to levels that would be below the Primary Drinking Water
Standard of 4 mrem for exposure due to drinking water.
It is also possible that surface water run-off containing PuO2 could
directly contaminate drinking water supplies from surface water bogies since
this type of contamination is greatest due to suspended PuO2 and not from
dissolved PuO2. Filtering of the surface water before chemTcal treatment
would reduce the concentration of total plutonium to very low exposure levels.
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The availability of PuO 2 to biota in marine, aquatic, and terrestrial
environments depends on the route of PuO z exposure to the biota and the
physical and chemical interaction of PuO z with the water and soil of the
affected area. These interactions determine whether PuOz is available for
root uptake by plants and for ingestion and/or inhalation by marine, aquatic,
and terrestrial fauna. The route of PuO z exposure differs between the two
basic categories of biota-flora and fauna. Flora, in marine, aquatic, and
terrestrial environments, can be exposed to PuOz contamination via surface
contamination, root uptake, and leaf absorption. Fauna can be exposed via
skin contact, ingestion, and inhalation of PuO z particles.
Surface contamination and skin contact does not pose a significant danger
to the biota. The alpha radiation emitted by plutonium has very little
penetration power (Hobbs and McClellan 1980). Therefore, little penetration
can occur through the skin of fauna. In addition, several studies on root
uptake and leaf absorption of PuOz indicate that very little, if any, PuOz is
absorbed by plants when PuOz is in an insoluble form (Cataldo et al. 1976,
Schultz et al. 1976).
The significance of ingesting PuOz can vary between terrestrial, and
marine and aquatic fauna. Studies of animals indicate that the digestive
tract tends to discriminate against transuranic elements (Cataldo et al. 1976,
Schultz et al. 1976). However, ingestion may be significant for small fauna
in terms of total exposure, especially for those that burrow, ingesting soil
along with food material If the soil is contaminated, ingestion of PuO z
could result. Although the transfer factor from the intestinal tract to the
blood and other organs is small, total activity passing through the tract
could be large relative to total body size.
Summary
The impact of ingesting PuOz by marine and aquatic fauna can be
significant depending on PuOz availability. For example, studies have found
that bioaccumulation of PuOz does occur in benthic organisms that ingest
sediments contaminated with PuO2 (Thompson and Wachholz 1980). However, most
of these studies also indicate that the bioaccumulation of PuOz is not
critical to the upper trophic levels, including humans.
Inhalation is considered to be the most critical exposure route for
terrestrial fauna (Wicker 1980). However, inhalation impact depends on
several factors, including the frequency of resuspension of PuOz, the
concentration and size of resuspended particles, and the amount actually
inhaled (Schmel 1980, Pinder et al. undated). Smaller particles have a
greater chance than larger particles for being resuspended and inhaled.
Although many of the particles may be subsequently exhaled, the smallest
particles have the greatest likelihood of being retained deep in the lung
(Hobbs and McClellan 1980, Thompson and Wachholz 1980). However, resuspended
material available for inhalation is on the order of I x 10.6 (one-millionth)
of the ground deposition, thus high levels of ground concentration would be
required to constitute a risk to animals through this route. Given the
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deposition levels estimated in the analysis, this risk is not likely to be
significant.
No definitive research has been conducted that defines the specific
effects of PuO2 on plant and animal species, particularly at the relatively
low contamination levels resulting from potential STS/IUS/PAH-S accidents.
Generally speaking, however, radiation can cause three main types of physical
effects on organisms: 1) somatic injury, that is damage to the normal
morphology and functioning of the exposed organism; 2) carcinogenic injury,
that is an increase in the incidence of cancers; and 3) genetic injury,
affecting reproductive cells and causing deleterious genetic changes in an
organism's offspring. Any of these three physical effects could cause
increased mortality to exposed organisms. Overall ecosystem structure is not
expected to change, and therefore no significant ecological consequences are
anticipated. At the low levels of deposition determined In the safety
analysis (see Appendix G), the effects are not likely to be significant.
4.3.2 Assessment of Imoacts to Kennedy Space Center and Vicinity
4.3.2.1 Surface Areas Contaminated by Representative Accidents
In the unlikely event that an accident severe enough to cause a release
of RTG fuel occurs, the areas potentially contaminated by the re]ease are
noted in Tables 4-4 and 4-5.
Accidents occurring within the first 70 seconds of the first stage ascent
phase would result primarily in deposition on the controlled land areas of
KSC. Beyond 70 seconds into the first stage ascent phase, the Shuttle has
gained enough altitude and down range distance from KSC that about 99 percent
of an accident release would result in ocean deposition, with the remaining 1
percent (small particles less than 10 microns in size) subject to long-term
residence time and transport in the upper atmosphere before settling to Earth.
4.3.2.2 Exposure Effects
Deposition of PuOz from ascent phase accident releases will have little
direct effect on land cover. The matertal wt11 not physically alter land
cover unless a particle provides enough heat to start a fire. Although PuOz
can affect the human use of these land covers, there is no initial impact on
soil chemistry, and most of the PuOz contamination deposited on the water
bodies is not expected to react chemically with the water column. No
significant consequences to flora and fauna are expected from surface
contamination and skin contact with the PuOz, except where particle
concentration and/or size is great enough to overheat the contaminated
surface.
Plutonium dioxide deposition would not have any direct effects on
historical or archaeological resources. It wtll not physically alter nor
chemically degrade historical or archaeological resources.
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4.3.2.3 Long-Term and Mitigation Effects
Natural Veaetation and Wetlands
Plutonium dioxide deposited on the soil will interact with inorganic and
organic ligands to form primarily insoluble compounds. It is expected that
over 95 percent of the plutonium dioxide will remain in the top 5 cm (2 in) of
surface soil for at least 10 to 20 years. No mitigation is necessary because
of long-term impacts to soil. Mitigation required for other reasons may
result in significant soil impacts.
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, surface contamination and skin contact do
not pose significant dangers to biota. No significant consequences to flora
are expected from root uptake and leaf absorption. Ingestion by terrestrial
fauna is negligible except for small fauna due to ingestion of contaminated
soil. This could result in a large total activity passing through the general
intestine track. Inhalation due to resuspended material is small [I x 10.6
percent (one-millionth of one percent) of ground deposition]. No significant
impacts to biota would be expected in any of the areas receiving surface
contamination. Areas of highest concentration are the result of deposition of
larger particles or chunks, which are noninhalable.
The particulate PuOz on the surface of the water bodies is not likely to
be readily available for consumption by pelagic aquatic fauna. The amount of
PuOz to be suspended or dissolved in the water column is predicted to be
slightly higher than 1 x 10"_ (i.e., .00001) times the concentration of PuO 2
deposited in the bottom sediment (i.e., the amount dissolved or suspended fn
the water column is I00,000 times less than the amount in the sediment).
Thus, for example, even if a w_tland area were contaminated by 2.0 y_Ci/m" of
PuOz, only about 2 x 10"_ l_Ci/m" of PuO2would be dissolved or suspended in the
water column. This small amount of PuO 2 available in the water column is not
considered to have significant impacts to the aquatic fauna that may ingest
the dissolved or suspended PuOz. In addition, studies have indicated that
higher trophic level organisms, such as fish, that are likely to live within
the water column have a low accumulation factor (DOE 1987, DOE IggOc).
Overall, the major potential impacts to the natural vegetation and
wetland biotic resources of the KSC and vicinity resulting from early first
stage ascent phase releases accidents include bioaccumulation of PuO 2 by
benthic organisms and bioaccumulation of PuO z by the aquatic vegetation.
Because of the potential for bioaccumulation to occur in aquatic vegetation
and benthic organisms, there is a potential for the PuO z to travel up both the
terrestrial and aquatic food chains. However, bioaccumulation of plutonium
decreases with higher trophic levels, thus impacts to the biological diversity
are not expected to occur. Redistribution of PuO z is a possible occurrence,
especially when contaminated terrestrial fauna, including birds, move from one
place to another. However, it is unlikely that they will create any
additional impacts that have not already been described. Recycling of PuOz
will predominantly occur with vegetation and fauna having short-life spans.
The bacteria that decomposes the organic matter may accumulate PuO However2"
most of the PuO z should return to the sediments. In the aquatic environment
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this may promote the continuance of bioaccumulation of PuO2 by the benthic
organisms and aquatic vegetation.
Mitigation of the impacts to flora and fauna in natural vegetation and
wetland areas could be accomplished through a combination of monitoring and
remedial action based on monitoring. The amount of PuOz resuspended in the
air in natural areas determines if PuO2 concentrations may pose inhalation
health hazards to humans. If levels are determined to pose Inhalation health
hazards, then access to the area could be restricted until monitoring
indicates that PuO2 concentrations will no longer pose a potential health
hazard. The impacts of wetland mitigation activities (see Table 4-10) could
range from temporary disturbance of wetland soils and vegetation associated
with low range decontamination/mitigation methods, to complete removal of
vegetation and sediments/soils from localized areas of contamination followed
by longer-term recovery of the affected areas with habitat restoration.
Aqricultural Land
Citrus groves on the Kennedy Space Center could be contaminated with PuOz
at or above 0.2 /_Ct/m z from an early first stage ascent phase accident
resulting in a release. A study on citrus groves contaminated with PuO2
indicated that the plutonium dioxide on the fruit surfaces was not readily
washable with water. The PuO2 could enter the human food chain through
transfer to internal tissues auring peeling or in reconstituted juices,
flavorings, or other products made from orange skins. Approximately 1 percent
of the PuO2 deposited on the orange groves would be retained on fruit
harvested tn the year following deposition. Almost all would be from fruit
surface contamination. In contrast with the fruit, plutonium was readily
washed away from leaf surfaces (Pinder eta]. undated). Thus, if the leaf
surfaces were washed, recontamination of the fruit should not occur.
Resuspenston of plutonium from the soil via splash up was also studied. Very
little, if any, reached the fruit or leaf surfaces. This was thOught to occur
because splash up generally does not reach a height greater than I m (3 ft)
above the ground. Host orange tree leaves are over [ m (3 ft) above the
ground.
Mitigation of contaminated citrus fruit could include collection and
disposal of the contaminated fruit according to Federal and State regulations.
To prevent future contamination of citrus crops and protect the safety of
workers, the trees could be washed down to remove PuO2 from the leaves, and
the soil around the trees could be covered with new soil to reduce
resuspenslon. Future citrus crops could be monitored for PuOz contamination
before sold on the market.
Other crops grown in areas off the Kennedy Space Center site may be
contaminated by surface deposition. These crops would be examined and washed
to ensure no contamination. Those crops that can not be decontaminated may be
destroyed. The land on which the crops have been grown would be monitored and
scraping implemented if the monitoring shows significant PuOz concentrations.
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Urban Ar_l
Areas of land cover for human activities (e.g., buildings, roads,
ornamental vegetation, and grass areas) contaminated above the 0.2 pCi/m z
level would be monitored to determine if decontamination or mitigation actions
might be n@cessary. The results of the accident consequences analyses show up
to 2.240 m( of dry land areas could be contaminated at 25 mrem/yr. It is
likely that only small areas of cleanup would be necessary. If mitigation
actions were necessary, temporary relocation of the population from their
homes and workplaces may be required. Cleanup actions could last from several
days to several months. Rainfall could wash paved surfaces and exteriors of
buildings and move PuO z into the surface soil and surface waters.
There are several archaeological sites on the Kennedy Space Center site
and vicinity that may receive deposition by first stage ascent phase
accidents. In addition, Kennedy Space Center facilities that have historical
significance and are not damaged in the blast, could also have PuO_ deposited
on them. Presently, unknown archaeological sites could be within the area of
deposition. While the present analyses indicate that cleanup actions would
not be necessary (Table 4-10), should monitoring indicate otherwise, these
sites could be affected.
Deposition could also have a long-term effect on future investigations at
any archaeological site. Archaeological digs, by their very nature, disturb
the soil surface with digging and sifting operations, which could expose
workers and others to the PuOz. Radiological safety measures would need to be
taken to prevent potential health effects to the workers and could greatly
increase the cost of investigating these sites. If investigation of
archaeological sites that have PuOz deposited on them is proposed, a safety
analysis would be completed and approval given to proceed from appropriate
Federal and/or state authorities.
Inland Water and Ocean
The waters surrounding Merritt Island are classified by the State of
Florida as Class II and Class IIl waters, with radionuclide contamination
threshold limits of 15 pCi/l. Most of the PuO2 deposition is not expected to
be dissolved in the water column; therefore, tSis threshold level is not
expected to be exceeded.
Some of the waters surrounding Merritt Island are considered Outstanding
Florida Waters. These waters are designated to receive protection which
supersedes any other water classlfications and standards, and as such
prohibits any activity which reduces water quality parameters below existing
ambient water quality conditions. An ascent phase accident leading to a
release could deposit sufficient amounts of PuO2 to result in violation of
this protection standard. The recently designated manatee refuge (Banana
River north of State Road 528) could possibly be affected by deposition from
an early Phase I accident.
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Although shellfish harvesting is prohibited or un_pproved in some waters
surrounding Merritt Island, deposition above 0.2 _Ci/m" could impact an area
of conditionally approved shellfish harvesting. Again, the screening level is
used here only as an indicator. The EPA suggested screening level applies
only to land areas.
Mitigation of PuO2 impacts to inland water bodies may include any of the
following.
e All ditches and borrow pits with shallow depths and in close prgximity
to human activity receiving surface concentrations of 0.2 /_Ci/m" or
greater may need to be monitored. If the monitoring results provide
evidence of contamination, the ditches and borrow pits may need to be
drained and any contaminated sediment removed and disposed of within
Federal and State requirements. Larger areas of ponded water in close
proximity to human activity can also be monitored. Mitigation could
include skimming to remove the surficlal film of PuO.. Monitoring
after skimming will determine the need for water and)or sediment
removal. Measures should be employed to reduce surficlal runoff and
sediment from entering water bodies used by humans.
Recreational water activities (e.g., swimming, boating), as well as
sport and commercial fishing, may need to be restricted in larger
water bodies until monitoring results indicate that it is safe for
them to be resumed.
Monitoring the amount of PuOz suspended and/or dissolved in the water
columns of impacted water bodies wtll determine if PuO2 has been deposited in
the sediments. Benthic organisms, such as clams, scallops, and crabs, should
be monitored for bioaccumulation of PuO2. If bioaccumulation of PuOz in
benthic organisms is significant, then it should be determined if consumption
of such organisms would pose a human health hazard. If it is determined that
consumption of such organisms will pose a human health hazard, harvesting of
such organisms should be banned until concentration levels within the
organisms no longer pose a threat.
If it is determined that PuOz concentrations are significant in either
the water or sediment of impacted water bodies, then PuO2 btoaccumulatton in
aquatic vegetation should be monitored. If bioaccumulatlon of PuO2 in aquatic
vegetation is found to be significant, then organisms that feed off of these
aquatic plants should also be monitored for PuO2 bioaccumulation and the
levels of bioaccumulatton determined that could pose a human health threat if
such organisms are consumed.
Surface contamination levels may also impact the recharge areas of the
surficial aquifer. The surficial aquifer serves as the potable water source
for the cities of Titusville, Mtms, and Palm Bay. In addition, many wells on
private land in the area use the surftctal aquifer as a source of water.
Plutonium dioxide may have the potential to contaminate this aquifer, but
since PuOz is essentially insoluble, it is unlikely for any contamination to
reach the wellheads of municipal water supplies. It is also highly unlikely
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that any contamination on the Kennedy Space Center will reach offsite wells,
including municipal water supply wells. Transport through the underlying
aquatard to the lower Floridan aquifer is considered very unlikely.
Mitigation could include assessment of the amount of contamination in the
different soil horizons in aquifer recharge areas to determine if the
plutonium dioxide is migrating to the water table. If the potential for
migration of PuOR to the aquifer is high, these areas could be scraped to
below the contamlnation depth and the spoil disposed of properly. Private
wells in the area of contamination could be monitored and alternative water
supplies would need to be developed if contamination occurs.
A rough order of magnitude of possible cleanup costs can be estimated as
follows. Guidance under consideration calls for cleanup where dose levels due
to deposition exceed 100 millirems per year. This analysis indicated no such
areas. The same guidance indicates monitoring, but not cleanup, at dose
levels below 10 millirem per year. This analysis indicates that, in the mean
value case for O-IO s_conds, during the first year following plume passage, an
area of 2.16 x 10.3 km" exceeded 25 mrem/yr at a probability of 3.3G x 10.6.
Using the cost estimate of $25 million per square kilometer yields an
expectation value of cleanup cost which is a small fraction of the total
investment in this mission. Even using the figure of $475 million per square
kilometer still yields an expectation value of cleanup cost which is small
compared to the investment in the mission.
4.3.2.4 Assessment of Global Impacts
This section presents the environmental consequences of the last three
mission phases. The contamination from a release during any of these later
phases will result from accidents in which GPHS modules or fueled clads impact
a hard surface. Each of the GPHS modules or fueled clads involved in the
accident release would release PuO2 at a different location separated by a few
kilometers to hundreds or thousands of kilometers. Each release point is
independent of the other.
The radiological consequence analysis indicated that deposition from an
accident in any of the last three mission phases did not exceed the cleanup
level of 25 mrem/yr (or even 10 mrem/yr) as noted in Tables 4-4 and 4-5.
Should an accident occur during the mission, resulting in deposition
outside the United States, the Federal government will respond with the
technical assistance and support needed to clean up and remediate affected
areas, and to recover the plutonium fuel.
In summary, due to its low solubility in water and its limited uptake in
the food chain, in the unlikely event of an accident, the plutonium dioxide
RTG fuel released is expected to have very limited health or environmental
effects through these pathways, given the accident and risk analyses.
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4.3.3 Emeraencv Resoonse Planninq
In the event of an accident involving the Ulysses spacecraft and its RTG,
NASA and the DOE (the RTG supplier), have developed a comprehensive
contingency plan to ensure that any accident, whether tt involves a
radiological release or not, can be met with a well-developed and tested
response. The plan encompasses every phase of the Ulysses mission. It has
been coordinated with the Federal, State, and County organizations involved in
the launch, and has been exercised to assure the various organizations are
prepared to support the launch. The contingency plan entails the following
steps:
• Determine whether there has been a release of radioactive material
e Assess and characterize the extent of any release
i Predict the propagation and dispersion of the released matertal
e
e
Formulate/recommend protective and mitigating actions to safeguard
people and property from the consequences of the release
Minimize the effects of a release through control of the contaminated
areas and containment of radioactive materials
a Recover and dispose of the radioactive material
e Decontaminate and recover affected areas, facilities, equipment, and
properties.
A specially equipped Radiation Control Center located at KSC would direct
any emergency actions required during prelaunch countdown or early ascent.
These emergency actions would involve ground and aerial radiation monitoring
by prepositioned teams, and possibly precautionary sheltering or relocating
personnel. From a nearby offsite location, DOE, EPA, and the State of Florida
would conduct radiological monitoring and assess the accumulated data. In the
event of even the smallest release, or in support of preplanned precautionary
measures, the State of Florida and local governments would decide upon an
appropriate course of action. As more detailed radiological measurements
became available, decisions on the addition or rescission of precautions would
be made by State and local authorities. Long-termmenitoring and recovery
measures would be the responsibility of the EPA and the State of Florida.
4.4 INCOMPLETE OR UNAVAILABLE INFORMATION
The magnitude of the environmental impact for normal launches has been
determined from extensive data gathered over the past nine years. For the
assessment of posstble accidents that could result in a release from the RTG,
data has been derived from models, simulations, and analyses based on the
extensive test and verification program as discussed in Section 4.1.4.3 and
Appendix C.
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This Environmental Impact Statement uses the safety analysis conducted by
DOE for the Ulysses mission (see Appendix C and G) as its primary data source
for the risk assessment of accidents releasing nuclear material. The analysis
of the Ulysses mission builds upon the analysis of the Galileo mission, which
also used the Shuttle/IUS launch configuration. Even though Ulysses has an
additional third (PAM-S) stage, the third stage operates far from Earth and is
not expected to contribute to accident environments. The basic launch vehicle
configuration has therefore been through two comprehensive safety analyses,
including major external peer evaluations.
Regarding the conditional probability of release and the consequence
analysis, in addition to the analyses of RTG response to accidents (FSAR,
Volume II), and the dispersion and deposition analysis (FSAR, Volume Ill),
there has been an integrated (i.e., overall) risk assessment which used Monte
Carlo techniques to combine all of the source terms from the LASEP analysis
(FSAR, Volume II, Book I) with the ranges of possible dispersion, deposition,
and exposure pathway characteristics (FSAR, Volume Ill, Book I). This
resulted in tables of possible consequences, Table 4-3 to 4-5. Even within
LASEP, the analysis sampled across ranges for release thresholds and ranges
for material properties where there were data and experience to support such a
range. These techniques were intended to allow for uncertainties in material
properties and for differences in the interpretation of test data. Through
use of these techniques, the results are judged to be representative of the
range of eventualities which may pertain to an accident situation. For
instance, if a launch area accident were to occur, winds could be blowing from
sea to shore or shore to sea. The risk assessment takes into account the
range and frequency of the climatological situations.
For the purposes of this analysis, risk is defined as the product of the
consequences and probability of that consequence. In the risk assessment,
source terms, dispersions, deposition, and dose parameters ranged over one or
more orders or magnitude in the Monte Carlo (SPASM Code) combinations. For
the mission as a whole, the largest 9gth percentile consequence is for late in
Mission Phase I (106-120 seconds) and is 14.5 health effects at a probability
of 2.27 x I0"a. Allowing for even an additional order of magnitude
uncertainty, the risk would be 3.3 x I0TM health effects. Dividing by the
affected population, the average individual risk would still be several orders
of magnitude below any of the tabulated risks routinely faced by the public.
In view of the extensive analyses of the Shuttle/IUS launch configuration
together with the comprehensive analysis of significant parameters (and their
variabilities) which affect risk, sufficient information exists to enable a
decision among the alternatives in this EIS.
4.5 NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE
There are no environmental impacts associated with the no-action
alternative; however, there are major economic, programmatic, and geopolitical
consequences of such a cancellation. Through FY 1990 (i.e., through
September 30, 1989), NASA will have expended approximately $150 million on the
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Ulysses program. Cancellation would mean the abandonment of that investment
and a loss of the anticipated scientific gains identified in Section 1.2.
Currently, the United States has a clear lead in the exploration of the
solar system. Programmatically, there are currently no backup missions that
could achieve Ulysses' scientific goals within this century. Thus, the United
States would forego detailed scientific knowledge from the Ulysses mission.
4.6 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
The proposed action is the completion of preparations and operation of
the Ulysses mission, including its launch on the STS/IUS PAM-S in October 1990
or November 1991 as the backup contingency opportunity. The alternative to
the proposed action is no-action; that is, to terminate further commitment of
resources to the mission. The only expected environmental consequences are
associated with a normal launch. These impacts have been treated elsewhere in
NASA National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation. Even in the
statistically rare event of an accident leading to a release of plutonium, the
estimated consequences are quite limited, and the risks are small.
4.7 ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED
During the normal launch, hydrogen chloride will be produced by the SRBs.
This will likely produce short-term acidification of shallow surface waters
near the launch pad and deposition on nearby vegetation. The airborne
concentrations of aluminum oxide particulates within the launch cloud will
exceed air quality standards (see Section 4.1.2.1) for a short period, but
should not affect the overall ambient air quality of areas outside the launch
cloud. The deposition of HCI from the Shuttle exhaust will probably result in
some vegetation damage near the launch pad and possible fish kills in onsite
ponds near the launch pad. Launch of the Ulysses mission will contribute to
long-term changes in species richness in the near-field environment that will
be experienced with the resumption of STS launches at Launch Complex 39.
Launch of the Ulysses mission will also introduce ozone-degrading hydrogen
chloride into the stratosphere. This will have limited, temporary effect on
global ozone levels.
In the event of an accident near KSC, it is possible that some areas
could be contaminated by plutonium dioxide. The probability of this occurring
is predicted to be less than I in 215 thousand (first three subphases of first
stage ascent total probability of release). If such an accident
did occur, decontamination of land, vegetation, and buildings could be
required, and costs would be incurred.
4.8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USES OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT AND THE
MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT OF LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY
4.8.1 Short-Term Uses
The affected environment, for the short term, includes the KSC and
surrounding areas. The short-term uses of the area include NASA operations, a
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fish and wildlife refuge, citrus groves, residential communities, and
recreational areas. The proposed action will be conducted in accordance with
past and ongoing NASA procedures for operations at the launch site.
4.8.2 Lonq-Term Productivity
The KSC region will continue to support citrus groves and wildlife
habitat, as well as human activities. The proposed action should have no
long-term effect on such uses. Successful completion of the project, however,
may have an impact on the future of the space program and the continued
economic stability of Merritt Island and the surrounding areas. Both the
human and biotic ecosystems are expected to maintain their harmonious
productivity.
A potentially large benefit to be gained from successful completion of
this project is a better understanding of Earth through exploration and study
of the Sun. Included among the benefits are better understanding of the
Earth's climate, the Earth/space environment, and the Earth/space interface.
4.9 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES
4.9.1 Iridium
A total of IOg.5 troy ounces of iridium are contained in the Ulysses RTG.
This amount represents less than 0.0001 percent of the discovered reserves of
this metal in the world. Based on a cost of $315 per troy ounce, the December
1989 market price of iridium (DOI 1989), approximately $34,461 worth of
iridium would be irreversibly committed to the Ulysses mission.
Essentially all platinum-group metals, including iridium, are recycled in
domestic use, resulting in a small percentage loss. Consequently, the total
supply available does not appreciably decrease with time, as is the case with
less precious materials that are not aggressively recycled. The United States
maintains a strategic stockpile of iridium and, in 1988, had an inventory of
approximately 29,500 troy ounces (DOD IgBg). Although the amount of iridium
lost in the successful implementation of the missions would represent about
0.46 percent of the current U.S. stockpile, this amount could easily be
replaced from the world supply through current sources.
4.9.2 P1utonium-238
The RTG contains approximately 23.7 pounds of plutonium dioxide.
Therefore, successful implementation of the Ulysses mission therefore would
result in the loss of this much plutonium-238.
4.9.30_hqr Materials
The total quantities of other materials in the payloads that would be
irreversibly and irretrievably committed to the Ulysses mission are relatively
minor. These materials consist primarily of steel, aluminum, titanium, iron,
molybdenum, plastic, glass, nickel, chromium, lead, zinc, and copper, as well
as small quantities of silver, mercury, gold, and platinum.
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5. CONTRIBUTORS TO THE EIS
This Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared by Code SL of the
Office of Space Science and Applications of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). The organizations and individuals listed below
contributed inputs for use by NASA Code SL in the preparation of this document.
Table 5-I summarizes, for each contributor, the sections of the EIS for which
inputs were prepared.
PREPARER
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dudley McConnell, Ph.D. Deputy Director for Advanced Programs
Solar System Exploration Division
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
National AerQn_utics and Space Admini@tratiQn
David Bohlin, Ph.D.
Joyce Jatko
Arthur Reubens
Chief Scientist for Space Physics Division
NASA Acting NEPA Coordinator
Lead Electromagnetic Compatibility Engineer,
Integration Engineering Office, JSC
Science Applications International CorDoration
Barry Nichols
Dennis Ford, Ph.D.
Jeffrey Weiler
Douglas Outlaw, Ph.D.
Reginald Gotchy, Ph.D.
Isaac Kwarteng, Ph.D.
SAIC Project Manager
Senior Environmental Analyst
Senior Environmental Analyst
Senior Environmental Scientist
Senior Health Physicist
Environmental Engineer
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Reed Wilcox
Donald Meyer
Supervisor, Launch Approval Planning Group
Manager, Ulysses Mission Design, Operations
and Engineering
U.S. Department of Enerqy
A. Thomas Clark, Ph.D.
NUS Corporation
Manager, Operations Group,
Office of Special Applications
Bart Bartram
Richard Englehart, Ph.D.
Senior Executive Consultant
Senior Executive Consultant
GE
Richard Heml er Manager of RTG Programs
LOS Alamos National LaboratorY
Roy Zocher Project Leader, Safety, and Isotope Fuels Program
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6. AGENCIES AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED
This Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) was preceeded by a Draft
EIS which was made available for review and comment by Federal, state, and
local agencies and the public, as applicable, for a 45-day comment period.
All information received was considered during the preparation of the Final
EIS.
In preparing this EIS, NASA has actively solicited input from a wide
group of interested parties. In addition to the publication in the Federal
Register of a Notice of Intent (54 FR 48168) and a Notice of Availability
(55 FR 6326) for the DEIS, NASA mailed copies of the DEIS directly to agencies
and organizations which may have interest in environmental impacts and
alternatives associated with the Ulysses mission.
Comments on the DEIS were solicited or received from the following:
Federal Agencies:
Council on Environmental Quality
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management and Budget
U.S. Department of the Air Force
U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services-Centers for Disease Control
U.S. Department of the Interior
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of Transportation
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
State Agencies:
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council
State of California--Office of the Governor
State of Florida, Office of the Governor
State of New Mexico
Local Agencies:
Brevard County: Board of Commissioners
Comprehensive Planning Division
Economic Development Council
Planning and Zoning Department
Canaveral Port Authority
Cape Canaveral, City of
Cocoa, City of
Titusville, City of
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Organizations:
Air Pollution Control Association
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Brevardians for Peace and Justice
Center for Law and Social Policy
Christic Institute
Citizens for Peace in Space
Citizens to Stop Plutonium in Space
Committee for Risk Analysis and Regulation
CommonCause
Concern, Inc.
Environmental Defense Fund
Environmental Policy Institute
Federation of American Scientists
Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice
Florida Defenders of the Environment
Foundation on Economic Trends
Friends of the Earth
National Academy of Sciences
National Audubon Society
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
National Mobilization for Survival
National Space Society
National Wildlife Federation
Natural Resources Defense Council
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Project Censored
Radioactive Waste Campaign
SANE/FREEZE
Sandia National Laboratory
Sierra Club
Sierra Club, Committee on Military Impacts on the Environment
Sierra Club, Florida Chapter
Southern California Federation of Scientists
The American Association for the Advancement of Science
The Committee to Bridge the Gap
The HERO Project
The Planetary Society
The Union of Concerned Scientists
Women's International Coalition to Stop Making Radioactive Waste
Individuals:
Lance J. Bollinger (no address provided)
Dr. Horst Poehler
Mr. and Mrs. Paul Puchstein
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AFO
AOA
ALARA
ALSEP
AMTEC
APSA
ASD
ATO
AU
BEIR
BRC
CAA
CBCF
CCAFS
CEQ
Ci
cm
CO
DEIS
DOC
DOD
DOE
DOI
DREF
DSN
ECFRPC
EDE
EIS
EMC
EMI
EMISM
Abort-From-Orbit
Abort-Once-Around
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment Package
Alkali Metal Thermoelectric Converter
Advanced Photovoltaic Solar Array
Advanced Solar Dynamic
Abort-To-Orbit
Astronomical Units
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Below Regulatory Control
Clean Air Act
Carbon Bonded Carbon Fiber
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
Council on Environmental Quality
Curie
centimeter
Carbon Monoxide
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
Dissolved Organic Carbon
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Interior
Dose Reduction Effectiveness Factor
Deep Space Network
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council
Effective Dose Equivalent
Environmental Impact Statement
Electromagnetic Compatibility
Electromagnetic Interference
Electromagnetic Interference Safety Margins
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EPA
ESA
ESD
ESMC
ET
ETR
FAST
FC
FEIS
FDER
FDNR
FGFWFC
FRERP
f/s
FSAR
FTS
FUSRAP
FWPF
FY
g
GIS
GPHS
HERF
HERO
ICE-E
ISEE-3
ICRP
IMP-8
INSRP
ISEE-3
IUS
JPL
JSC
Kd
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
European Space Agency
Electrostatic Discharge
Eastern Space and Missile Center
External Tank
Eastern Test Range
Failure/Abort Sequence Tree
Fueled clad
Final Environmental Impact Statement
Florida Department of Environmental Regulations
Florida Department of Natural Resources
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
feet per second
Final Safety Analysis Report
Flight Termination System
Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Program
fine weave, pierced fabric
Fiscal Year
gram
Graphite impact shell
General Purpose Heat Source
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuels
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance
International Cometary Explorer-E
International Solar Earth Explorer
International Commission on Radiological Protection
International Monitoring Platform-8
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel
International Solar Earth Explorer
Inertial Upper Stage
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
Distribution Coefficient
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kg
KSC
km/s
km2
LASEP
LES8/9
LET
Ibs
MECO
MET
MMH
ffgn
m/s
MSA
NAS
NASA
NCRP
NESHAP
NEPA
NIH
NOAA
NOI
NOX
NO2
NRC
NSTS
OFW
OMS
PAMS
PAM-S
ppm
PSAR
psi
Pu
kilograms
Kennedy Space Center
kilometers per second
square kilometers
Launch Accident Scenario Evaluation Program
Lincoln Experimental Satellite 8 and g
Low Energy Transfer
pounds
Main Engine Cut Off
Mission elapsed time
Monomethyl hydrazine
millimeter
meters per second
Metropolitan Statistical Area
National Academy of Sciences
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
National Environmental Policy Act
National Institutes of Health
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Notice of Intent
Nitrogen Oxides
Nitrogen Dioxide
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Space Transportation System
Outstanding Florida Waters
Orbital Maneuvering System
Permanent Air Monitoring Station
Payload Assist Module-Special
parts per million
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
pounds per square inch
Plutonium
A-3
PuOz
RCE
RCRA
RDA
RDT&E
ROD
RSO
RSS
RTG
RTLS
SAR
SER
SNAP
SOz
SPP
SRB
SPJ4
SSEP
SSME
STS
TAL
TEC
TOPEX
_Ci
.g/m 3
UNSCEAR
USAEC
USAF
USFWS
VAB
VAFB
W
WIND
Plutonium dioxide
Reaction Control Equipment
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RDA Logicon, Inc.
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Record of Decision
Range Safety Officer
Range Safety System
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
Return to Launch Site (abort)
Safety Analysis Report
Safety Evaluation Report
Space Nuclear Auxiliary Power
Sulfur Dioxide
Space Physics Program
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Solar System Exploration Program
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Space Transportation System
Transoceanic Abort Landing
Turbine Energy Converter
Ocean Topography Experiment
micro Curies
micrograms per cubic meter
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
United States Atomic Energy Commission
United States Air Force
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Vertical Assembly Building
Vandenberg Air Force Base
Watt
Weather Information Network Display
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B.I INTRODUCTION
B.I.I RTG Response tq Accidents: Source Term Derivatiqn
This appendix describes the methodology of the analyses of FSAR
Volume II, the Accident Model Document (AMD) (DOE iggof) which principally
presents the response of the RTG to various accident environments. That is,
if there is a source term, then the analysis describes its magnitude, location
(air, ground, fireball), and conditional probability of source term occurrence
given that the initiating accident occurred.
B.I.2 Accident Probabilities: Updated Values
A key input to the overall analysis is the probability of the initiating
accidents. Based on its operational experience and knowledge of the launch
system, NASA provides accident scenario probabilities to the DOE for use in
the safety analysis. In July 1988, NASA provided data to DOE for use in both
the Galileo and Ulysses safety analyses. In April Iggo, as part of its
continuing oversight of Shuttle operations, NASA completed a reassessment of
Shuttle accident scenario probabilities and provided those updated values to
DOE. The data could not be incorporated in the FSAR. NASA did, however, ask
the DOE to use the updated data to update the Ulysses safety analysis for
incorporation in the FEIS. The basic methodology of the RTG response analysis
and of the nuclear risk assessment remained unchanged. The only change was in
the values for the initiating accident probabilities. The updated probability
values are generally higher (by a factor of about three) than the earlier
values, so their use is an added measure of conservatism. To avoid confusion,
Appendix C presents only the tabular and graphical results of the updated
analysis.
B.2 ACCIDENT SCENARIO DEFINITION APPROACH
The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) approach to
defining potential accident scenarios and probabilities involved several
steps. First, potential failures were identified that could occur in each of
the seven major elements of the Shuttle Space Transportation System (STS):
• Launch Support Equipment
• Payload
• Orbiter
• External Tank (ET)
• Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs)
• Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs)
e Range Safety Destruct System.
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The failure modes of concern are those that generally cause a loss of the
vehicle and may produce an accident environment which is a potential threat to
the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG). These are generally single
point failures in systems and subsystems which cannot be mitigated by
astronaut intervention or other pre-planned system overrides. These failure
modes represent exceptions to the program requirement of single-failure
tolerance. They have been accepted by NASA technical and program management
and by the contractor, after extensive review indicating that they were
impractical or imposstb]e to eliminate.
The next step involved dividing the mission into five phases, with each
of the phases subdivided further, as necessary. Fault trees were developed
for each of these mission phases. Each fault tree encompassed, as
appropriate, all relevant failures that could occur in the seven major Shuttle
systems. Finally, because many of the accident scenarios represented by the
fault trees looked similar, representative accident scenarios were developed
for each of the mission phases.
After the Johnson Space Center developed the mapping of system failures
into scenarios, NASA provided estimates of failure probabilities for each of
the systems as a function of time (see Appendix G). These estimates were
generated based on reviews of system characteristics, historical failure rate
data from similar systems, and previous safety analyses. Because of the wide
uncertainty in applying historical data, NASA provided estimates with an order
of magnitude range for each system. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), with
NASA concurrence, then used the geometric means of each range in performing
its safety analysis. The representative accident scenarios and accident
probabilities are presented in Tables B-1 and B-Z, respectively. The
accidents listed represent only failures that can potentially lead to RTG
damage and possible fuel release.
B.3 ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
This section summarizes information contained in the Accident Model
Document of the DOE Final Safety Analysis Report for the Ulysses mission (DOE
1990f).
Accident scenarios and environments by mission phase (from NASA 1988, and
as described in DOE 1990f) are summarized in Table B-I. The applicable intact
abort modes for each phase are also indicated in Table B-1. The intact abort
modes are: Return to Launch Site (RTLS), Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAt),
Abort-Once-Around (AOA), Abort-To-Orbit (ATO), and Abort-From-Orbit (AFO).
The first four are generally caused by premature shutdown of one of the SSMEs.
AFO would be a result of ATO or a problem with the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)
or spacecraft which prevented deployment on orbit. If two or more SSNEs shut
down during parts of the ascent to orbit, a contingency abort mode leading to
crew bailout and ocean ditch of the Shuttle would occur. Finally, there is a
very small probability of multiple Shuttle system failures leading to a crash
during the landing phase. Both types of crash accidents were evaluated in the
Final Safety Analysis Report (DOE 1990d, DOE 1990e, DOE 1990f, DOE 1990g).
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TABLE B-I. ACCIDENT SCENARIOS BY MISSION PHASE, STS
Phase Description Accident Scenario
Prelaunch to Launch
(T-8 hrs. to T = 0 sec.)
First Stage Ascent
(T + 0 sec. to 128 sec.)
Second Stage (SSME) Ascent
(T + 128 sec. to 532 sec.)
On-Orbit
(T+532 sec. to 6 hrs.4Om.)
Payload Deploy
(T + 6 hr 4Om. to
Spacecraft Escape)
Inadvertent Range Safety System (RSS)
destruct
Pad Fire/explosion
Solid Rocket Booster failure*
Case Rupture
Tower Impact
Loss of Thrust
No Ignition
Range Safety System destruct*
Aft compartment explosion
Vehicle breakup
Orbiter Failure
External Tank Failure
Payload Failure
Crash landing
Ocean ditch
Intact Abort Scenario - RTLS, TAL
Vehtcle Breakup*
Orbiter failure
External Tank failure
Space Shuttle main engine failure
Payload failure
Range Safety System destruct
Crash landing
Ocean ditch
Intact Abort Scenario - TAL, ATO
Orbiter failure and reentry*
Intact Abort Scenario - AFO
Solid Rocket Motor Case burst/
burnthrough (IUS)
Other IUS Failures/Reentry*
Solid Rocket Motor no ignition,
Low impulse
Tumbling from separation or
recontact
Misaligned burns due to guidance
failure
Erratic burns
* Indicates scenario potentially resulting in release of RTG fuel.
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TABLE B-2. ULYSSES NISSION ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES
Phase 0
Pad Fire Explosion
Phase 1
Tower Impact
SRB Loss of Thrust
SRB No Ign_tton
SRB Case Burst
Range Destruct
Aft. Compartment Exp]osfon
Vehic]e Breakup
Crash Landing
Ocean Ditch
Phase 2
Vehtc]e Breakup
Crash Landing
Ocean Ditch
Phase 3
On Orbit Failure
Phase 4
Reentry
1 Geometric mean of a decade range
z Arithmetic mean of distribution
Updated"
1.79 x 10 "4
2.06 x lO "4
2.49 x 10 .3
7.59 x 10 "s
1.02 x lO "3
1.51 x 10 .6
3.95 x 10 .6
8.98 x 10 s
3.79 x 10 "6
7.21 x I0 "s
1.51 X 10 "3
8.85 x 10.6
1.68 x 10"4
1.58 x 10 .4
6.16 x 10"3
2.91 x 10 "3
1.89 x 10"4
2.17 x 10 .3
8.65 x I0"s
2.92 x 10 .3
1.70 x 10 .6
3.54 x 10 .3
2.20 x 10 "4
3.79 x 10 .6
7.21 x 10"s
5.65 x I03
8.0 x 10.6
l.Sg x 10.4
5.75 x I0"4
6.16 x I0 3
Source: See Appendix G
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The primary accidents for each phase are generally caused by the most
active portion of the system during that phase. For the propulsive phases, it
is generally that system providing the propulsive thrust, the structure
supporting the thrust and being acted on by external loads, and/or the
guidance system. Multiple redundancies in the Shuttle guidance tend to
decrease the likelihood of guidance failures for the Shuttle.
Environments created by the accidents generally depend on the source of
the accident and the time that it occurs. Time is important because it may
affect the character of the source or the resulting secondary environments.
For example, the Shuttle SRB fragments will achieve higher velocity if an SRB
case failure occurs near the end of the burn when less propellant is available
to be accelerated along with the case wall. Liquid propellant explosions are
more severe near the ground where the ground promotes mixing. Early failures
can result in ground impacts, while failures above the upper atmosphere can
result in reentry heating and subsequent ground or water impact.
Phas_ 0 Ac_iUent Scenarios (Pre-Launch)
Phase 0 accidents of concern are those associated with propellant
loading. A pad fire or a pad explosion are the primary accidents of concern.
The causes for either accident are the same, being linked to failures in
launch support equipment, vehicle structural failures, propellant
contamination, and inadvertent Range Safety System destruct activation. The
latter accident could occur only after destruct arming in the last 20 seconds
before launch.
Phase 1 Accident Scenarios (SRB Burn)
Phase 1 commences with launch at T-O seconds and ends with separation of
the SRBs at T+128 seconds. Phase 1 accident scenarios (Table B-l) represent
the period in which the SRBs are the primary failure threat, and the external
environments which may be seen by the RTG can be affected by ground surface
interactions. A failure of the left SRB in the first 2 seconds can cause
vehicle impact with the launch tower. Between 0 and 10 seconds, a release of
ET propellants caused by either a Shuttle main engine failure or a rupture of
the ET initiated by a SRB case rupture can cause a ground surface pool
explosion, which is explained in Section B.3. After about 17 seconds, the
trajectory of the launch vehicle, if thrust were stopped, would lead to water
impact rather than land impact.
An aft-compartment explosion causing the large bipropellant feed lines to
rupture and propellant flow onto the launch pad can result from a Shuttle main
engine failure. In this accident, the Shuttle continues its ascent until the
blast wave, from explosion of the propellants pooled on the launch pad,
reaches the vehicle and causes it to break up. The SRBs continue their ascent
until Range Safety System (RSS) destruct occurs.
In-flight vehicle breakup occurring between T+IO seconds and the end of
Phase 1 can occur with a catastrophic structural failure of the ET. Between
T+IO to T+30 seconds, the massive dump of liquid propellants can lead to an
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explosion with breakup of the Shuttle and subsequent ground impact.
T+30 seconds and the end of Phase 1, a trailing fire and small local
explosions would ensue with vehicle breakup and impact in the ocean.
Between
In addition to vehicle breakup by instantaneous failures of the SRBs or
SSMEs, RSS destruct is an intentional abort action by the Range Safety Officer
in the event the Shuttle vehicle trajectory could result in endangering
populated land areas.
Automatic shutdown of one of the SSMEs during Phase 1 can lead to a RTLS
intact abort mode. After SRB separation, the vehicle reverses the direction
of flight till such a time when main engine cutoff (MECO) point is reached,
which allows acceptable Orbiter/ET separation conditions, acceptable ET impact
location, and an acceptable range for the Shuttle to glide back to the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC). A Shuttle failure on touchdown can result in a crash
landing.
If a combination of failures occurs which does not allow the Shuttle to
safely return to KSC, the contingency abort plan of crew bailout will occur,
leading to ocean ditch.
Phase _ Acclden_ Scenarios (Start of Ist Orbital Maneuverina System Burn)
This phase of the flight starts when the SRBs separate from the vehicle
at T+128 seconds and extends until start of Ist Orbital Maneuvering System
burn at T+532 seconds. The primary vehicle catastrophic accidents during this
period (Table B-I) result in vehicle breakup or in failure to achieve orbit,
leading to uncontrolled reentry. Given a normal mission trajectory, accidents
in this phase would occur at altitudes in excess of 150,000 feet with the
vehicle a minimum of 40 miles down range from KSC.
At altitudes exceeding 150,000 feet, explosions and fragment environments
are no longer a threat to the RTG. The SRBs are no longer attached and
formation of explosive mixtures of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen from the
ET cannot result in explosion overpressures, considering the rarefied
atmosphere at the altitudes during which this phase takes place. Ballistic
reentry of the spacecraft will result in breakup and release of the RTG.
There are only 5.5 sec of MET (out of 404 sec of Phase 2 total MET) during
which the RTG can reenter and have modules land on Africa.
Non-catastrophic shutdown of one or more SSMEs during this phase can lead
to a variety of intact or contingency abort modes.
Phase 3 Accident Scenarios rlst Orbital Maneuverina System Burn to IUS/
Payload Assist Module-Special DeDlovmentl
Phase 3 commences with initiation of the Ist Orbital Maneuvering System
burn at T+532 seconds and ends with deployment of the Ulysses/IUS/Payload
Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) at about T+6 hours 40 minutes. Accidents in
this phase would occur after vehicle orbit has been achieved but prior to
deployment of the Ulysses/IUS/PAM-S. The accidents of primary concern
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deployment of the Ulysses/IUS/PAM-S. The accidents of primary concern (Table
B-I) are those associated with Shuttle failures that would result in orbital
decay and eventual uncontrolled reentry. The entry angle would be very
shallow at a velocity of less than 26,000 feet per second. Should a
reentering General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) module impact rock or a similar
hard surface, small amounts of fuel could be released.
If problems are found with either orbital parameters, the Ulysses
spacecraft, or the IUS/PAM-S, that clearly indicate deployment from the
Shuttle would not result in a successful Earth escape trajectory insertion,
then two options exist. If safe return of the Shuttle is threatened,the cargo
will be jettisoned in low Earth orbit. However, if it is determined no threat
exists to a safe landing, the Shuttle will return with the cargo. The primary
and alternate landing sites noted previously for the AOA may be employed in
this abort mode.
Although abort landing accidents are theoretically possible from AFO, the
probability was considered to be very small compared to RTLS, TAL, or AOA
related accidents because the SSME does not affect AFO, and time pressures are
much reduced. Because of these considerations and since the consequences
would be no different, a separate treatment was not included in the Phase 3
analyses.
Phase 4 Accident Scenarios (UIvsses/IUS/PAM-S Deolovment to Earth Escape)
Phase 4 commences with deployment of the spacecraft/IUS/PAM-S at T+6
hours 40 minutes and ends with firing of the IUS and insertion of the
spacecraft on its trajectory to Jupiter. Accidents in this phase would occur
between UIysses/IUS/PAM-S separation from the Shuttle and trajectory
insertion. The accidents of primary concern (Table B-I) are IUS propulsion or
guidance failures which could result in vehicle breakup and/or in reentry from
orbit. The IUS motor case burst accidents could lead to large chunks of the
solid propellant interacting with the RTG. Reentry conditions can range from
speeds of 6,900 to 36,400 ft/sec at angles of -0.5 to -89.0 degrees. Should
the GPHS module impact rock or a similar hard surface, a small amount of fuel
could be released.
B.4 ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTS
The following paragraphs summarize the key accident environments which
were addressed in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the Ulysses mission
(DOE Iggof).
SRB Fr_omen_ Environment
During operation of a SRB, fragments will be produced upon rupture of the
steel pressure-containment motor case either by random failure or by range
destruct action. These substantial fragments may damage an RTG or propel it
into another structure. The size, velocity, and directional distributions of
SRB fragments are based in part upon analysis of films and recovered debris of
the destructed SRBs from the Challenger (STS SI-L) and the Titan 34D-g
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accidents. To supplement these empirical data and to fill gaps not
represented by the two accidents, analytical modeling was performed and
calculations were made using a computer code capable of predicting the very
fast structural breakup of the rocket motor case and the ensuing fragment
motion away from the centerline of the motor.
The characteristic mechanism for fragment formation is a rapid release of
the operating motor pressure through a fracture in the case causing further
extensive breakup of the case and rapid acceleration of the pieces to
velocities of hundreds of feet per second. The peak velocity of case wall
fragments depends on motor pressure and volume. The mass of propellant
remaining attached to a case wall fragment is also a major determinant of the
final fragment velocity. In addition to velocity, the fragment also rotates
or spins as it travels. Since all these parameters vary with mission elapsed
time, the spectrum of SRB fragment characteristics is highly dependent upon
mission elapsed time (MET) at the time of initial case fracture.
In the range destruct scenario, the two SRBs are destroyed
simultaneously. The two fragment fields thus created could result in
sequential hits on the RTG. Tests in which GPHS modules and intact RTGs were
subjected to impact by SRB motor case fragments have indicated that a fuel
release will not occur when the intact RTG is struck by the face of SRB
fragments (face-on) at velocities up to 695 feet-per-second (fps). (Note that
fragment velocities will not be in this range until near the end of Phase 1;
i.e., between 105 and 120 seconds after launch. During this period, a minimum
of 95 percent of the SRB fragment impacts would be in a face-on orientation.)
When struck by fragments in the edge-on orientation at velocities of 312 f/s
or greater, the leading fueled clads impacted can be breached with gram
quantities of fuel released. The probability of the range destruct scenarios
is much smaller than the probability of SRB random failure (see Table B-2).
Pre- _nd [_rly-Fliqht Ground Pool Exolosions
A significant explosion source for the Shuttle is possible should a
massive spill of the liquid oxygen and hydrogen ET propellants occur. Spills
of these propellants, as a result of ET structural breakup, Shuttle impact
with the launch tower, early range destruct, SRB case rupture, or Orbiter aft-
compartment explosions could lead to collection, mixing, and ignition of
significant portions of the propellants on launch pad surfaces while the
Shuttle is still essentially at the pad. The resulting blast wave
subsequently sweeps past the Orbiter, acting on the exterior surfaces in a
manner to implode or crush the structure into the RTG within the Orbiter. It
is also posstble that, as the blast wave causes the structure to fail, the RTG
will be directly exposed to the blast environment. Thus, not only Orbiter
fragmentation but also blast loading (acceleration) hazards are presented to
the RTG.
There have been no pad accidents involving the spillage of ET propellants
from which to base estimates of potential explosion environments, therefore,
environments are based on results from a hydrodynamic computer code capable of
predicting the blast loading parameters of a fast moving planar blast pulse as
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it travels through the air above the pad. The behavior of the explosion
energy release itself (source characteristic) is varied over a wide range to
include the range of uncertainty in the initial collection, mixing, and
ignition of the propellants. Since the explosion source characteristic
controls the blast pulse loading parameters, a probabilistic computational
treatment of the source characteristic yields a probabilistic estimate of
blast loading parameters at specified heights above the pad. Application of
these loading parameters to an analytical fragment acceleration model for the
Orbiter cargo bay door yields a probabilistic estimate of fragment velocity
for this closest component to the RTG.
An explosion of ET propellants on or near the launch pad would cause the
walls of the Shuttle payload bay to implode around the Ulysses spacecraft and
the RTG. Because ensuing distortion of fueled clads within the RTG is
estimated at 10 percent or less, fuel would not be released. The distortion
threshold for breach is 25 percent as determined in bare clad impact tests
conducted for the safety verification and test program.
In-F]iqht ExDIQsiQns
A second explosion source involving the ET propellants is possible for a
short time after the Shuttle has cleared the tower. Aerodynamic conditions
through the next 20 seconds (up to a MET of 30 seconds) are such that failures
of the ET structure can lead quickly to its breakup and the consequent
airborne dump of liquid hydrogen and oxygen propellants. The hydrogen quickly
vaporizes and mixes with air to form a vapor cloud. The burning SRBs provide
an ignition source to ignite the mixture at some distance from the Shuttle
depending upon velocity of the vehicle. A hydrodynamic computer code is used
to compute the blast loading parameters of a fast-moving, spherically-
expanding, blast pulse.
As the ET breaks up, propellant dump and mixing require an elapsed time
on the order of a second. As Phase I proceeds, the increasing speed of the
Shuttle over elapsed time allows an increased distance to develop between the
Orbiter and the center of explosion for the later occurring breakup. Hence,
the potential blast environment for airborne explosions rapidly diminishes.
Beyond MET 30 seconds, changing atmospheric and aerodynamic conditions will
preclude significant airborne explosions. No source terms are predicted for
this accident scenario.
An IUS solid-fuel rocket was in the Shuttle bay during the Challenger
accident as the booster to propel a data relay satellite into its prescribed
orbit. Detailed examination of photographic records, telemetry data, and
fragments recovered from the Challenger accident have shown that 1) no major
explosion occurred, rather a rupture of the external propellant tank,
initiated by the effects of the Shuttle booster joint failure, was followed by
release and rapid burn of some of the liquid propellants; 2) the Shuttle
Orbiter subsequently broke up under flight dynamic and aerodynamic forces; and
3) the IUS booster came out of the cargo bay relatively intact, broke up under
aerodynamic forces, and fell 50,000 feet to the ocean surface without violent
solid propellant ignition. Uncertain photographic evidence and an incomplete
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recovery of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite did not permit an assessment
of its response sequence.
The tnteragency study group formed to evaluate both the Challenger and
Titan 34 D-9 explosions (NASA et al. 1989) concluded that, had an RTG been on
board, both it and its cladded heat sources would have survived the Challenger
accident with no release of plutonium fuel. This study did not consider solid
rocket motor fragments since these were not a factor in the case of the
Challenger accident.
Fireball [nvironment From ET Prooellants
The updrafts and high temperatures within the fireball produced by a
large liquid propellant ground fire are important if the exposed RTG fuel
clads have been breached earlier by severe mechanical impact loads. The
released fuel fines in this case can be vaporized and dispersed into the
atmosphere by the ftreball environment. It should be noted that bare fueled
clads, that is those unprotected by any of the graphlttcs (aeroshell or
graphite impact shield, or the RTG case), have been demonstrated to survive
temperatures (see Section 2.2.4.3) greater than expected In the peak ftreball
(2,163°6 or 3,925°F), without a loss of fuel. The fireball will, however,
modify the particle size distribution or location of fuel released from clads
damaged by SRB fragments. Fires and the fireball above, cannot cause a
release of fuel.
Abort Crash Environments
During the latter aerodynamic flight portion of a return from a mission
abort, the Orbiter fltes without engine thrust and exhibits the same general
flight characteristics as a conventional heavy aircraft during a final landing
approach. Assuming that the orbiter has entered this final phase of the abort
return under normal control, a crash could ensue due to control error or
mechanical failures of the flight control system or landtng gear.
Examination of the Orbiter flight profile and flying characteristics
leads to a set of four abort crash accidents that are deemed credible: two
landing scenarios and two ocean ditch scenarios. In each case, crashes with
and without the final landing flare are considered in estimating the resulting
relative-impact velocity of the RTG with the surrounding Orbiter structure.
The estimated upper and lower bounds of these impact velocities are shown in
Table B-3. The environments experienced by the RTG during a landing crash or
ocean ditch are relatively mild compared with other accident environments.
The GPHS modules are capable of surviving impacts on steel and concrete up to
172 f/s and the bare fueled clads survive impact on concrete up to 113 f/s,
much more severe than the impacts experienced inside the Shuttle while
crushing up during an accident. For this reason, landing and ocean ditch
crash accidents are not considered to be threatening accident environments for
the RTG.
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TABLE B-3. RTG IMPACT VELOCITIES DUE TO ABORT CRASH: STS/IUS/PAM-S
Crash Scenario RTG Impact Velocity (fps)
Ditch No Flare
Ditch With F1are
Landing Pre-Flare
Landing Post-Fl are
Flat Spin
65-115
50-100
60-115
50-60
60-200
[nvironments For Uncontrolled Orbiter Reentry
Aerodynamic and heat transfer analysis of the uncontrolled, accidental
reentry of the Shuttle prior to the deployment of the upper stage and payload
shows that the RTG condition just prior to earth surface impact varies with
the time of launch failure. For the time interval of interest between SRB
separation (MET - 128 seconds) and the achievement of the parking orbit (MET -
510 seconds), the predictions are:
I) The Orbiter and IUS will always break up during reentry and will
not reach the surface intact.
2) For MET between 128 and 210 seconds, the RTG will reach the
surface intact without case melting and attached to the
spacecraft.
3) For MET between 210 and 238 seconds, the RTG can either reach the
surface without case melting, or if the case melts, the GPHS
modules may be released prior to reaching the surface.
4) For MET greater than 238 seconds, the GPHS modules are released
prior to surface impact.
s) For all MET less than 495 seconds, the RTG or GPHS modules reach
the surface over the Atlantic Ocean.
6) Between MET 495-501 seconds, the GPHS modules will impact on the
African continent along the ground track of the Shuttle.
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In_rti_l UDDer Staae and Payload Environments
The IUS/P@Uq-S does not significantly add to any of the accident
environments produced by the main launch vehicle. The solid propellant is not
detonable under accident conditions of concern for the Ulysses mission.
Although solid propellant impacting the ground as ejecta from other events may
react vigorously as an explosion, these events produce only localized blast
effects. In addition, the propellant does not contribute significantly to
fireball environments, since the burn is relatively slow and occurs at ambient
pressure.
Some IUS failures after the deployment of Ulysses/IUS/PAM-S from the
Orbiter result in errant reentry within the design capability of the RTG.
Earth impact conditions are similar to those for reentry from orbit.
The only IUS failure that can cause a direct threat to the RTG is a motor
case rupture during the second firing of the IUS. The dominant threat from
this failure is the production of fragments of solid propellant estimated to
be traveling at velocities in the range of 92 to 728 feet per second and
weighing from 2 to 8 pounds per fragment.
With a successful second-stage (IUS) burn, the spacecraft wlll be on its
trajectory toward Venus and will have escaped Earth's gravitational influence.
Thus, a failure in the PAM-S at this point in the mission will not result in a
threat that the spacecraft will reenter into the Earth's atmosphere and have a
potential of release of any RTG fuel into the Earth's environment.
The Ulysses spacecraft also does not significantly add to any of the
accident environments produced by the launch vehicle accident scenarios.
GPHS modules released by orbiter reentry or upper stage/payload accident
environments may release small amounts of fuel upon impact with land if rock
or other hard surfaces are hit.
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C.I INTRODUCTION
C.I.! Source Term Consequence Analysis and Risk A@@essmCnt
This appendix describes the methodology of the analyses of the Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Volume Ill, the Nuclear Risk Assessment Document
(NRAD) (DOE 19gOg). This volume principally presents the consequence, if any,
of the released material. That is, if there is a source term, then the
analysis describes how the atmosphere disperses and deposits the material, and
calculates the health and environmental consequences of the dispersed
material.
C.I.2 Aq¢ident Probabilities: UpdBted V_lues
A key input to the overall analysis is the probability of the initiating
accidents. Based on its operational experience and knowledge of the launch
system, NASA provides accident scenario probabilities to the DOE for use in
the safety analysis. In July 1988, NASA provided data to DOE for use in both
the Galileo and Ulysses safety analyses. In April 1990, as part of its
continuing oversight of Shuttle operations, NASA completed a reassessment of
Shuttle accident scenario probabilities and provided those updated values to
DOE. The data could not be incorporated in the FSAR. NASA did, however, ask
the DOE to use the updated data to update the Ulysses safety analysis for
incorporation in the FEIS. The basic methodology of the RTG response analysis
and of the nuclear risk assessment remained unchanged. The only change was in
the values for the initiating accident probabilities. The updated values are
generally higher (by a factor of about three) than the earlier values, so
their use is an added measure of conservatism. To avoid confusion, Appendix C
presents the tabular and graphical results of the updated analysis as provided
in Appendix G.
C.2 PROCEDURE FOR ANALYSIS OF RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducts a detailed analysis of the
safety of the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) systems used on
space missions. This analysis is included in the FSAR. The elements of the
analysis and the information flow are summarized in Figure C-1. For the
Ulysses mission, the DOE has prepared a Final Safety Analysis Report (DOE
19gOd, DOE 1990e, DOE 1990f, DOE 19gOg) to provide the basic safety data used
in this Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). Research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of RTGs has been an ongoing activity
within the DOE for over 3 decades and continues at the present time.
Specifically, RDT&E work on the Galileo/Ulysses RTGs has been underway since
the late IgTOs. For instance, even after publication of the FSAR for the
Galileo mission (DOE Ig88a, DOE 1988b, DOE 198ga), additional test and
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analysis results were documented in a supplement (DOE lg8gb). The Ulysses
safety analysis utilizes the data base, techniques, and experience developed
over the years. This appendix summarizes key information found in two
documents of the DOE Final Safety Analysis Report (DOE Iggof, DOE 19gOg),
which forms the basis for the evaluation of radiological consequences found in
Chapter 4 of the Ulysses FEIS.
The accident scenarios and environments were reviewed in Appendix B. Not
all accident scenarios were found to pose a threat to the RTG in terms of fuel
release. This appendix deals only with the accident scenarios potentially
leading to a release of fuel.
C.3 SOURCE TERMS
A source term consists of the quantity of fuel released (expressed in
Curies of plutonium dioxide), the location of the release, the particle size
distribution of the released PuOz, and the probability of release. The
methods for developing the source terms are described in the Accident Model
Document of the FSAR (DOE lggof) and are summarized below.
Shuttle-related accident source terms for Phase 0 and Phase I were
calculated using the Launch Accident Scenario Evaluation Program (LASEP 3).
LASEP 3 uses a Monte Carlo approach to simulate RTG response to a given
accident environment. This is done using I00,000 trials (20,000 trials for
the explosion case) for each scenario or subscenario considered, representing
variations on accident environment severity and RTG component responses
determined by probability distributions of conditions based on the accident
environments, hydrocode modeling, and component test results. The LASEP 3
calculations arrive ultimately at fueled clad distortion and amount of fuel
release, if it is found to occur. LASEP 3 was developed specifically for the
Ulysses safety analysis, utilizing the LASEP 2 program developed for the
Galileo analysis (DOE Ig88a, DOE Ig88b, DOE IgSga) as a foundation. The
following subsection discusses some key revisions and modifications
incorporated into the LASEP program for use as LASEP 3 in the Ulysses safety
analysis.
A number of revisions were made to LASEP utilizing updated environments
from the Shuttle Data Book (NASA ]gB8b) and more recent results obtained from
the GPHS Safety Test and Development Program conducted by DOE on the RTG and
its components. These revisions and others were incorporated into LASEP 3, as
discussed in the Ulysses Final Safety Analysis Report (DOE ]ggOd, DOE 19gOe,
DOE Iggof, DOE IggOg).
Changes were also made to LASEP 3 for Ulysses to accommodate the addition
of the Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) to the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)
and the positioning of the Ulysses RTG in the Orbiter bay. The long axis of
the Ulysses RTG is oriented perpendicular to the long axis of the Shuttle,
whereas the Galileo RTGs were along the sides of the spacecraft.
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The Monte Carlo calculational technique incorporated in LASEP 3 samples
values from the range of variables and conditions applicable to each failure
mode and accident scenario or subscenario. For example, in a given LASEP 3
trial (i.e., one of the I00,000 individual trials in a run) for a Solid Rocket
Booster (SRB) case rupture accident analysis, LASEP 3 randomly samples (within
the bounds set in the Shuttle Data Book) variables and conditions such as SRB
fragment size, fragmentvelocities, spin rates of the fragments, the direction
and angle at which the fragment leaves the disintegrating SRB case, and the
point along the mission trajectory (Mission Elapsed Time) at which the
accident occurs. LASEP 3 then determines if the RTG is hit by a fragment, and
utilizing the data base of RTG response to accident environments developed
through component tests and hydrocode modeling, determines the scenario of the
RTG damage as a result of the hit. If the damage is sufficient, LASEP 3 then
calculates the amount of fuel released in the air. LASEP 3 then continues to
analyze the trajectory of the RTG or RTG component (e.g., GPHS module, fueled
clad) to determine its Earth impact location (e.g., steel, concrete, sand) and
associated release if any. For Phase I accidents, LASEP 3 also determines
whether or not the release occurs within the confines of the fireball and
whether impact would occur on steel or concrete surfaces at the launch pad or
on the surrounding sandy areas, or in the ocean. Each release or source term
is further described by a particle size distribution.
The releases or source terms resulting from the Phase 1LASEP 3 runs are
reported in the Accident Model document of the Final Safety Analysis Report
(DOE 1990f) as the average for the given accident scenario or subscenario.
(The output from LASEP 3 are in the form of a distribution of source terms by
quantity of release.) The average source term is simply the average of the
source terms from those trials which result in a release (i.e., the average is
not based upon the ]00,000 trials in a run, only those that have a release).
Average source terms are reported for each release location (fireball, ground
level, in-air), (see Section 2 of DOE, ]990f).
Source terms for Phases 2, 3, and 4 accidents were developed utilizing
prior analyses of the response of the General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS)
modules to various types of reentry conditions. Among the tests providing
results pertinent to these analyses were the Safety Verification Test series,
the Design Iteration Test series, and the Reentw Testing program [details of
these programs are provided in the Accident Model Document of the Final Safety
Analysis Report (DOE lggof)].
Results of the accident analyses for all of the accident scenarios within
each mission phase show that only the accident scenarios listed below have any
potential for a release or source term.
m Phase 0 - None
• Phase 1 - SRB Case Rupture and Range Safety System (RSS) Destruct
e Phase 2 Vehicle Breakup
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• Phase 3 Uncontrolled Reentry of the Orbiter (Shuttle) and Payload
• Phase 4 - IUS/PAM-S Failure and Reentry with Breakup of the
Spacecraft.
C.3.1 Phase 0 Source Terms
None of the Phase 0 (Prelaunch) accident scenarios resulted in a release
of RTG fuel. The inadvertent RSS destruct scenario will not generate any case
or propellant fragments because the SRBs have not been ignited in this phase,
thus there is no chamber pressure in the SRBs with which to generate
fragments. (SRB fragments are the principal threat to the RTG during Phase l
of the mission.) The pad fire/explosion scenario also does not result in a
release of RTG fuel. Implosion of the payload bay doors will not cause the
doors to strike the RTG in an edge-on manner because there is not enough room
in the bay for the doors to orient in this fashion before striking the RTG.
Initial distortions of the fueled clads would be less than 10 percent, well
below that needed to breach the clads (25 percent). Subsequent impacts of
modules or bare clads on the steel and concrete surfaces of the launch pad or
on the surrounding land (sand) have been demonstrated in the Bare Clad Impact
tests and the Safety Verification Tests to be insufficient to cause fuel
release. Thus, Phase 0 was not considered further in the evaluation of
potential radiological consequences of accidents.
C.3.2 Phase | Sourc_ Terms
The Monte Carlo runs for the Phase I SRB case rupture scenario were
treated differently from the other accident scenarios. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)-supplied failure probabilities
(NASA Ig88b) indicated that the probability of a random SRB failure varied
over five different periods in Phase I: 0-10 seconds, 11-20 seconds, 21-70
seconds, 71-105 seconds, and 106-120 seconds.
The SRBs have essentially completed their burn by 119 seconds and can no
longer rupture because the SRB chamber pressure drops rapidly to zero by 120
seconds into the flight.
Within Phase I, the source terms for the SRB case rupture scenario were
developed by 100,000 Monte Carlo runs for each of the five remaining time
intervals. In addition, given the revisions to LASEP (i.e., LASEP 3) for the
Ulysses safety analysis which enable LASEP 3 to track the affected RTG
components, type of ground impact (e.g., steel, concrete, sand), and whether
or not a release would occur within a fireball, the individual source terms
were reported by location of release (i.e., fireball, ground-level, or in air)
and the altitude of the release.
Releases into the fireball are an important consideration because of the
potential for the fireball to vaporize and/or modify the particle sizes and
dispersion of the released plutonium dioxide (see Appendix B). Particle sizes
in the range of IO microns or less can be inhaled by humans and remain in lung
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tissue. Such particles are the principal source of human health consequences,
through the inhalation pathway.
The particle size distributions associated with these releases are based
on aeroshell module and fueled clad impact tests conducted at Los Alamos
National Laboratory (DOE IggOc). Based on the fueled clad crack sizes
calculated by LASEP 3, the particle size distributions were cut off at a
particle size equal to one-half the maximum crack size and then renormalized.
A more detailed discussion of the particle size considerations is
presented in Appendices D and H of the Accident Model Document (DOE Ig9of) and
Appendix D to the Nuclear Risk Analysis Document of the Final Safety Analysis
Report (DOE IggOg). The results of these analyses show that:
I. Stratification of the particles in an explosion plume is very rapid,
usually occurring within the first kilometer (.6 mi) of plume
movement after an explosion.
2. The vaporized PuOz is a significant component of dose (86 percent of
the short-term dose and 69 percent of the long-term dose).
3. The primary contributor to surface contamination ab°velth)/mU.S.Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) suggested 0.2 pC screening
level (EPA ]977) are particles in the I0 to ZO micron range.
C.3.3 Phases Z. 3. and 4 Source Terms
The source terms for Phases 2, 3, and 4 were derived by factoring the
probability of one or more of the GPHS modules impacting rock on the Earth's
surface into the analyses. In Phase 2 (T+128 seconds to T+532 seconds), an
accident leading to breakup of the Shuttle and payload during the period T+128
seconds to T+210 seconds will result in the RTG reaching the Earth's surface
intact. After T+210 seconds, the GPHS modules will be released from the RTG
by thermal failure of the RTG case prior to impact. During Phase 2, there are
only 5.5 seconds out of a total 404 seconds when the reentering RTG or its
modules can impact on the African Continent.
A Phase 3 accident causing breakup of the Shuttle and payload due to an
uncontrolled reentry results in thermal failure of the RTG case, with release
of the 18 GPHS modules. The modules will survive reentry to impact on either
land or ocean. The Phase 3 source term was developed utilizing the
distributions of ocean and land within the North-South latitude band where
impact could occur, and within the land category the distribution of
soil/water versus rock. Ocean and soil/water land impacts will not result in
a release of RTG fuel; however, a rock impact may.
In Phase 4, an IUS failure with subsequent reentry and breakup of the
spacecraft will cause release of the GPHS modules from the RTG due to thermal
failure of the RTG case. The footprint of the 18 GPHS modules is assumed to
be small compared with the major oceans and land masses, and large compared
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with the average rock area. Therefore, it is assumed that all the modules
either impact on water or on land, but that for land impact each module has an
independent probability of striking rock. Based upon the reentry analysis
performed for the Ulysses Final Safety Analysis Report (see DOE Iggof,
Appendix I), the GPHS modules will survive reentry intact to impact either
ocean or land. An ocean impact will not result in a source term; whereas, a
land impact on rock mayresult in fueled clad failure with a release of RTG
fuel. The resulting source term is the same as in Phase 3.
The numerical values of the source terms for Phases 2, 3, and 4 were
calculated as the expectation value of one or more modules hitting rock and
one or more clads releasing fuel, given land impact. Specifically in
Phases 2, _, and _h_ to_al probabilities of land impact are 6.16 x 10.5,
1.55 x 10 , and 10 TM, respectively. The subsequent expectation values
for the conditional probability of fuel release are 0.102 in Phase 2 and 0.129
in Phases 3 and 4.
Review of the data from the SVT test series indicates a basis for the
released material being contained within the graphite aeroshell and thus not
available for atmospheric transport. Nevertheless, both the FSAR and this EIS
adopt the conservative position that the releases in Phases 2, 3, and 4,
although small, are available for atmospheric transport.
C.4 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES METHODOLOGY
The evaluation of the radiological consequences of fuel releases from
postulated accidents include the following steps:
I. Identification of the postulated accident, fuel release probability,
and release location.
2. Source term characterization in terms of quantity, particle size
distribution, and volume distribution.
. Analysis of the dispersion of the released fuel in the environment to
determine concentrations in environmental media (i.e., air, soil, and
water) as functions of time and space.
J Analysis of the interaction of environmental radioactive
concentrations with people through inhalation, ingestion, and
external exposure pathways.
S. Evaluation of resulting radiological consequences in terms of maximum
individual and population doses and contaminated environmental media.
The average source terms derived from the accident modeling analyses and
used in the nuclear risk analysis of the FSAR are found in Table C-].
It should be noted that the Phase ] RSS destruct sc_pario analyses
yielded release probabilities on the order of 10.9 to ]0" (I in I trillion or
less) or about 1,000 or more times less probable than the SRB case rupture
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accident. In addition, the releases or source terms were of the same order of
magnitude. Thus, the RSS destruct scenario contributes only a small fraction
of the risk attributable to Phase 1 SRB failures and was not carried into the
risk analyses for the Ulysses mission.
The radiological consequences for the first stage ascent phase were
calculated using the EMERGE, LOPAR, and HIPAR computer models. Releases in
the troposphere (up to about 6.2 miles in altitude; i.e., reached at a Mission
Elapsed Time of about 60 seconds) are treated using EMERGE, and higher
altitude releases are treated using LOPAR for small particles (less than 10
microns in diameter) and HIPAR for large particles (greater than 10 microns in
diameter). EMERGE is a three dimensional Gaussian puff-trajectory model that
treats meteorology which varies in time and space (vertically) and accounts
for vertical plume configuration; particle-size-dependent transport,
deposition, and plume depletion; and sea-breeze recirculation in the vicinity
of KSC. HIPAR is a particle trajectory model which accounts for atmospheric
properties which affect the velocity of particle fall, specifically,
altitudinal variation in atmospheric conditions and the rotation of the Earth.
HIPAR utilizes a wind field that is a function of latitude, longitude, and
altitude. LOPAR is an empirical model derived from weapons testing data, and
accounts for worldwide circulation patterns and delayed fallout as a function
of latitude band. Both HIPAR and LOPAR interface with a worldwide demographic
data base to facilitate the estimation of radiological consequences. The
consequences for the remaining three mission phases were estimated using
average population densities from the worldwide demographic data base for the
affected area, and time-independent median meteorological conditions utilizing
the EMERGE model.
Key features and assumptions of the analysis are summarized below.
Details of the methodology are presented in the Nuclear Risk Analysis Document
of the Final Safety Analysis Report (DOE 1990g).
The average source terms with their particle size distributions are given
an initial spatial distribution appropriate to the conditions for release.
Releases in the launch area from surface impacts outside a fireball are given
an initial cloud diameter of 33 ft (10 m) at a height of 16 ft (5 m).
The fireball would have a diameter of about l,O00 ft and a mean duration
of 30 seconds. The fireball sphere would lift off the ground after about l
seconds, with the trailing stem lifting off the ground after about 10 seconds.
Material released into a fireball starting out at ground level is given a
distribution in which 80 percent of the material is in an elevated cloud and
20 percent is in a vertical stem reaching toward ground. (See Appendix B for
additional discussion of the fireball environment.)
The plume configuration resulting from liquid propellant explosions and
fire has been estimated based on results of high explosive field tests
involving both liquid and solid high explosives. The center release height
and the diameter of the stabilized cloud resulting from the explosion fireball
are correlated to the TNT equivalent yield of the explosion.
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Of the thermal energy associated with the complete combustion of liquid
propellants, it is estimated that 50 percent contributes to the thermal
buoyancy of the initial fireball. The resulting center release height and
diameter of the cloud were assumed to be representative of the base case for
launch pad accidents during the first 10 seconds (0-10 sec.) of Phase 1.
Launch area ground-level source terms result when fueled clads impact
hard surfaces at speeds above their fatlure thresholds or when previously
breached fueled clads impact any surface outside of the tnittal fireball.
Impact points would be distributed around the launch pad. All of these
distributed releases have been assumed to be at the launch pad with an initial
height of 16 ft (5 m) and an initial 33 ft (10 m) cloud diameter. Collective
(population) doses should not be significantly affected.
Due to the forward velocity of the vehicle beyond T+IO seconds, the
release is distributed in a "puff," the diameter of which is equal to the
distance travelled by the vehicle in 1 second, determined by the velocity of
the vehicle at the release altitude.
The atmospheric dispersion of the source term material with the initial
cloud specifications determined, as described in the preceding paragraphs, is
then calculated, using models described below.
Meteorology for the launch period (October 5 - 23) reflects the complex
coastal meteorology of the KSC launch area. Historical meteorological data
were examined to provide 40 sets of actual sequential data representative of
the launch window. Each set consisted of ]5-minute averages of surface wind
speeds and direction, temperature lapse rate, and wind variability over the
12-hour period of T-2 hours to T+IO hours. The radiological consequences were
the mean values resulting from dispersion calculations using average source
terms, calculated for all 40 meteorological conditions, with the set of
pathway parameters and assumptions representing central estimates, to define
the Base Case consequences for Phase 1. For Phases 2, 3, and 4, the
calculations used an average source term and time independent meteorology
representative of the average condition for the Base Case.
Radiation doses to populations are calculated based on environmental
concentrations. The dose conversion factors have been derived using a model
published by the International Commission on Radiological Protection in
ICRP-30 (ICRP 1978).
The features of the analyses significant to the magnitude of the results
reported here are:
I. The fuel remains in the insoluble PuOz form in the environment.
2. Particle size distributions are unchanged following the accident
except for the effects of vaporization in fireballs.
3. The initial plume configuration (cloud size, height) of ground-level
and elevated releases is important to the results.
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. Long-term doses contain a component due to food ingestion. In other
words, no credit was taken for dose reduction measures, such as
sheltering, cleanup operations, or food restrictions.
C.5 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCE RESULTS
The results of the radiological consequence analysis for the Base Case
are summarized in Table C-2.
The types of radiological consequences include:
I. The "short-term" radiation dose resulting from the initial exposure
and dose from continuing exposure to materials in the environment over
an extended period following release. Long-term doses include those
to KSC workers and to offsite KSC and worldwide populations due to
inhalation of resuspended material and ingestion of contaminated food
over a 50-year period. The doses are 50-year dose commitments
resulting from the extended retention of material in the body.
2. Estimates of land- and water-surface areas contaminated by deposition
of radioactivity above certain levels. It should be noted that the
estimates presented here are for illustrative purposes. In the event
of an accident, real-time estimates of wind transport and deposition
would use meteorological_conditions current at that time.
This information is presented in the following terms:
I. Maximum Individual Dose. The maximum individual dose commitment which
an individual could receive. For launch area accidents (mission phase
I), this estimate takes account of the location of launch site
visitors and workers and local demographics. For succeeding phases,
average population distributions are used. Table C-3 provides a list
of radiological doses commonly received in everyday life.
2. Collective (or Population) Dose (i.e., the sum of all doses to exposed
individuals). This accounts for the fact that as the released
material is transported by the atmosphere, in general its
concentration decreases but the area of deposition and exposed
population increases. The collective dose thus accounts for the
number of people exposed and their level of exposure and is reported
in terms of person-rems.
The term "de minimis" refers to a dose level below which values could
be excluded from assessments of collective dose as they contribute
negligible individual risk. In this EIS, collective doses are
calculated without reference to a de minimis value.
(It should be noted that the Maximum Individual Dose and the Total
Collective Dose are committed effective dose equivalents.
Specifically, "committed" means that the dose from uptake from the
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TABLE C-3. AVERAGE ANNUAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT OF IONIZING
RADIATIONS TO A MEMBER OF THE U.S. POPULATION
Source
Dose Eauiwl_nt a
mrem
Effective Dose EQuivalent
mrem % of Total
Natural_
Radon _ 2,400 200 55
Cosmic 27 27 8.0
Terrestrial 28 28 8.0
Internal 39 39 11
Subtotal--Natural -- 300 82
Man-Made
Medical
X-ray diagnosis 39 3g 11
Nuclear medicine 14 14 4.0
Consumer Products 10 10 3.0
Other
Occupational 0.9 <I <0.3
Nuclear fuel cycle <1.0 <I <0.03
Fallout <1.0 <I <0.03
Miscellaneous c <I.O <I <0.03
Subtotal--Man-Made -- 63 18
Total Natural and
Man-Made -- 360 100
a
b
C
Source: adapted from Nat. Res. Coun. 1990
To soft tissues.
Dose equivalent to bronchi from radon daughter products. The assumed
weighting factor for the effective dose equivalent relative to whole-body
exposure is 0.08.
Department of Energy facilities, smelters, transportation, etc.
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.radioactive material into the body is accounted for over a 50-year
residence time in the body. "Dose equivalent" means the dose to (a)
specific organ(s). Effective means that the "dose equivalent" to
(a) specific organ(s) is then converted to the equivalent of a dose
delivered to the whole body.
Estimates of the dry land area affected within which the annual dose
level would exceed I0, 25, and IO0 mrem per year during the first
year following plume passage, assuming no cleanup or other remedial
activities have taken place.
4. Land areas on whic_ initial deposition would exceed the screening
level of 0.2 _i/m _ suggested by the EPA.
For the purposes of comparing the accident consequences and the release
probabilities from a Ulysses mission accident as estimated in the FSAR (DOE
19gOe, DOE Iggof, DOE IggOg), a list of common accident causes, numbers of
fatalities, and the chances of an individual in the U.S. population succumbing
to those causes is provided in Table C-4.
C-6 INTEGRATED MISSION RISK ANALYSIS
C.6.] Aooroach
The radiological consequences outlined in Table C-2 were based on
averages.
Each of the average and best estimate parameter values used to calculate
the consequences in Table C-2, was drawn from a group or population of
possible parameter values. It follows then, that each of the parameters could
vary, and as a result, the radiological consequences could vary depending upon
which value (other than the mean or best estimate) is chosen from the various
populations of values. For example, the 0-I0 second LASEP 3 run resulted in
230 trials that had a release (see Appendix D, Table D-15 of DOE 1990f). The
source terms used in the calculation of the 14.1 person-rem collective dose in
Table C-2, was the mean over those 230 trials. The source term value that
could be used to determine collective dose, however, could be any of the other
values found in those 230 trials, ranging from the lowest source term to the
highest source term. In other words, the source term value used in the
calculation could be any value within that range. The same is true for all
the other parameters (meteorological and exposure pathway) used in the
calculation of collective dose.
In addition to a range of possible values for each of the parameters
used to calculate collective dose, each of those populations of values also
has another characteristtc--a probability distribution. In other words, each
value in the range has a probability of occurring. The LASEP 3 source term
population for the 0-10 second subphase, for example, has a probability
C-14
TABLEC-4. CALCULATEDINDIVIDUALRISK OFFATALITYBY VARIOUSCAUSESa
Accident Type
Numberof
Fatalities
for 1987
Approximate
Individual Risk
Per Year c
Motor Vehicle
Falls
Drowning
Fires and Flames
Poison
Water Transport
Air Travel
Manufacturing d
Railway
Electrocution
Lightning
Tornadoes b
Hurricanes b
Suicide
Homicide and Legal Intervention
(Executions)
Guns, Firearms, and Explosives
Suffocation
All Accidents
Diseases
48,290
11,733
4,360
4,710
5,315
949
1,263
1,200
624
760
99
114 b
46b
30,796
21,103
1,656
3,688
95,020
1,993,381
2 x I0"4
5 x I0s
2 x I05
2 x I0"s
2 x 10s
4 x I06
5 x I06
5 x 10"6
2.5 x 10"6
3 x 10 "6
4 x 10 "z
5 x 10-7
2 x 10 "7
1.2 x 10.4
9 x 10 5
7 x 10 -6
1.5 x 10 .5
4 x 10 .4
8 X 10 .3
ALL CAUSES 2,123,323 9 x 10 .3
" USDHHS 1989.
b 1946 to 1984 average.
c Fatalities/Total Population. (USBC 1988).
d Source USBC 1986.
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distribution that is directly determined by the LASEP 3 run. Specifically,
each possible source term value within the range of values established by that
run, has a probability of occurring.
The function of the integrated risk assessment is to evaluate the
effects of the variability in each of the parameters used to calculate the
Base Case consequences. In other words, what is the possible array of
outcomes (i.e, consequences) that could occur if the value of each of the
parameters affecting the outcome were something other than the mean or best
estimate values used in the Base Case.
The approach to assessing the effects of this variability was performed
in a stepwlse fashion:
(I) First, the areas where variability exists within each of the three
major factors (source terms, meteorology, exposure pathways), and
which affect the consequences (i.e. collective dose, health effects,
area contaminated), were identified, (see Section 4.0 and
Appendix A - Section A.5 of DOE 1990g for details). The areas of
variability thus identified were:
• Accident scenario
Accident environment
Accident probability
• Release characterization
- Conditional source term probability
- Source term
- Source term modifiers
- Particle size distribution
- Particle size distribution modifiers
- Initial cloud dimensions
- Vertical source term distribution
- Release location
• Meteorological conditions
- Atmospheric stability
- Wind speed and direction
- Mixing height
- Sea-breeze recirculation
- Fumigation
- Space and time variation
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• Exposure pathway parameters
Population distribution
Resuspension factor
Deposition velocity
Vegetable ingestion
Protective action
• Radiation doses and health effects
Internal dose factors
Health effects estimator.
(2) Second, a range was established for the variability of each of the
parameters affecting radiological consequences, and the probability
distribution of the values within the range was determined. The
ranges were established either from actual data, as in the case of
the Phase I LASEP 3 source term results and the results from
transport modeling with EMERGE, or from specific sensitivity
analyses. Sensitivity analyses were performed on the effect of
particle size distribution, particle size modifiers, specifically
agglomeration and vaporization, plume drift, internal dose factors,
resuspension factor and vegetable dose pathway. Additional details
can be found in Appendix A, Section A.5 of Volume Ill of the FSAR
(DOE IggOg). The probability distributions were determined either
from actual data (LASEP 3 source terms and EMERGE modeling), from
the sensitivity analyses, or in the case of some parameters by
applying one of two commonly used probability distributions. If all
values with a range are considered equally probable, then what is
known as a "flat top" distribution was used for that parameter. If
a "best estimate" value was determined, then the range in
variability was represented as a ±2 o of a normal or log-normal
distribution, with the "best estimate" treated as an arithmetic or
geometric mean, respectively.
In applying the results of sensitivity analyses, it was recognized
that the sensitivity case represented a small sample of a larger
population. Thus the parameter range established for use in the
integrated risk analysis was usually larger than that indicated by
the sensitivity analysis. The ranges and probability distributions
for each area of variability examined in the integrated risk
assessment are provided in Tables C-5, C-6, and C-7.
(3) Third, the functional relationships among all of the variable
parameters as they affect the radiological consequences, were
determined from earlier sensitivity studies.
These relationships are most often additive or multiplicative as
determined by sensitivity analyses.
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(4) Lastly, the probability distributions of all the variable parameters
were combined using a Monte Carlo approach, to determine the
probability distribution of the radiological consequences (i.e.,
collective dose, health effects, area contaminated and risk). The
SPASM Monte Carlo computer code was used for this final step. SPASM
is a general use simulation program designed to test the effects of
parameter variability on a systems model. A total of 15,000 trials
were performed for each phase and/or subphase to develop the overall
probability distribution of the consequences reflecting the
variabilities determined for the individual parameters.
The variability in accident environments were also accounted for in the
accident modeling (DOE 19gof). The accident environments specified in the
Shuttle Data Book (NASA Ig88b), were presented as distributions of conditions
(e.g., explosion overpressure; SRB fragment velocities). The distributions
were factored into the accident modeling (DOE Iggof), and are thus reflected
in the source term distributions provided for the nuclear risk assessment
portion of the FSAR (DOE 1990g).
C.6.2 Results
The SPASM runs worked in essentially the following manner:
(a) The ranges and probability distributions for each of the source term
parameters, meteorological conditions and exposure pathways
parameters affecting the radiological consequences of a given
phase/subphase accident release were inputted to SPASM;
(b) The SPASM code WAS run for 15,000 trials for that phase/subphase,
with each trial randomly selecting a value for each parameter from
that parameter's range and probability distribution;
(c) Each trial produced, for example, the collective dose that resulted
from using the randomly selected parameter values; a resulting
health effect was calculated using the randomly selected health
effects factor; and an area of contamination was determined
reflecting the randomly selected meteorological parameters.
The 15,000 SPASM trials for each of the accident release scenarios
thus produced the range of possible outcomes (radiological
consequences) Associated with the variability in all of the source
term, meteorological and exposure pathway parameters used in the
Base Case analysis. In other words, SPASM produced new populations
of consequence outcomes, with each population consisting of 15,000
outcomes (i.e., 15,000 possible collective doses; 15,000 possible
health effects outcomes; etc.). The results are presented in the
cumulative complementary distribution functions and the tabular data
that follows.
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Table C-8 presents the mission risk, by phase/subphase, calculated
on the basis of the phase/subphase SPASM runs. In general, risk of
an outcome is defined as the expectation value of that outcome.
Here risk is applied to health effects. The phase/subphase risks
provided in Table C-8 are based upon the mean of the health effects
distribution for each phase/subphase, times the total probability of
release for each phase/subphase. The total probabilities of release
noted in Table C-8 reflect the updated NASA initiating accident
probabilities provided to DOE in April of ]ggo. The effect of the
updated NASA initiating accident probabilities was to increase
mission risk by a factor of 3.Z compared with the FSAR (DOE 1990g).
This is due primarily to the increase in the SRB case rupture
initiating accident probability, (see Appendix B; Table B-2).
The results of the 15,000 SPASM trials for each phase/subphase were then
transformed into a Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of
health effects consequences. The results were then plotted as shown in
Figures C-2 through C-9. These plots show the total probability that a given
level of health effects consequences are equal to or greater than the value
indicated on the horizontal or X-axis.
These plots are derived from the SPASM run for each phase/subphase as
follows:
(a) When SPASM randomly selects a value for a given parameter from the
range of values for that parameter, the value selected also has a
probability of occurring associated with it as determined by the
probability distribution for the parameter;
(b) SPASM, once it has randomly selected a value for each of the
parameters being examined, generates the resulting value of the
radiological consequence. The consequence value is generated using
the functional relationships (e.g., additive, multiplicative, etc.)
by which the consequence is calculated.
(c) SPASM does the same thing for the probability associated with each
of the randomly selected parameter values, generating the
probability of that consequence by adding, multiplying, etc. the
probabilities of each randomly selected parameter value to arrive at
what is called the cumulative probability of the consequence.
Thus, each SPASM trial results in two numbers for each consequence
type--a numerical value of the consequence, and the associated cumulative
probability of that value. The 15,000 data sets thus generated by a SPASM run
are used to develop the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function plots.
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FIGURE C-5. COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION
OF HEALTH EFFECTS CONSEQUENCE, 71-105 SECONDS
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FIGURE C-7. COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION
OF HEALTH EFFECTS CONSEQUENCE DURING PHASE 2
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FIGURE C-8. COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION
OF HEALTH EFFECTS CONSEQUENCE DURING PHASE 3
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FIGURE C-9. COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION
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Figure C-lO shows all of the phase/subphase Complementary Cumulative
Distribution Functions plotted together. Figure C-I1 is the plot of the
overall mission (Phases ]-4 inclusive) Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Function for the updated risk analysis compared with that generated from the
FSAR analysis.
Following the DOE update of the safety analysis, the integrated risk
assessment was performed to extract additional parameters (maximum individual
dose, collective dose, land contamination) not explicitly displayed in the
FSAR but of interest in an environmental assessment. Results are presented in
Tables c-g through C-17. Tables 4-4, 4-5, and 4-7 of Chapter 4 summarize the
findings. The assessment focuses principally on the mean values and cites the
9gth percentile values as representative of a "maximum case."
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TABLE C-13. ULYSSES MISSION SUMMARY OF RISK
Phase
Time
Period
(sec)
Risk
Mean
2
3
4
0-10
11-20
21-70
71-105
106-120
1.24 x 10.7
7.92 x 10.9
4.98 x 10"I°
2.98 x I0"e
1.95 x 10.6
9.61 x 10"1°
1.17 x 10.8
1.25 x 10.7
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APPENDIX D
DEVELOPMENT OF PHASE I SOURCE TERMS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
The purpose of this appendix is to explain the detailed derivation of the source
terms presented in the Ulysses FSAR Vol. II. The Accident Model Document of the
FSAR (DOE 19gof, Book I) presents the Phase I source terms and associated release
probabilities in two different ways. The aim here is to trace the relationship
between the two forms of presentation. Table 2-] on page Z-6 presents the
average source terms for each of the five subphases. These average source terms
are presented for each of three release locations that affect the transport
pathways to people and the environment:
• Releases in the fireball (possible only in the 0-10 sec. subphase)
e Releases at ground-level (outside the fireball)
• Releases at some altitude above the Earth.
The average source terms in Table 2-I are the averages taken over all of the
Monte Carlo trials for each subphase, where a release occurs. For example, in
the 0-]0 sec. subphase, 230 trials resulted in a release (see Table D-IS, p. D-gg
of Vol. II, Book 2), thus the average fireball and ground-level source terms
presented for these two release locations in Table 2-I were derived by dividing
the sum of all fireball releases by230, and the sum of all ground-level releases
not in the fireball by Z30. The source terms presented in Table 2-] are the
average source terms carried over into the Nuclear Risk Analysis Document, Vol.
Ill, Book I (see Table 3-I).
From Table 0-15, it can be determined that the average source terms for the
remaining subphases were based upon:
II - 20 sec.:
21 - 70 sec.:
71 - 104 sec.:
lOS - 120 sec.:
233 trials with a release
66 trials with a release
176 trials with a release
1,328 trials with a release
The probability of release presented in Table Z-] for each subp_ase is the
product of the accident (SRB Case Rupture) probability (1.02 x ]0"=) found on
Figure 3-I] on page 3-60, times the conditional probability (i.e., weighting
factor) that the case rupture, if it occurred, would occur in that particular
subphase (see Table 3-6 for the conditional probabilities bysubphase), times the
probability of a release, if such an accident occurs, as determined by the
subphase LASEP3 run. Again, using the 0-10 sec. subphase as an example:
• SRB Case Rupture = 1.02 x 10.3
• Conditional probability that a case rupture, if it occurred, would
occur in the O-IO sec. subphase = 0.5
D-!
• Probability of Release from the O-IO s,c. LASEP3run = 230 trials with
releases out of 100,000 trials, or 230 / I00,000 = 0.0023.
The release probability for the 0-10 sec subphase is thus:
[1.02 x 10 "3] x 0.5 x 0.0023 = 1.17 x 10.6 or 1.2 x 10 .6 rounded
The average source terms and the subphase probabilities thus derived for Table
2-I, are those found in the Nuclear Risk Analysis Document (Vol. Ill, Book I) in
Table 3-I as "Conditional Probabilities."
The second way average source terms and release probabilities are presented in
Vol. II, Book I can be found in Tables 3-6 and 3-7 on pages 3-62 and 3-63. These
average source terms are the source terms by release mechanism as opposed to
location. There are 7 possible release mechanisms:
• SRB fragment impact; release in air
• impact of GPHS on: steel, concrete, sand
• impact of Fueled Clad on: steel, concrete, sand.
The averages for each of these 7 possible mechanisms were computed (where they
occurred) on the basis of only the number of trials within a Monte Carlo run
where a release occurred for the given mechanism. For example, within the 230
trials showing a release for the 0-10 s,c. subphase, a release in air occurred
in 114 of those trials. The average air release shown in Table 3-6 was thus
based on dividing the sum of all air releases by 114.
The probabilities for each average source term presented in Tables 3-6 and 3-7
were developed by multiplying the initiating probability for a SRB Case Rupture
accident (1.02 x I0"*; see Figure 3-11 on page 3-60) times the conditional
probability (i.e., the weighting factor) of a release within each subphase (see
Table 3-6, page 3-62), time the probability of release by the given mechanism as
determined from the LASEP3 run. For example, to develop the release probability
found in Table 3-6 for an air release in the 0-10 sec. subphase:
[1.02 x 10.3 ] x 0.5 x [114 / 100,000] - 5.8 x 10 "T
EXAMPLE:
To develop the fireball source term for the 0-I0 sec. subphase found in Table
2-I, the following process can be followed.
a.
Refer to Table 3-6 for the 0-10 sec. average air release. All air
releases in the first 10 seconds of Phase I are assumed to occur in the
fireball.
be Refer to Table 3-7 for the remaining 0-10 sec. average releases that occur
in the fireball. (Note that under "Fueled Clad Impacts', the 0-10 sec.
impact on steel should be coded as within the fireball. This is a
D-2
C.
d,
eo
typographical error.) All of the components of the 0-10 sec. average
Ci (114 trials)
1,340 Ci ( 7 trials)
1,510 Ci ( 3 trials)
0.843 Ci ( 8 trials)
0.0217 Ci ( I trial)
fireball release thus become:
• Air: 5.64
• GPHS (Steel):
• FC (Steel):
• FC (Concrete):
• FC (Sand):
Refer to Table D-15 for the total number of trials with a release for the
0-10 sec. subphase (i.e., 230 trials showed a release).
Reconstruct the sum on which each of the average fireball source term
components is based as follows:
5.64 Ci x 114 trials - 642.96 Ci Sum
1,340 Ci x 7 trials - 9,380 Ci Sum
1,510 Ci x 3 trials - 4,530 Ci Sum
0.842 Ci x 8 trials - 6.74 Ci Sum
0.0217 Ci x I trial - 0.0217 Ci Sum
Add the reconstructed sums and divide by the total number of trials for
the 0-10 sec. subphase in which a release occurred.
14,559.72 Ci Total Sum / 230 trials - 63.4 Ci Average Fireball Release
D-3
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APPENDIX E
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS
E.I INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a Notice of
Availability for the Ulysses mission (Tier 2) Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (DEIS) in the Federal Register on February 23, 1990. The 45-day public
review and comment period closed on April g, 1990. Timely comments were received
from the Federal, state, and local organizations and individuals listed in
Table E-I.
This Appendix provides specific responses to the comments received from
the individuals and organizations listed in Table E-I. Copies of the comment
letters are presented in the following pages. The relevant comments are marked
and numbered for identification along with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA's) response to each comment. Where changes in the text
were appropriate, such changes were noted.
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NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, DC,
20546
Attachment 1
ReDly to Ann of S L May ii, 1990
Mr. Daniel Hirsch
President
Committee to Bridge the Gap
1637 Butler Avenue #203
Los Angeles, CA 90025
Dear Mr. Hirsch:
This letter responds to yours of April 24, 1990 (received on
April 30, 1990) which stated your concerns regarding NASA
providing you documents cited as references in the draft
environmental impact statement for the Ulysses mission (Tier-2).
In order of the points you raised:
. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Ulysses
mission was published by the Department of Energy (DOE) on
March 14, 1990. You may obtain a copy by contacting Dr. A.
T. Clark, Operations Manager, Office of Special Applications
(NE-53) at DoE Headquarters or by calling (301) 353-4021.
Dr. Clark will provide copies as long as his supply will
permit. The FSAR is also available from the National
Technical Information Service (NTIS) which is the public
source of record for such government reports.
The DoE has distributed the FSAR to many repositories. In
particular, it will be available for review at all of the
NASA sites at which the Ulysses Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) will be available.
, The NASA regulation at 14 CFR 1216.310(b) provides for
making available to the public the draft and final EIS and
the key underlying documents on which the EIS is based. In
the case of the Ulysses mission DEIS (Tier-2), the key
underlying document was the DoE's Safety Status Report.
That document was available at information locations, such
as NASA field Centers, NASA Headquarters, and the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. Similarly, the FSAR will be
available at those installations along with the FEIS.
J
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Further the regulation provides that supporting
documentation shall be available for public review and
copying in the office of the responsible Headquarters
official or a suitable designee. While we are still in the
process of preparing the FEIS, the complete set of
references to which you allude is in the hands of our
consultants, Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC), at Tysons Corners, Virginia. A complete set of
those references will be forwarded to my office and
available for review when the FEIS is completed• Requests
for any specific non-NASA document cited in the references
should be directed to the agency or entity that originated
the document. Requests for a specific NASA document may be
directed to my office.
The NASA regulation is based upon the CEQ regulations which
require a concise, clear, and to the point EIS, which need
not be encyclopedic (see 40 CFR 1502.7); and the EIS's
efficient and economic distribution (see 40 CFR 1502.19).
Nothing in the NASA or CEQ regulations require that all
references cited in a reference appendix (which is
comparable to a bibliography) be made available by NASA.
• NASA would face an impractical and undue burden in seeking
to assist all parties, such as your organization, to obtain
all of the documents cited in the DEIS reference appendix
beyond those key documents (such as the Safety Status
Report) which are provided for inspection along with the
DEIS. NASA mails out dozens of copies of its DEIS to
agencies, organizations, and individuals that we have reason
to believe would be interested in receiving the DEIS. It is
not appropriate or practical to assist all such recipients
to obtain all of the cited reference documents listed in the
reference appendix• If we assisted one, we would have to
offer the same assistance to all. This would obviously be
contrary to the efficient and economical administration of
the EIS process. Rather NASA will make publicly available a
complete set of references as stated above.
• As indicated above, the FSAR is available now for your
review -- for instance, at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
The DEIS indicated that it was based on the Safety Status
Report (SSR) and that the FEIS would be based on the FSAR.
The DEIS was based upon the most current information
available at the time of its publication. Upon completion
of the FEIS there will be a 30 day waiting period,
£-88
3following public notice of the availability of the FEIS,
prior to NASA's reaching its decision and filing the record
of decision. I believe that you will find that the FEIS
takes account of all of your concerns, and, of course, you
are welcome to comment on the FEIS during the 30-day period.
Thank you very much for your interest in the Ulysses mission.
Sincerely,
/
Dudley G/McConnell
Deputy Director (Advanced Programs)
cc:
DoE NE-53/Dr. A. T. Clark, Jr.
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APPENDIX F
STATE AND FEDERAL COORDINATION

APPENDIX F
STATE AND FEDERAL COORDINATION
Appendix F documents NASA's Federal and State coordination regarding the
environmental analysis of the Ulysses mission. This coordination particularly
involves the State of Florida, site of the action, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which oversees Federal environmental analyses, and
the U.S. Air Force which operates the Eastern Test Range at which Shuttle
launches occur. Thus, these communications are distinct from the general
comment activity.
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APPENDIX G
UPDATE OF ULYSSES FSAR RESULTS

Update of Ulysses FSAR Results
Using Updated NASA Probabilities
1.0 Introduction
The mission risk results reported in the Ulysses FSAR issued on March 14, 1990,
were based on initiating accident probabilities the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) provided to the Department of Energy (DOE) on July
13, 1988. These probabilities were provided in terms of ranges; the geometric
mean of these ranges were used in the development and presentation of the results
in the FSAR for source terms, radiological consequences and risks.
Subsequent to the issuance of the FSAR, DOE received a revised set of
probabilities from NASA. These probabilities were presented in terms of
distributions for each initiating accident and characterized by a mean and
cumulative percentile values. NASA recommended that DOE use the updated
probabilities to update the Ulysses FSAR results. Accordingly, at the request
of DOE this letter report has been prepared to evaluate the changes in the
Ulysses FSAR results when the updated mean probabilities are used.
2.0 Initiatinq Accident and Total Fuel Release Probabilities
A comparison of the two sets of initiating accident probabilities for all
accident scenarios considered in the FSAR is presented in Table I. The accident
analysis in the FSAR determined that onJy a subset of the scenarios would lead
to source terms. For this subset of accident scenarios, the total fuel release
probabilities by mission phase and sub-phase are shown in Table 2. As in the
FSAR, the Range Safety Destruct scenario has not been included due to its low
probability and small contribution to risk.
It should be noted that aside from the total fuel release probabilities, the base
case source terms and radiological consequences reported in the FSAR (Executive
Summary, Tables 3-2 and 3-3, and Volume Ill, Book i, Tables 3-i and 3-2) remain
unchanged.
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3.0 Risk Analysis Results
The FSAR analyses produced probability distributions of radiological consequences
for accident scenarios leading to source terms. These results were presented by
figures displaying complementary cumulative distributions functions (CCDFs) of
consequences. (See the FSAR, Executive Summary, page 3-9, and Volume III, Book
I, Figures 4-I through 4-9.) The plotted results of the CCDFs show the total
probability (including initiating accident and conditional fuel release
probabilities) that consequences (calculated health effects) would be equal to
or greater than the indicated value.
The CCDFs have been regenerated taking into account the updated NASA mean
probabilities. Figures I through 5 show the CCDF for subphases of Mission Phase
I. Figures 6 through 8 show the CCDFs for Mission Phases 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. Figure I0 shows all the phase and sub-phase revised mean value
CCDFs plotted together. A comparison of the overall mission CCDF based on the
mean values for the FSAR and revised probabilities is shown in Figure I0.
The total risk associated with each of the mission phases or sub-phases is equal
to the product of total release probability and the mean value of calculated
health effects. Table 3 shows these values using both sets of probabilities.
4.0 Conclusions
The conclusion of this evaluation is that the mean value of the overall mission
risk increases by a factor of 3.4 when the updated rather than the FSAR
probabilities are used. This is due primarily to the increase in the SRB case
rupture probability. However, the resulting risk is still well within the bounds
of normally acceptable risks.
Phase
Phase
Phase
Phase
Phase
Ulysses
0
Pad Fire/Explosion
Table i
Mission Accident Probabilities
Mean Accident Probabilities
FSAR Updated
1.79xi0 "4 2.91xi0 "3
1
Tower Impact 2.06xi0 -4 1.89xi0 -4
SRB Loss of Thrust 2.49xi0 "3 2.17xi0 -3
SRB No Ignitition 7,5gxlO -5 8.65xi0 "5
SRB Case Burst 1.02xlO "3 2.92xi0 -3
Range Destruct 1.51xlO -6 1.70xlO -6
Aft. Compartment 3.95xi0 "4 3 54xi0 "3
Explosion
Vehicle Breakup 8.98xi0 "5 2.20xi0 -4
Crash Landing 3.79xi0 "6 3.79xi0 "6
Ocean Ditch 7.21xi0 "5 7.21xi0 "5
2
Vehicle Breakup 1.51xi0 -3
8.0xlO -6Crash Landing 8.85xi0 "6 5'65xi0-3
Ocean Ditch 1.68xi0 "4 1.59xi0 "4
3
On Orbit Failure
4
Reentry
1.58xi0 "4 5.75xi0 -4
6.16xi0 "3 6.16x10 -3
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ABSTRACT
LEAD AGENCY:
COOPERATING AGENCY:
FOR INFORMATION CONTACT:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546
U.S. Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
Dr. Dudley G. McConnell
NASA Headquarters
Code SL
Washington, DC 20546
(202) 453-1587
DATE: June ]990
This Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) addresses the
environmental impacts which may be caused by the implementation of the Ulysses
mission, a space flight mission to observe the polar regions of the Sun. The
proposed action is completion of preparation and operation of the Ulysses
spacecraft, including its planned launch at the earliest available launch
opportunity on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle in October 1990
or in the backup opportunity in November 1991. The alternative is canceling
further work on the mission.
The Tier I EIS_included a delay alternative which considered
the Titan IV launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991
or later. This alternative was further evaluated and eliminated from
consideration when, in November 1988, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the_
Titan IV, notified t)._ ;_.._ G._:,I ,.......+,......_--_............,J. •._r_-.• _(_IASA_!._-
that it could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity
because of high priority Department of Defense requirements._,
M_S_ _ notlfi_d t_:t : Titan IV cc'_Id _ct _c _v_il_I: '_nti! _99_.
I_E_B(AAIIAnflv_ NASA tprmina_ad all mJ_¢Jnn nl*nn;nO Cn_ +ka Tt_n IV a© a
_rkllh lalmrh v_hicl_ for thp Imlvce=e .J_;^- c .... 4_ - T_/_-- T. ....
modiflcations to _be basic Titan IV launrh _on_ur:tic= _ft_.a dect_i_ _s
vv uo= _.© _ t_a. si. inereruret Ifl_U[Tl_llll& &lllll_ WUUIU U_ a¥lll4Ul_ LO
u.: = ,it:..... _,,,c,e ,n n_v_u_r ,..., ....s, the Titan IV launch vehicle is
no longer a feasible alternative to the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (lUS)/Payload
Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) for the November 1991 launch opportunity.
-9_only launch configuration available forJ._]j_h-_Ft99U_oi _--
PAN-S

Idel_d provide no new _ information and is
_eliminated from ruin. The ]991_ts a
_ontin._-gP-oI}p_nity due to the short launch period available tn_990:_-
The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are
associated with normal launch vehicle operation and are treated _;_-_.,,hl.-,..r -.i_h=d- _.E_H_J_
_.+_..1 r-.._ ...... _.1 PO1;_y Act [NLPA) documents on the Snu_tie (_A$_ !_7-8)
and the Kennedy Snac_ C_nf_ IMAeA ......
. . __. , ...... 1_7_), .,,J _a the KSC [,,._,o,_,_atal
___ ...... nnrnm_nt (NASA 19A_ +k- p.1,, ..........
(N .. _....... ;l=u Tier 2 Ei$ (HASA IV-T81_.
The environmental impacts of normal Shuttle launches have been addressed
in existing NEPA documentation and are briefly summarized in Chapter 4. These
impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch pad, except for
temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and occasional sonic boom
effects near the landing site. These effects l_judged insufficient to
preclude Shuttle launches. ;
There could also be environmental impacts associated with the accidental
release of radiological material during launch, deployment, or interplanetary
trajectory injection of the Ulysses spacecraft. Intensive analysis indicates
that the probability of release is small._ZIbe _-est prob:b!¢ rc!c;;a ccc';r_
J:lur_n 9 M_ssinn ....... , ,,,_=,v ........ _ .._ .... :# ,,,_,u,,, wmcn a _u_o,
_probability of r_l_a_e of ] in 4.670.{_x_4 x )O'). Even !n thc r_re eYent of
a release, comn_'hen_!vc aaal_is_lcaCes Cha¢ Che ch<n_=s 6F advar;¢ health
or environmmnt_l r^_se_ue_c._c'_.__rc_ote. No _ccid_t :c:_=rla In aj_ pha,e
of th_s mlsslnn __hil_tv !eve! eF ! ........,,,,,u,,t_ x _u ;, wou)o
q aad _a"_']% Ld_ity.
- ""There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative; however,
the U.S. Government and the European Space Agency would suffer adverse fiscal
and programmatic impacts if this alternative were adopted. The scientific
benefits of the mission would be delayed and possibly lost. There could be
significant impacts on the ability of the U.S. to negotiate international
agreements for cooperative space activities.
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